Formal aspects of reduplication

Aristotle’s presentation of ontology advanced at the beginning of the fourth book of Metaphysics is universally known: “there is a science which studies being qua being...”. Needless to say, this is a familiar sentence: unfortunately, it is also quite an odd one. Why Aristotle does not simply say that ontology is the theory of being? Is there any difference between ‘theory of being’ and ‘theory of being qua being’?In brief, the problem is to decide whether the two expressions ‘the study of being’ and ‘the study of being qua being’ are equivalent. If they are, the ‘qua’ does not play any interesting role. On the contrary, if the two expressions are different, that is to say, if there is a difference between the study of being (simpliciter) and the study of being qua being, we should study the role played by the (operator) ‘qua’

Remark on Al-Fārābī's missing modal logic and its effect on Ibn Sīnā

We reconstruct as much as we can the part of al-Fārābī's treatment of modal logic that is missing from the surviving pages of his Long Commentary on the Prior Analytics. We use as a basis the quotations from this work in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides, together with relevant material from al-Fārābī's other writings. We present a case that al-Fārābī's treatment of the dictum de omni had a decisive effect on the development and presentation of Ibn Sīnā's modal logic. We give further evidence that the Harmonisation of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle was not written by al-Fārābī

The Unambiguity of Aristotelian Being

In this paper, I shall try to enhance our understanding of Aristotle\u27s thought by relating it to certain contemporary problems and insights of philosophical logicians. One of the most central current issues in philosophical logic is a challenge to a hundred-year old dogma. Almost all twentieth-century philosophers in English-speaking countries have followed Frege and Russell and claimed that the words for being in natural languages — is, ist, ἔστι etc.— are ambiguous between the is of predication, the is of existence, the is of identity, and the generic is. The significance of this ambiguity thesis has not been limited to topical discussions but has extended to historical studies, including studies of ancient Greek philosophy. A generation or two of scholars working in this area used the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis as an important ingredient of their interpretational framework. Many of us have by this time come to suspect that the Frege-Russell ambiguity claim is completely anachronistic when applied to Aristotle. The sources of this dark professional secret are various, ranging from G. E. L. Owen\u27s brilliant studies of Aristotle on being to Charles Kahn\u27s patient examination of the Greek verb τὸ εῖναι . Most of us good Aristotelians have nevertheless remained in the closet. As was illustrated by the fate that befell the first major study in which Plato\u27s failure to draw the Frege-Russell distinction was noted, most of the unliberated Aristotelians seem to have thought that to note Aristotle\u27s failure to draw the distinction is to accuse him of an abject logical mistake. Accordingly, we have shied away from such impiety. It is time for some consciousness-raising, however. It is not convincing enough merely to register the inapplicability of the modern distinction to Aristotle. We need a deeper understanding of the whole situation. In an earlier paper, I have shown that there need not be anything logically or semantically wrong with a theory which treats the verbs of being as not exhibiting the Frege- Russell ambiguity. (See Hintikka 1979.) More than that: not only can we now say that Aristotle’s procedure is free from any taint of fallacy; he may have been a better semanticist of natural language than Frege and Russell in this particular respect

Aspectual shape : presentational approach

Aspectual shape is widely recognized property of intentionality. This means that subject’s access to reality is necessarily conditioned by applied concepts, perspective, modes of sensation, etc. I argue against representational and indirect-realist account of this phenomenon. My own proposition - presentational and direct realist - is based on the recognition of historical contexts, in which the phenomenon of aspectuality should be reconsidered; on the other hand - it is based on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of aspectual perception. Moreover I apply some results from the area of logicophilosophical investigations called qua theory

Proofs, Reasoning and the Metamorphosis of Logic

Revised version of a conference given under title "From Natural Deduction to the nature of reasoning", at the colloquium Natural Deduction organized by Luiz Carlos Pereira and dedicated to the work of Dag Prawitz, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 2001.With the “mathematical watershed”, Logic had been transformed into a foundational theory for mathematics, a theory of truth and proofs - far away from its philosophical status of theory of the intellectual process of reasoning. With the recent substitution of the traditional proofs-as-discourses paradigm by the proofs-as-programs one, Logic is now becomming a foundational theory for computing. One could interpret this new watershed as being “yet another technological drift”, bringing Logic always closer to applied ingeneering, always further from the human intellectual process of reasoning. This article promote the dual point of view: enlightened by the contemporary analysis of the dynamic of proofs, which bring us to a new understanding of the semantic counterpart of processes operationality (including the links between semantic dereliction due to inconsistency and computational exuberance), Logic has never appeared so close to being, finally, the theory of reasoning.A partir de son "tournant mathématique", la logique se convertit en une théorie des fondements des mathématiques, une théorie de la vérité et des preuves - loin de son statut philosophique de theorie du processus intellectuel de raisonnement. Avec le remplacement récent du paradigme traditionnel des preuves-comme-discours par celui des preuves-comme-programes, la Logique est à présent devenue une théorie des fondements du calcul. On peut voir dans ce nouveau tournant comme un glissement supplémentaire qui conduirait la logique toujours plus près de l'ingénierie appliquée, toujours plus loin de son statut historique de théorie des processus de raisonnement. Cet article défend le point de vue dual: sous la lumière des analyses contemporaines de la dynamique des preuves, qui conduisent à une compréhension originale de la contrepartie sémantique de l'opérationalité des processus (y compris les liens entre déreliction sémantique due à l'incohérence et exubérance calculatoire), la logique n'a finalement jamais semblé aussi proche de devenir la théorie du raisonnement

Quatenus and Spinoza's monism

I examine Spinoza’s use of the term quatenus. It is, I argue, an operator working in the context of a broader logical theory and blocking certain inferences that, according to critics such as Pierre Bayle, lead Spinoza’s metaphysical system into absurdities. I reconstruct this crucial theory from some treatises on logic to which Spinoza had access. I then show how a later logical theory—that of the Port-Royal Logic—does not permit Bayle’s troublesome inferences to be blocked by the use of terms like quatenus. Most likely Bayle was thinking in terms of the later theory, Spinoza in terms of the earlier.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Early Medieval Rhetoric: Epideictic Underpinnings in Old English Homilies

Medieval rhetoric, as a field and as a subject, has largely been under-developed and under-emphasized within medieval and rhetorical studies for several reasons: the disconnect between Germanic, Anglo-Saxon society and the Greco-Roman tradition that defined rhetoric as an art; the problems associated with translating the Old and Middle English vernacular in light of rhetorical and, thereby, Greco-Latin precepts; and the complexities of the medieval period itself with the lack of surviving manuscripts, often indistinct and inconsistent political and legal structure, and widespread interspersion and interpolation of Christian doctrine. However, it was Christianity and its governance of medieval culture that preserved classical rhetoric within the medieval period through reliance upon a classic epideictic platform, which, in turn, became the foundation for early medieval rhetoric. The role of epideictic rhetoric itself is often undervalued within the rhetorical tradition because it appears too basic or less essential than the judicial or deliberative branches for in-depth study and analysis. Closer inspection of this branch reveals that epideictic rhetoric contains fundamental elements of human communication with the focus upon praise and blame and upon appropriate thought and behavior. In analyzing the medieval world’s heritage and knowledge of the Greco-Roman tradition, epideictic rhetoric’s role within the writings and lives of Greek and Roman philosophers, and the popular Christian writings of the medieval period – such as Alfred’s translation of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, Alfred’s translation of Gregory the Great’s Pastoral Care, Ælfric’s Lives of Saints, Ælfric’s Catholic Homilies, Wulfstan’s Sermo Lupi ad Anglos, and the anonymously written Vercelli and Blickling homiles – an early medieval rhetoric begins to be revealed. This Old English rhetoric rests upon a blended epideictic structure based largely upon the encomium and vituperation formats of the ancient progymnasmata, with some additions from the chreia and commonplace exercises, to form a unique rhetoric of the soul that aimed to convert words into moral thought and action within the lives of every individual. Unlike its classical predecessors, medieval rhetoric did not argue, refute, or prove; it did not rely solely on either praise or blame; and it did not cultivate words merely for intellectual, educative, or political purposes. Instead, early medieval rhetoric placed the power of words in the hands of all humanity, inspiring every individual to greater discernment of character and reality, greater spirituality, greater morality, and greater pragmatism in daily life