Decompositions of two player games: potential, zero-sum, and stable games

We introduce several methods of decomposition for two player normal form games. Viewing the set of all games as a vector space, we exhibit explicit orthonormal bases for the subspaces of potential games, zero-sum games, and their orthogonal complements which we call anti-potential games and anti-zero-sum games, respectively. Perhaps surprisingly, every anti-potential game comes either from the Rock-Paper-Scissors type games (in the case of symmetric games) or from the Matching Pennies type games (in the case of asymmetric games). Using these decompositions, we prove old (and some new) cycle criteria for potential and zero-sum games (as orthogonality relations between subspaces). We illustrate the usefulness of our decomposition by (a) analyzing the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors game, (b) completely characterizing the set of all null-stable games, (c) providing a large class of strict stable games, (d) relating the game decomposition to the decomposition of vector fields for the replicator equations, (e) constructing Lyapunov functions for some replicator dynamics, and (f) constructing Zeeman games -games with an interior asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium and a pure strategy ESS

Signaling equilibria for dynamic LQG games with asymmetric information

We consider a finite horizon dynamic game with two players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as independent, controlled linear Gaussian processes and players incur quadratic instantaneous costs. This forms a dynamic linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) game with asymmetric information. We show that under certain conditions, players' strategies that are linear in their private types, together with Gaussian beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. Furthermore, it is shown that this is a signaling equilibrium due to the fact that future beliefs on players' types are affected by the equilibrium strategies. We provide a backward-forward algorithm to find the PBE. Each step of the backward algorithm reduces to solving an algebraic matrix equation for every possible realization of the state estimate covariance matrix. The forward algorithm consists of Kalman filter recursions, where state estimate covariance matrices depend on equilibrium strategies

The Symmetric Sugeno Integral

We propose an extension of the Sugeno integral for negative numbers, in the spirit of the symmetric extension of Choquet integral, also called \Sipos\ integral. Our framework is purely ordinal, since the Sugeno integral has its interest when the underlying structure is ordinal. We begin by defining negative numbers on a linearly ordered set, and we endow this new structure with a suitable algebra, very close to the ring of real numbers. In a second step, we introduce the Möbius transform on this new structure. Lastly, we define the symmetric Sugeno integral, and show its similarity with the symmetric Choquet integral.

On the Hardness of Signaling

There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information available to players in the game. Lurking beneath this literature is a fundamental, yet largely unexplored, algorithmic question: how should a "market maker" who is privy to additional information, and equipped with a specified objective, inform the players in the game? This is an informational analogue of the mechanism design question, and views the information structure of a game as a mathematical object to be designed, rather than an exogenous variable. We initiate a complexity-theoretic examination of the design of optimal information structures in general Bayesian games, a task often referred to as signaling. We focus on one of the simplest instantiations of the signaling question: Bayesian zero-sum games, and a principal who must choose an information structure maximizing the equilibrium payoff of one of the players. In this setting, we show that optimal signaling is computationally intractable, and in some cases hard to approximate, assuming that it is hard to recover a planted clique from an Erdos-Renyi random graph. This is despite the fact that equilibria in these games are computable in polynomial time, and therefore suggests that the hardness of optimal signaling is a distinct phenomenon from the hardness of equilibrium computation. Necessitated by the non-local nature of information structures, en-route to our results we prove an "amplification lemma" for the planted clique problem which may be of independent interest

Measuring multivariate redundant information with pointwise common change in surprisal

The problem of how to properly quantify redundant information is an open question that has been the subject of much recent research. Redundant information refers to information about a target variable S that is common to two or more predictor variables Xi . It can be thought of as quantifying overlapping information content or similarities in the representation of S between the Xi . We present a new measure of redundancy which measures the common change in surprisal shared between variables at the local or pointwise level. We provide a game-theoretic operational definition of unique information, and use this to derive constraints which are used to obtain a maximum entropy distribution. Redundancy is then calculated from this maximum entropy distribution by counting only those local co-information terms which admit an unambiguous interpretation as redundant information. We show how this redundancy measure can be used within the framework of the Partial Information Decomposition (PID) to give an intuitive decomposition of the multivariate mutual information into redundant, unique and synergistic contributions. We compare our new measure to existing approaches over a range of example systems, including continuous Gaussian variables. Matlab code for the measure is provided, including all considered examples