TIMCC: On Data Freshness in Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism Design for Continuous Crowdsensing Using Reverse Auction

© 2013 IEEE. As an emerging paradigm that leverages the wisdom and efforts of the crowd, mobile crowdsensing has shown its great potential to collect distributed data. The crowd may incur such costs and risks as energy consumption, memory consumption, and privacy leakage when performing various tasks, so they may not be willing to participate in crowdsensing tasks unless they are well-paid. Hence, a proper privacy-preserving incentive mechanism is of great significance to motivate users to join, which has attracted a lot of research efforts. Most of the existing works regard tasks as one-shot tasks, which may not work very well for the type of tasks that requires continuous monitoring, e.g., WIFI signal sensing, where the WiFi signal may vary over time, and users are required to contribute continuous efforts. The incentive mechanism for continuous crowdsensing has yet to be investigated, where the corresponding tasks need continuous efforts of users, and the freshness of the sensed data is very important. In this paper, we design TIMCC, a privacy-preserving incentive mechanism for continuous crowdsensing. In contrast to most existing studies that treat tasks as one-shot tasks, we consider the tasks that require users to contribute continuous efforts, where the freshness of data is a key factor impacting the value of data, which further determines the rewards. We introduce a metric named age of data that is defined as the amount of time elapsed since the generation of the data to capture the freshness of data. We adopt the reverse auction framework to model the connection between the platform and the users. We prove that the proposed mechanism satisfies individual rationality, computational efficiency, and truthfulness. Simulation results further validate our theoretical analysis and the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism

A Stackelberg Game Approach Towards Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing (Online report)

Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. For example, in a crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing application, a user can get a better and accurate traffic report if more users join and share their road information. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information (the social network effects) is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. Numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider to achieve greater revenue gain.Comment: Submitted for possible journal publication. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1711.0105

Reputation and Reward : Two Sides of the Same Bitcoin

In Mobile Crowd Sensing (MCS), the power of the crowd, jointly with the sensing capabilities of the smartphones they wear, provides a new paradigm for data sensing. Scenarios involving user behavior or those that rely on user mobility are examples where standard sensor networks may not be suitable, and MCS provides an interesting solution. However, including human participation in sensing tasks presents numerous and unique research challenges. In this paper, we analyze three of the most important: user participation, data sensing quality and user anonymity. We tackle the three as a whole, since all of them are strongly correlated. As a result, we present PaySense, a general framework that incentivizes user participation and provides a mechanism to validate the quality of collected data based on the users' reputation. All such features are performed in a privacy-preserving way by using the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. Rather than a theoretical one, our framework has been implemented, and it is ready to be deployed and complement any existint MCS system

Quality of Information in Mobile Crowdsensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Smartphones have become the most pervasive devices in people's lives, and are clearly transforming the way we live and perceive technology. Today's smartphones benefit from almost ubiquitous Internet connectivity and come equipped with a plethora of inexpensive yet powerful embedded sensors, such as accelerometer, gyroscope, microphone, and camera. This unique combination has enabled revolutionary applications based on the mobile crowdsensing paradigm, such as real-time road traffic monitoring, air and noise pollution, crime control, and wildlife monitoring, just to name a few. Differently from prior sensing paradigms, humans are now the primary actors of the sensing process, since they become fundamental in retrieving reliable and up-to-date information about the event being monitored. As humans may behave unreliably or maliciously, assessing and guaranteeing Quality of Information (QoI) becomes more important than ever. In this paper, we provide a new framework for defining and enforcing the QoI in mobile crowdsensing, and analyze in depth the current state-of-the-art on the topic. We also outline novel research challenges, along with possible directions of future work.Comment: To appear in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN

Proof of Travel for Trust-Based Data Validation in V2I Communication Part I: Methodology

Previous work on misbehavior detection and trust management for Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication can identify falsified and malicious messages, enabling witness vehicles to report observations about high-criticality traffic events. However, there may not exist enough "benign" vehicles with V2X connectivity or vehicle owners who are willing to opt-in in the early stages of connected-vehicle deployment. In this paper, we propose a security protocol for the communication between vehicles and infrastructure, titled Proof-of-Travel (POT), to answer the research question: How can we transform the power of cryptography techniques embedded within the protocol into social and economic mechanisms to simultaneously incentivize Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) data sharing activities and validate the data? The key idea is to determine the reputation of and the contribution made by a vehicle based on its distance traveled and the information it shared through V2I channels. In particular, the total vehicle miles traveled for a vehicle must be testified by digital signatures signed by each infrastructure component along the path of its movement. While building a chain of proofs of spatial movement creates burdens for malicious vehicles, acquiring proofs does not result in extra cost for normal vehicles, which naturally want to move from the origin to the destination. The proof of travel for a vehicle can then be used to determine the contribution and reward by its altruistic behaviors. We propose short-term and long-term incentive designs based on the POT protocol and evaluate their security and performance through theoretical analysis and simulations

An Efficient Collaboration and Incentive Mechanism for Internet-of-Vehicles (IoVs) with Secured Information Exchange Based on Blockchains

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from IEEE via the DOI in this recordWith the rapid development of Internet-of-Things (IoT), mobile crowdsensing, i.e., outsourcing sensing tasks to mobile devices or vehicles, has been proposed to address the problem of data collection in the scenarios such as smart city. Despite its benefits for a wide range of applications, mobile crowdsensing lacks an efficient incentive mechanism, restricting the development of IoT applications, especially for Internet-ofVehicles (IoV) – a typical example of IoT applications; this is because vehicles are usually reluctant to participate these sensing tasks. Moreover, in practice some sensing tasks may arrive suddenly (called an emergent task) in the IoV environment, but the resources of a single vehicle may be insufficient to handle, and thus multi-vehicles collaboration is required. In this case, the incentive mechanisms for the participation of multiple vehicles and the task scheduling for their collaborations are collectively needed. To address this important problem, we firstly propose a new model for the scenario of two vehicles collaboration, considering the situation of emergent appearance of a task. In this model, for a general sensing task, we propose a bidding mechanism to better encourage vehicles to contribute their resources, and the tasks for those vehicles are scheduled accordingly. Secondly, for an emergent task, a novel time-window based method is devised to manage the tasks among vehicles and to incent the vehicles to participate. Finally, we develop a blockchain framework to achieve the secured information exchange through smart contract for the proposed models in IoV.National Key Research and Development Program of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC)Purple Mountain Laboratory: Networking, Communications and SecurityAcademician Expert Workstation of Bitvalue Technology (Hunan) Company Limite

Security and Privacy Preservation in Mobile Crowdsensing

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is a compelling paradigm that enables a crowd of individuals to cooperatively collect and share data to measure phenomena or record events of common interest using their mobile devices. Pairing with inherent mobility and intelligence, mobile users can collect, produce and upload large amounts of data to service providers based on crowdsensing tasks released by customers, ranging from general information, such as temperature, air quality and traffic condition, to more specialized data, such as recommended places, health condition and voting intentions. Compared with traditional sensor networks, MCS can support large-scale sensing applications, improve sensing data trustworthiness and reduce the cost on deploying expensive hardware or software to acquire high-quality data. Despite the appealing benefits, however, MCS is also confronted with a variety of security and privacy threats, which would impede its rapid development. Due to their own incentives and vulnerabilities of service providers, data security and user privacy are being put at risk. The corruption of sensing reports may directly affect crowdsensing results, and thereby mislead customers to make irrational decisions. Moreover, the content of crowdsensing tasks may expose the intention of customers, and the sensing reports might inadvertently reveal sensitive information about mobile users. Data encryption and anonymization techniques can provide straightforward solutions for data security and user privacy, but there are several issues, which are of significantly importance to make MCS practical. First of all, to enhance data trustworthiness, service providers need to recruit mobile users based on their personal information, such as preferences, mobility pattern and reputation, resulting in the privacy exposure to service providers. Secondly, it is inevitable to have replicate data in crowdsensing reports, which may possess large communication bandwidth, but traditional data encryption makes replicate data detection and deletion challenging. Thirdly, crowdsensed data analysis is essential to generate crowdsensing reports in MCS, but the correctness of crowdsensing results in the absence of malicious mobile users and service providers become a huge concern for customers. Finally yet importantly, even if user privacy is preserved during task allocation and data collection, it may still be exposed during reward distribution. It further discourage mobile users from task participation. In this thesis, we explore the approaches to resolve these challenges in MCS. Based on the architecture of MCS, we conduct our research with the focus on security and privacy protection without sacrificing data quality and users' enthusiasm. Specifically, the main contributions are, i) to enable privacy preservation and task allocation, we propose SPOON, a strong privacy-preserving mobile crowdsensing scheme supporting accurate task allocation. In SPOON, the service provider recruits mobile users based on their locations, and selects proper sensing reports according to their trust levels without invading user privacy. By utilizing the blind signature, sensing tasks are protected and reports are anonymized. In addition, a privacy-preserving credit management mechanism is introduced to achieve decentralized trust management and secure credit proof for mobile users; ii) to improve communication efficiency while guaranteeing data confidentiality, we propose a fog-assisted secure data deduplication scheme, in which a BLS-oblivious pseudo-random function is developed to enable fog nodes to detect and delete replicate data in sensing reports without exposing the content of reports. Considering the privacy leakages of mobile users who report the same data, the blind signature is utilized to hide users' identities, and chameleon hash function is leveraged to achieve contribution claim and reward retrieval for anonymous greedy mobile users; iii) to achieve data statistics with privacy preservation, we propose a privacy-preserving data statistics scheme to achieve end-to-end security and integrity protection, while enabling the aggregation of the collected data from multiple sources. The correctness verification is supported to prevent the corruption of the aggregate results during data transmission based on the homomorphic authenticator and the proxy re-signature. A privacy-preserving verifiable linear statistics mechanism is developed to realize the linear aggregation of multiple crowdsensed data from a same device and the verification on the correctness of aggregate results; and iv) to encourage mobile users to participating in sensing tasks, we propose a dual-anonymous reward distribution scheme to offer the incentive for mobile users and privacy protection for both customers and mobile users in MCS. Based on the dividable cash, a new reward sharing incentive mechanism is developed to encourage mobile users to participating in sensing tasks, and the randomization technique is leveraged to protect the identities of customers and mobile users during reward claim, distribution and deposit