Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game

Producción CientíficaIn this paper we apply non-linear incentive strategies to sustain over time an agreement. We illustrate the use of these strategies in a linear-quadratic transboundary pollution differential game. The incentive strategies are constructed in such a way that in the long run the pollution stock (the state variable) is close to the steady state of the pollution stock under the cooperative mode of play. The non-linear incentive functions depend on the emission rates (control variables) of both players and on the current value of the pollution stock. The credibility of the incentive equilibrium strategies is analyzed and the performance of open-loop and feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.This research is partially supported by MINECO under projects MTM2016-78995-P (AEI) and ECO2014-52343-P and ECO2017-82227-P (AEI) and by Junta de Castilla y León VA024P17 and VA105G18 co-financed by FEDER funds (EU

Does Flexibility Facilitate Sustainability of Cooperation Over Time? A Case Study from Environmental Economics

In this paper we present nonlinear incentive strategies that can be applied to a class of differential games that are frequently used in the literature, in particular, in environmental economics literature. We consider a class of nonlinear incentive functions that depend on the control variables of both players and on the current value of the state variable. The strategies are constructed to allow some flexibility in the sense that, unlike the common literature on the subject, the optimal state path evolves close to the cooperative trajectory. As a consequence of this flexibility, the incentive equilibrium is credible in a larger region than the one associated with the usual linear incentive strategies.This research has been supported by Spanish MINECO, projects ECO2008-01551/ECON, ECO2011-24352 and MTM2010-14919 (cofinanced by FEDER funds)

Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game

We analyze a transboundary pollution differential game where pollution control is spatially distributed among a number of agents with predetermined spatial relationships. The analysis emphasizes, first, the effects of the different geographical relationships among decision makers; and second, the strategic behaviour of the agents. The dynamic game considers a pollution stock (the state variable) distributed among one large region divided in subregions which control their own emissions of pollutants. The emissions are also represented as distributed variables. The dynamics of the pollution stock is defined by a parabolic partial differential equation. We numerically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium of a discrete-space model that still captures the spatial interactions among agents. We evaluate the impact of the strategic and spatially dynamic behaviour of the agents on the design of equilibrium environmental policiesThis research is partially supported by MINECO under projects MTM2013-42538-P, MTM2016-78995-P (AEI) (first author) and ECO2014-52343-P (second author), co-financed by FEDER funds. The authors thank the support of European Cooperation in Science and Technology through COST Action IS1104, ``The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evaluation"

Stochastic Hyperbolic Discounting: An Application to an Environmental Dynamic Game

Treballs Finals del Màster d'Economia, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2017-2018, Tutor: Jesús Marín-Solano ; Jorge NavasWe study the infinite horizon emissions and stock of pollution choices of time-inconsistent individuals by incorporating the stochastic hyperbolic preferences of Harris and Laibson (2013), later extended by Zou et al. (2014), into the environmental dynamic game pro-posed by Jørgensen et al. (2003) with linear-state structure. We derive analytic solutions for optimal emissions and stock of pollution selections for sophisticated individuals and extend the results with a sensitivity analysis of the stochastic hyperbolic parameters and their impact on the economy. Compared to the results of Jørgensen et al., we find that the stochastic hyperbolic discounting model increases the emissions rates and the stock of pollution, concretely, in the case in which agents are highly impatient

Conditional rewards for sustainable behavior: targeting lessons from an open access fishery

We design and conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to test the effect of a conditional contract on the sustainability of an open access fishery, where unit prices are conditional on aggregate catch. The contract provides collective incentives to decrease extraction but maintain the individual incentives of extraction maximization. We conduct the experiment with two communities of artisanal fishermen differing in their market and technological restrictions. We find that the conditional contract, compared to a fixed price scheme, increases efficiency, the duration of the resource and the total yield. The contract has a greater effect upon groups from the less restricted community

Social Shaping for Multi-Agent Systems

Multi-agent systems have gained attention due to advances in automation, technology, and AI. In these systems, intelligent agents collaborate through networks to achieve goals. Despite successes, multi-agent systems pose social challenges. Problems include agents finding resource prices unacceptable due to efficient allocation, interactions being cooperative/competitive, leading to varying outcomes, and sensitive data being at risk due to sharing. Problems are: 1. Price Acceptance; 2. Agent Cooperation and Competition; 3. Privacy Risks. For Price Acceptance, we address decentralized resource allocation systems as markets. We solve price acceptance in static systems with quadratic utility functions by defining allowed quadratic ranges. For dynamic systems, we present dynamic competitive equilibrium computation and propose a horizon strategy for smoothing dynamic pricing. Concerning Agent Cooperation and Competition, we study the well-known Regional Integrated Climate-Economy model (RICE). It's a dynamic game. We analyze cooperative and competitive solutions, showing impact on negotiations and consensus for regional climate action. Regarding Privacy Risks, we infer network structures from linear-quadratic game best-response dynamics to reveal agent vulnerabilities. We prove network identifiability tied to controllability conditions. A stable, sparse system identification algorithm learns network structures despite noise. Lastly, we contribute privacy-aware algorithms. We address network games where agents aggregate under differential privacy. Extending to network games, we propose a Laplace linear-quadratic functional perturbation algorithm. A tutorial example demonstrates meeting privacy needs through tuning. In summary, this thesis solves social challenges in multi-agent systems: Price Acceptance, Agent Cooperation and Competition, and Privacy Risks

Trois essais sur la divergence et la convergence des représentations de la responsabilité sociale et environnementale : une analyse internationale

Cette thèse consiste en trois essais quantitatifs qui examinent les aspects de convergence et de divergence dans les négociations des normes et des accords internationaux dans le domaine de l'environnement et de la responsabilité sociétale des organisations. Dans le premier essai, nous comparons les artéfacts de convergence et de divergence dans les représentations de RSE de plusieurs groupes nationaux. Pour ce faire, nous avons étudié les commentaires de 163 groupes provenant de 48 pays dans le cadre de la négociation de la norme internationale de responsabilité sociale ISO 26000. Quatre dimensions internationales de la RSE ont été développées par la technique d'analyse de composantes principales (ACP). Ces dimensions ont ensuite été analysées graphiquement afin de déceler leurs signes potentiels de convergence et de divergence. Nos résultats montrent que, malgré la prééminence de convergence, des manifestations de convergence et de divergence coexistent sur les différentes dimensions de la norme ISO 26000. En se basant sur des analyses de la variance, cette recherche prouve que ni le niveau de développement économique (Nord-Sud), ni la catégorie de parties prenantes sont associés à la divergence dans les représentations de RSE entre les participants. Par contre, nous observons des divergences sur la dimension « principes de la RSE » et la dimension « implantation de la RSE », laquelle est significativement liée à l'origine nationale. Cet article démontre aussi que la divergence internationale sur les dimensions relatives aux questions centrales, aux principes de la RSE, ainsi qu'à l'implantation de la RSE est associée au niveau du consensus national observé entre les groupes de chacun des pays participants. Dans le deuxième essai, nous examinons plus spécifiquement la relation potentielle entre, d'une part, la culture, et d'autre part, les représentations en responsabilité sociale. L'étude porte spécifiquement sur l'Amérique du Nord, l'Europe de l'Ouest et l'Europe de l'Est. Cette recherche se base sur les quatre dimensions de RSE précédemment développées dans le premier essai. Pour ce faire, nous avons analysé les commentaires des 76 groupes issus de 23 pays américains et européens qui ont participé à la négociation de la norme internationale de RSE (ISO 26000). Les résultats de l'analyse de la régression linéaire multiple démontrent que la divergence sur la dimension relative aux principes de RSE, ainsi que la divergence relative à son implantation, est sensiblement associée au niveau d'acceptation du pouvoir. Nos résultats démontrent aussi une relation statistiquement significative entre le niveau de masculinité et la dimension relative aux principes de RSE. Dans le dernier essai, nous avons eu recours aux jeux dynamiques, afin d'évaluer mathématiquement deux situations de négociations internationales entre les pays développés et en voie de développement (Nord-Sud) dans un cas particulier de RSE, à savoir la pollution transfrontalière. La première situation est relative à la divergence (jeu non coopératif) tandis que la deuxième est relative à la convergence (jeu coopératif). Cet essai propose un jeu différentiel de contrôle de la pollution transfrontalière entre deux joueurs asymétriques. Nous considérons qu'un des deux joueurs est non vulnérable à la pollution (pays en voie de développement) ou ne veut pas internaliser le coût du dommage lors du choix de sa politique de production dans un jeu non coopératif. Dans un premier temps, nous déterminons un équilibre de Nash avec rétroaction ainsi qu'une solution coopérative. Ensuite, nous établissons des conditions sous lesquelles le joueur vulnérable (pays développés) pourrait acheter la coopération du joueur non vulnérable afin de contrôler ses émissions et d'investir dans des activités d'atténuation. Finalement, afin d'allouer d'une façon optimale et de décomposer le dividende de la coopération pour les deux joueurs dans le temps, une solution de négociation de Nash est caractérisée. Nous démontrons que cette décomposition est temporellement cohérente.\ud ______________________________________________________________________________ \ud MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Responsabilité sociale et environnementale, ISO 26000, parties prenantes, pays d'origine, culture, Nord-Sud, Amérique du Nord, Europe, convergence, divergence, crossvergence, environnement, jeux différentiels, solution coopérative, équilibre de Nash avec rétroaction, cohérence temporelle, solution de négociation de Nash

Impact of Hybrid-Enabling Technology on Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium Subject to Energy Sources

In this chapter, we quantify an optimal level of subsidy for the sharing of hybrid-enabling technology innovation in an energy market while examining its Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. We formulate this as a Stochastic Differential Game (SDG) and analyze the stability of the Stuckenberg, Nash and cooperative equilibria via a feedback control strategy. We then adopt limit expectation and variance of the improvement degree to identify the influence of the external environment on the decision maker. We show that the game depends on its parameters and the equilibria chosen. Ultimately, our use of short-run price competition characterized by strategic supplies for renewable and fossil resources provides a more robust model than that presented by Bertrand-Edgworth with endogenous capacity. As a result, we highlight that R&D investments in hybrid-enabling technology can ensure immediate reliability and affordability within energy production and implementation of policy instruments

Conditional contracts and sustainability: targeting lessons from an open access fishery

We design and conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to test the effect of a conditional contract on the sustainability of an open access fishery, where unit prices are conditional on aggregate catch. The contract provides collective incentives to decrease extraction but maintain the individual incentives of extraction maximization. We conduct the experiment with two communities of artisanal fishermen differing in their market and technological restrictions. We find that the conditional contract, compared to a fixed price scheme, increases efficiency, the duration of the resource and the total yield. The contract has a greater effect upon groups from the less restricted community