2,211 research outputs found

    Cyber Switching Attacks on Smart Grids

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    As we live in smart grid revolution, the conventional power systems turn into a fast pace toward smart grids, this transition creates new and significant challenges on the electrical network security level; In addition to the important features of the smart grids, cyber security transpire to be a serious issue due to connecting all the loads, generation units, renewable resources, substations and switches via communication network. Cyber-physical attacks are classified as the major threatening of smart grids security, this attacks may lead to a many severe repercussions in the smart grid such as large blackout and destruction of infrastructures. Switching attack is one of the most serious cyber-physical attacks on smart grids because it is direct, fast, and effective in destabilizing the grids. We start the thesis by introducing a state-of-the-art on cyber attacks from the power layer point of view i.e. the cyber attacks that affect the smart grid stability and what are the power system based solutions have been done so far to prevent or reduce the cyber attacks severity .As we focus on cyber switching attack and the method of preventing it, firstly a study on the attack principles and effects is introduced, we construct the attack on a single machine connected to an infinite bus through a transmission line. The attack on the target generator implemented by modeling the system using swing equation on Matlab platform, then we verified the result by implementing the same attack on Simulink Platform. Finally we present a novel solution to mitigate such type of attacks by using Thyristor-Controlled Braking Resistor (TCBR).The suggested solution is able to recapture the machine stability directly after the attack

    Resilient Consensus Control Design for DC Microgrids against False Data Injection Attacks Using a Distributed Bank of Sliding Mode Observers

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    This paper investigates the problem of false data injection attack (FDIA) detection in microgrids. The grid under study is a DC microgrid with distributed boost converters, where the false data are injected into the voltage data so as to investigate the effect of attacks. The proposed algorithm uses a bank of sliding mode observers that estimates the states of the neighbor agents. Each agent estimates the neighboring states and, according to the estimation and communication data, the detection mechanism reveals the presence of FDIA. The proposed control scheme provides resiliency to the system by replacing the conventional consensus rule with attack-resilient ones. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed method, a real-time simulation with eight agents has been performed. Moreover, a verification experimental test with three boost converters has been utilized to confirm the simulation results. It is shown that the proposed algorithm is able to detect FDI attacks and it protects the consensus deviation against FDI attacks

    Resilient Consensus Control Design for DC Microgrids against False Data Injection Attacks Using a Distributed Bank of Sliding Mode Observers

    Get PDF
    This paper investigates the problem of false data injection attack (FDIA) detection in microgrids. The grid under study is a DC microgrid with distributed boost converters, where the false data are injected into the voltage data so as to investigate the effect of attacks. The proposed algorithm uses a bank of sliding mode observers that estimates the states of the neighbor agents. Each agent estimates the neighboring states and, according to the estimation and communication data, the detection mechanism reveals the presence of FDIA. The proposed control scheme provides resiliency to the system by replacing the conventional consensus rule with attack-resilient ones. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed method, a real-time simulation with eight agents has been performed. Moreover, a verification experimental test with three boost converters has been utilized to confirm the simulation results. It is shown that the proposed algorithm is able to detect FDI attacks and it protects the consensus deviation against FDI attacks

    A Framework for Modeling Cyber-Physical Switching Attacks in Smart Grid

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    Security issues in cyber-physical systems are of paramount importance due to the often safety- critical nature of its associated applications. A rst step in understanding how to protect such systems requires an understanding of emergent weaknesses, in part, due to the cyber-physical coupling. In this paper, we present a framework that models a class of cyber-physical switching vulnerabilities in smart grid systems. Variable structure system theory is employed to effectively characterize the cyber-physical interaction of the smart grid and demonstrate how existence of the switching vulnerability is dependent on the local structure of the power grid. We identify and demonstrate how through successful cyber intrusion and local knowledge of the grid an opponent can compute and apply a coordinated switching sequence to a circuit breaker to disrupt operation within a short interval of time. We illustrate the utility of the attack approach empirically on the Western Electricity Coordinating Council three-machine, nine-bus system under both model error and partial state information.The open access fee for this work was funded through the Texas A&M University Open Access to Knowledge (OAK) Fund

    On the Control of Microgrids Against Cyber-Attacks: A Review of Methods and Applications

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    Nowadays, the use of renewable generations, energy storage systems (ESSs) and microgrids (MGs) has been developed due to better controllability of distributed energy resources (DERs) as well as their cost-effective and emission-aware operation. The development of MGs as well as the use of hierarchical control has led to data transmission in the communication platform. As a result, the expansion of communication infrastructure has made MGs as cyber-physical systems (CPSs) vulnerable to cyber-attacks (CAs). Accordingly, prevention, detection and isolation of CAs during proper control of MGs is essential. In this paper, a comprehensive review on the control strategies of microgrids against CAs and its defense mechanisms has been done. The general structure of the paper is as follows: firstly, MGs operational conditions, i.e., the secure or insecure mode of the physical and cyber layers are investigated and the appropriate control to return to a safer mode are presented. Then, the common MGs communication system is described which is generally used for multi-agent systems (MASs). Also, classification of CAs in MGs has been reviewed. Afterwards, a comprehensive survey of available researches in the field of prevention, detection and isolation of CA and MG control against CA are summarized. Finally, future trends in this context are clarified

    Efficiency and Sustainability of the Distributed Renewable Hybrid Power Systems Based on the Energy Internet, Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts-Volume II

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    The climate changes that are becoming visible today are a challenge for the global research community. In this context, renewable energy sources, fuel cell systems, and other energy generating sources must be optimally combined and connected to the grid system using advanced energy transaction methods. As this reprint presents the latest solutions in the implementation of fuel cell and renewable energy in mobile and stationary applications, such as hybrid and microgrid power systems based on the Energy Internet, Blockchain technology, and smart contracts, we hope that they will be of interest to readers working in the related fields mentioned above

    Data-driven cyber attack detection and mitigation for decentralized wide-area protection and control in smart grids

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    Modern power systems have already evolved into complicated cyber physical systems (CPS), often referred to as smart grids, due to the continuous expansion of the electrical infrastructure, the augmentation of the number of heterogeneous system components and players, and the consequential application of a diversity of information and telecommunication technologies to facilitate the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) of the day-to-day power system operation. Because of the reliance on cyber technologies, WAMPAC, among other critical functions, is prone to various malicious cyber attacks. Successful cyber attacks, especially those sabotage the operation of Bulk Electric System (BES), can cause great financial losses and social panics. Application of conventional IT security solutions is indispensable, but it often turns out to be insufficient to mitigate sophisticated attacks that deploy zero-day vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics. To further improve the resilience of the operation of smart grids when facing cyber attacks, it is desirable to make the WAMPAC functions per se capable of detecting various anomalies automatically, carrying out adaptive activity adjustments in time and thus staying unimpaired even under attack. Most of the existing research efforts attempt to achieve this by adding novel functional modules, such as model-based anomaly detectors, to the legacy centralized WAMPAC functions. In contrast, this dissertation investigates the application of data-driven algorithms in cyber attack detection and mitigation within a decentralized architecture aiming at improving the situational awareness and self-adaptiveness of WAMPAC. First part of the research focuses on the decentralization of System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) with Multi-Agent System (MAS), within which the data-driven anomaly detection and optimal adaptive load shedding are further explored. An algorithm named as Support Vector Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree (SVMLDT) is proposed for the anomaly detection, which provides satisfactory detection accuracy as well as decision-making interpretability. The adaptive load shedding is carried out by every agent individually with dynamic programming. The load shedding relies on the load profile propagation among peer agents and the attack adaptiveness is accomplished by maintaining the historical mean of load shedding proportion. Load shedding only takes place after the consensus pertaining to the anomaly detection is achieved among all interconnected agents and it serves the purpose of mitigating certain cyber attacks. The attack resilience of the decentralized SIPS is evaluated using IEEE 39 bus model. It is shown that, unlike the traditional centralized SIPS, the proposed solution is able to carry out the remedial actions under most Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second part investigates the clustering based anomalous behavior detection and peer-assisted mitigation for power system generation control. To reduce the dimensionality of the data, three metrics are designed to interpret the behavior conformity of generator within the same balancing area. Semi-supervised K-means clustering and a density sensitive clustering algorithm based on Hieararchical DBSCAN (HDBSCAN) are both applied in clustering in the 3D feature space. Aiming to mitigate the cyber attacks targeting the generation control commands, a peer-assisted strategy is proposed. When the control commands from control center is detected as anomalous, i.e. either missing or the payload of which have been manipulated, the generating unit utilizes the peer data to infer and estimate a new generation adjustment value as replacement. Linear regression is utilized to obtain the relation of control values received by different generating units, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is adopted during the peer selection and 1-dimensional clustering is performed with the inferred control values, which are followed by the final control value estimation. The mitigation strategy proposed requires that generating units can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of the proposed solution in counteracting data availability and data integrity attacks targeting the generation controls. However, the strategy stays effective only if less than half of the generating units are compromised and it is not able to mitigate cyber attacks targeting the measurements involved in the generation control
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