Modelling Multilateral Negotiation in Linear Logic

We show how to embed a framework for multilateral negotiation, in which a group of agents implement a sequence of deals concerning the exchange of a number of resources, into linear logic. In this model, multisets of goods, allocations of resources, preferences of agents, and deals are all modelled as formulas of linear logic. Whether or not a proposed deal is rational, given the preferences of the agents concerned, reduces to a question of provability, as does the question of whether there exists a sequence of deals leading to an allocation with certain desirable properties, such as maximising social welfare. Thus, linear logic provides a formal basis for modelling convergence properties in distributed resource allocation

The Homeostasis Protocol: Avoiding Transaction Coordination Through Program Analysis

Datastores today rely on distribution and replication to achieve improved performance and fault-tolerance. But correctness of many applications depends on strong consistency properties - something that can impose substantial overheads, since it requires coordinating the behavior of multiple nodes. This paper describes a new approach to achieving strong consistency in distributed systems while minimizing communication between nodes. The key insight is to allow the state of the system to be inconsistent during execution, as long as this inconsistency is bounded and does not affect transaction correctness. In contrast to previous work, our approach uses program analysis to extract semantic information about permissible levels of inconsistency and is fully automated. We then employ a novel homeostasis protocol to allow sites to operate independently, without communicating, as long as any inconsistency is governed by appropriate treaties between the nodes. We discuss mechanisms for optimizing treaties based on workload characteristics to minimize communication, as well as a prototype implementation and experiments that demonstrate the benefits of our approach on common transactional benchmarks

Arts management beyond eventification

Looking for cultural remedies between the opposite perspectives of marketisation and culturalisation of the arts, is equivalent to trying new logics between instrumental (Benjamin 1936; Bourdieu 1979) and communicative logics (Habermas 1981). This engagement includes the considera-tion of the arts management, that nowadays copes much more with design of the contents and drama-turgy of events, planning and production scheduling, marketing processes of the specific event, com-munication and promotion of the event than with a critic conceptualisation of the forced relation be-tween arts and instrumental thinking. In a new perspective of a cultural and social role of the arts, autonomously and not only instrumentally/economically conceived (i.e. the so called cultural depos-its) the aims and core of a necessary reconceptualisation of the relation between the arts and manage-ment could concern a struggle against the \u2018eventification\u2019 of the arts management: to requalify the relationship between arts and aesthetics in the frame of the need of new categories but the solid of socialspacejournal.eu nr 2/2015(10) 2 modernity; to develop awareness of the importance of creativity and innovation for individual, social and economic development; getting closer to communities; taking advantage of the new technologies; attracting new audiences; to stimulate education and research; to promote and bolster policy debate on art issues; to disseminate good practices (Chong, Gibbons, 1997)

An adequate logic for full LOTOS

We present a novel result for a logic for symbolic transition systems based on LOTOS processes. The logic is adequate with respect to bisimulation defined on symbolic transition systems

Modelling Combinatorial Auctions in Linear Logic

We show that linear logic can serve as an expressive framework in which to model a rich variety of combinatorial auction mechanisms. Due to its resource-sensitive nature, linear logic can easily represent bids in combinatorial auctions in which goods may be sold in multiple units, and we show how it naturally generalises several bidding languages familiar from the literature. Moreover, the winner determination problem, i.e., the problem of computing an allocation of goods to bidders producing a certain amount of revenue for the auctioneer, can be modelled as the problem of finding a proof for a particular linear logic sequent