Future DCS objectives in communication network timing and synchronization

The Defense Communication System will be moving rapidly toward providing switched digital service to it's users within the next ten years. The principal driving force in the transition to a digital system is the requirement for high performance secure voice service. Additionally, the anticipated data requirements in this time frame can be handled most effectively by a digital network. The characteristics of a switched digital network which impose timing and synchronization requirements on the system design are presented. Several alternative approaches to implementing a timing subsystem suitable for a switched digital communications system have been considered. These include pulse stuffing, independent stable clocks, and clock correction techniques. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are discussed relative to both the strategic and tactical communication system requirements

Paper Session III-B - The Space Test Program, A Case for Dedicated Research, Development, Test and Evaluation in Space

Soon after the first space launches, it became apparent that space systems could provide unique services; but how would new space technologies and concepts be developed and tested? In 1966, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) established the Space Test Program (STP) for which the Department of the Air Force was named the executive agent. STP is chartered to provide space flight opportunities for DoD relevant science and technology experiments lacking other means of space flight. From 1967 to the present, STP has provided space flight for more than 370 research and development payloads in a cost effective manner using various methods including: unique satellites on dedicated expendable rockets, the Space Shuttle, and secondary opportunities on larger missions. STP has enhanced DoD operability by: improving operational and pre-operational designs, applying needed capabilities prior to the existence of operational systems, reducing the development risk for pre-operational payloads, increasing knowledge of the space environment and discovering unanticipated benefits. The execution of the STP mission has been shown to be a better, faster, cheaper means of enhancing DoD space technologies

The role of space in the security and defence policy of Turkey. A change in outlook: Security in space versus security from space

Space and security domains are strongly related with each other. Nowadays, space is an indispensable part of security and defence policy, and it is increasingly becoming a critical infrastructure for strategic Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. However, space is vulnerable itself to the new space threats. This study reviews the current and near future space role in Turkey's security and defence policy and aims to address the threats against space based capabilities. To provide security from space, space based systems shall themselves need to be secure in space to warrant the security. The concept of security from space starts with space security, in other words the security in space. This paper also highlights the emerging technological opportunities for these space threats to be secure in space in order to provide the security from space. According to the relevant taxonomy, a categorized opportunity proposal for more robust and resilient space/satellite projects' architecture is proposed for Turkey

The role of space in the security and defence policy of Turkey. A change in outlook: Security in space versus security from space

Space and security domains are strongly related with each other. Nowadays, space is an indispensable part of security and defence policy, and it is increasingly becoming a critical infrastructure for strategic Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. However, space is vulnerable itself to the new space threats. This study reviews the current and near future space role in Turkey's security and defence policy and aims to address the threats against space based capabilities. To provide security from space, space based systems shall themselves need to be secure in space to warrant the security. The concept of security from space starts with space security, in other words the security in space. This paper also highlights the emerging technological opportunities for these space threats to be secure in space in order to provide the security from space. According to the relevant taxonomy, a categorized opportunity proposal for more robust and resilient space/satellite projects' architecture is proposed for Turkey

Globalstar for the Military

Globalstar, a new satellite-based mobile voice/data telephone service, is being planned by LQSS for operation in 1998. It will let military personnel, using handheld, ship-board, or vehicular mobile terminals in even the most remote areas of the world, to stay in contact with each other and with personnel who are on established communication networks. A constellation of 48 low-earth orbiting (LEO) satellites and an advanced method of digital signal formatting will provide low-cost and reliable voice, data, fax and position-locating services to military personnel in most areas of the world. Globalstar will interoperate with existing local (domestic or foreign), long-distance, public, private, terrestrial-cellular, DoD, and specialized telecommunications networks. The system will permit the military, for its general purpose communications, to share with commercial MSS (Mobile Satellite Services) at low cost. This paper includes an overview of the Globalstar system and describes possible DoD applications

An overview of the Copernicus C4I architecture

The purpose of this thesis is to provide the reader with an overview of the U.S. Navy's Copernicus C4I Architecture. The acronym "C4I" emphasizes the intimate relationship between command, control, communications and intelligence, as well as their significance to the modern day warrior. Never in the history of the U.S> Navy has the importance of an extremely flexible C4I architecture been made more apparent than in the last decade. Included are discussions of the Copernicus concept, its command and control doctrine, its architectural goals and components, and Copernicus-related programs. Also included is a discussion on joint service efforts and the initiatives being conducted by the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army. Finally, a discussion of the Copernicus Phase I Requirements Definition Document's compliance with the acquisition process as required by DoD Instruction 5000.2 is presented.http://archive.org/details/overviewofcopern00dearLieutenant, United States NavyApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

NASA's Space Research and Technology Program. Report of a workshop

The status of the spacecraft and subsystem industry and the civil and military uses of space were examined. Genetic and specific enabling technologies were identified. It was found that U.S. spacecraft manufacturers support civil and commercial uses, the military and NASA and, in turn, are supported by subsystem suppliers. However, no single spacecraft program carries sufficient resources to develop advanced critical subsystem technologies and increasingly, U.S. suppliers are facing strong competition from foreign industry that is government subsidized

A Validation Assessment of THUNDER 6.5\u27s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Module

A validation assessment of THUNDER 6.5\u27s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) module is accomplished using formulational and experimental validation techniques. A comparison of ISR purposes and processes according to military doctrine is made with the purposes and processes of ISR implemented within THUNDER 6.5. This comparison provides an overview of the process, an understanding of the level of aggregation within THUNDER, insight into possible problem areas in THUNDER, and a basis for improving THUNDER ISR processes. Sensitivity analysis of the ISR parameters as they relate to the Quality, Quantity, and Timeliness of ISR is also presented to provide insight into the responsiveness of THUNDER to changes in ISR capability for selected battle outcomes. Linear Regression and a Face-Centered Central Composite Design were used to generate a response surface. Ninety-percent confidence intervals were used to determine differences in mean response among the full factorial design points

Summary Of The Second Army DIS Data Call: Technical Report

Report identifying user requirements, such as operational needs and corresponding functional requirements, so that effective decisions can be made regarding ongoing DIS development and use

Nuclear Deterrence and the Space and Cyber domains

NPS NRP Technical ReportThe space and cyber domains are becoming increasingly intertwined in both conventional and theoretical nuclear conflicts. Deterrence strategies involving aggression, escalation, and deterrence must evolve with ever changing reality of the world situation. The space and cyber domains are unique from other domains since actions taken in these domains may be unattributable to a state actor and damage that occurs may be non-kinetic yet severe at the same time. In the past the U.S. has clearly defined nuclear redlines and communicated these to potential adversaries to help them understand actions which could be interpreted by the U.S. as precursor to nuclear aggression. Clearly communicated nuclear redlines seem to have been effective strategy at deterring the actions defined by the redline. In many cases potential adversaries have protested some of the redlines, but regardless of their protest in practically every case they still abided by them. It is vitally important that nuclear redlines evolve as the world situation and technology progress. This is not a simple task. Many space and cyber assets are dual tasked with conventional and nuclear missions. This project will help define which events in these domains is significant enough to warrant a kinetic response from the U.S., and which may justified crossing the nuclear threshold. With this understanding, recommendations will be made to improve or modify U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy if necessary. Keywords: Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Deterrence, Space domain, cyber domain, crossdomainN3/N5 - Plans & StrategyThis research is supported by funding from the Naval Postgraduate School, Naval Research Program (PE 0605853N/2098). https://nps.edu/nrpChief of Naval Operations (CNO)Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.