Survivability of Deterministic Dynamical Systems

The notion of a part of phase space containing desired (or allowed) states of a dynamical system is important in a wide range of complex systems research. It has been called the safe operating space, the viability kernel or the sunny region. In this paper we define the notion of survivability: Given a random initial condition, what is the likelihood that the transient behaviour of a deterministic system does not leave a region of desirable states. We demonstrate the utility of this novel stability measure by considering models from climate science, neuronal networks and power grids. We also show that a semi-analytic lower bound for the survivability of linear systems allows a numerically very efficient survivability analysis in realistic models of power grids. Our numerical and semi-analytic work underlines that the type of stability measured by survivability is not captured by common asymptotic stability measures.Comment: 21 pages, 6 figure

Topological resilience in non-normal networked systems

The network of interactions in complex systems, strongly influences their resilience, the system capability to resist to external perturbations or structural damages and to promptly recover thereafter. The phenomenon manifests itself in different domains, e.g. cascade failures in computer networks or parasitic species invasion in ecosystems. Understanding the networks topological features that affect the resilience phenomenon remains a challenging goal of the design of robust complex systems. We prove that the non-normality character of the network of interactions amplifies the response of the system to exogenous disturbances and can drastically change the global dynamics. We provide an illustrative application to ecology by proposing a mechanism to mute the Allee effect and eventually a new theory of patterns formation involving a single diffusing species

Topological resilience in non-normal networked systems

The network of interactions in complex systems, strongly influences their resilience, the system capability to resist to external perturbations or structural damages and to promptly recover thereafter. The phenomenon manifests itself in different domains, e.g. cascade failures in computer networks or parasitic species invasion in ecosystems. Understanding the networks topological features that affect the resilience phenomenon remains a challenging goal of the design of robust complex systems. We prove that the non-normality character of the network of interactions amplifies the response of the system to exogenous disturbances and can drastically change the global dynamics. We provide an illustrative application to ecology by proposing a mechanism to mute the Allee effect and eventually a new theory of patterns formation involving a single diffusing species

Survivability modeling for cyber-physical systems subject to data corruption

Cyber-physical critical infrastructures are created when traditional physical infrastructure is supplemented with advanced monitoring, control, computing, and communication capability. More intelligent decision support and improved efficacy, dependability, and security are expected. Quantitative models and evaluation methods are required for determining the extent to which a cyber-physical infrastructure improves on its physical predecessors. It is essential that these models reflect both cyber and physical aspects of operation and failure. In this dissertation, we propose quantitative models for dependability attributes, in particular, survivability, of cyber-physical systems. Any malfunction or security breach, whether cyber or physical, that causes the system operation to depart from specifications will affect these dependability attributes. Our focus is on data corruption, which compromises decision support -- the fundamental role played by cyber infrastructure. The first research contribution of this work is a Petri net model for information exchange in cyber-physical systems, which facilitates i) evaluation of the extent of data corruption at a given time, and ii) illuminates the service degradation caused by propagation of corrupt data through the cyber infrastructure. In the second research contribution, we propose metrics and an evaluation method for survivability, which captures the extent of functionality retained by a system after a disruptive event. We illustrate the application of our methods through case studies on smart grids, intelligent water distribution networks, and intelligent transportation systems. Data, cyber infrastructure, and intelligent control are part and parcel of nearly every critical infrastructure that underpins daily life in developed countries. Our work provides means for quantifying and predicting the service degradation caused when cyber infrastructure fails to serve its intended purpose. It can also serve as the foundation for efforts to fortify critical systems and mitigate inevitable failures --Abstract, page iii

Disaster-Resilient Control Plane Design and Mapping in Software-Defined Networks

Communication networks, such as core optical networks, heavily depend on their physical infrastructure, and hence they are vulnerable to man-made disasters, such as Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attacks, as well as to natural disasters. Large-scale disasters may cause huge data loss and connectivity disruption in these networks. As our dependence on network services increases, the need for novel survivability methods to mitigate the effects of disasters on communication networks becomes a major concern. Software-Defined Networking (SDN), by centralizing control logic and separating it from physical equipment, facilitates network programmability and opens up new ways to design disaster-resilient networks. On the other hand, to fully exploit the potential of SDN, along with data-plane survivability, we also need to design the control plane to be resilient enough to survive network failures caused by disasters. Several distributed SDN controller architectures have been proposed to mitigate the risks of overload and failure, but they are optimized for limited faults without addressing the extent of large-scale disaster failures. For disaster resiliency of the control plane, we propose to design it as a virtual network, which can be solved using Virtual Network Mapping techniques. We select appropriate mapping of the controllers over the physical network such that the connectivity among the controllers (controller-to-controller) and between the switches to the controllers (switch-to-controllers) is not compromised by physical infrastructure failures caused by disasters. We formally model this disaster-aware control-plane design and mapping problem, and demonstrate a significant reduction in the disruption of controller-to-controller and switch-to-controller communication channels using our approach.Comment: 6 page