1,416 research outputs found

    Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems

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    The first-ever Ukraine cyberattack on power grid has proven its devastation by hacking into their critical cyber assets. With administrative privileges accessing substation networks/local control centers, one intelligent way of coordinated cyberattacks is to execute a series of disruptive switching executions on multiple substations using compromised supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These actions can cause significant impacts to an interconnected power grid. Unlike the previous power blackouts, such high-impact initiating events can aggravate operating conditions, initiating instability that may lead to system-wide cascading failure. A systemic evaluation of "nightmare" scenarios is highly desirable for asset owners to manage and prioritize the maintenance and investment in protecting their cyberinfrastructure. This survey paper is a conceptual expansion of real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analyses, and mitigation (RAIM) framework that emphasizes on the resulting impacts, both on steady-state and dynamic aspects of power system stability. Hypothetically, we associate the combinatorial analyses of steady state on substations/components outages and dynamics of the sequential switching orders as part of the permutation. The expanded framework includes (1) critical/noncritical combination verification, (2) cascade confirmation, and (3) combination re-evaluation. This paper ends with a discussion of the open issues for metrics and future design pertaining the impact quantification of cyber-related contingencies

    A survey on cyber security for smart grid communications

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    A smart grid is a new form of electricity network with high fidelity power-flow control, self-healing, and energy reliability and energy security using digital communications and control technology. To upgrade an existing power grid into a smart grid, it requires significant dependence on intelligent and secure communication infrastructures. It requires security frameworks for distributed communications, pervasive computing and sensing technologies in smart grid. However, as many of the communication technologies currently recommended to use by a smart grid is vulnerable in cyber security, it could lead to unreliable system operations, causing unnecessary expenditure, even consequential disaster to both utilities and consumers. In this paper, we summarize the cyber security requirements and the possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications and survey the current solutions on cyber security for smart grid communications. © 2012 IEEE

    Defending Against Firmware Cyber Attacks on Safety-Critical Systems

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    In the past, it was not possible to update the underlying software in many industrial control devices. Engineering teams had to ‘rip and replace’ obsolete components. However, the ability to make firmware updates has provided significant benefits to the companies who use Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), switches, gateways and bridges as well as an array of smart sensor/actuators. These updates include security patches when vulnerabilities are identified in existing devices; they can be distributed by physical media but are increasingly downloaded over Internet connections. These mechanisms pose a growing threat to the cyber security of safety-critical applications, which are illustrated by recent attacks on safety-related infrastructures across the Ukraine. Subsequent sections explain how malware can be distributed within firmware updates. Even when attackers cannot reverse engineer the code necessary to disguise their attack, they can undermine a device by forcing it into a constant upload cycle where the firmware installation never terminates. In this paper, we present means of mitigating the risks of firmware attack on safety-critical systems as part of wider initiatives to secure national critical infrastructures. Technical solutions, including firmware hashing, must be augmented by organizational measures to secure the supply chain within individual plants, across companies and throughout safety-related industries

    Detection techniques in operational technology infrastructure

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    In previous decades, cyber-attacks have not been considered a threat to critical infrastructure. However, as the Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) domains converge, the vulnerability of OT infrastructure is being exploited. Nation-states, cyber criminals and hacktivists are moving to benefit from economic and political gains. The OT network, i.e. Industrial Control System (ICS) is referred to within OT infrastructure as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). SCADA systems were introduced primarily to optimise the data transfer within OT network infrastructure. The introduction of SCADA can be traced back to the 1960’s, a time where cyber-attacks were not considered. Hence SCADA networks and associated systems are highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks which can ultimately result in catastrophic events. Historically, when deployed, intrusion detection systems in converged IT/OT networks are deployed and monitor the IT side of the network. While academic research into OT specific intrusion detection is not a new direction, application to real systems are few and lack the contextual information required to make intrusion detection systems actionable. This paper provides an overview of cyber security in OT SCADA networks. Through evaluating the historical development of OT systems and protocols, a range of current issues caused by the IT/OT convergence is presented. A number of publicly disclosed SCADA vulnerabilities are outlined, in addition to approaches for detecting attacks in OT networks. The paper concludes with a discussion of what the future of interconnected OT systems should entail, and the potential risks of continuing with an insecure design philosophy

    Comprehensive Survey and Taxonomies of False Injection Attacks in Smart Grid: Attack Models, Targets, and Impacts

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    Smart Grid has rapidly transformed the centrally controlled power system into a massively interconnected cyber-physical system that benefits from the revolutions happening in the communications (e.g. 5G) and the growing proliferation of the Internet of Things devices (such as smart metres and intelligent electronic devices). While the convergence of a significant number of cyber-physical elements has enabled the Smart Grid to be far more efficient and competitive in addressing the growing global energy challenges, it has also introduced a large number of vulnerabilities culminating in violations of data availability, integrity, and confidentiality. Recently, false data injection (FDI) has become one of the most critical cyberattacks, and appears to be a focal point of interest for both research and industry. To this end, this paper presents a comprehensive review in the recent advances of the FDI attacks, with particular emphasis on 1) adversarial models, 2) attack targets, and 3) impacts in the Smart Grid infrastructure. This review paper aims to provide a thorough understanding of the incumbent threats affecting the entire spectrum of the Smart Grid. Related literature are analysed and compared in terms of their theoretical and practical implications to the Smart Grid cybersecurity. In conclusion, a range of technical limitations of existing false data attack research is identified, and a number of future research directions is recommended.Comment: Double-column of 24 pages, prepared based on IEEE Transaction articl
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