An uneasy reality: Donor support for IDPs in Ukraine Łukasz Wenerski, Andriy Korniychuk, Oleksandr Kliuzhev (cooperation)

According to international organizations, since the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbas, internal migrations might have affected from two to three million people. From Crimea and Donbas alone, 1.5 million Ukrainian citizens had to change their place of residence. Concerns that these internally displaced persons (IDPs) will become “Ukraine’s lost generation” have been voiced. A considerable number of Ukrainian citizens affected by the war in eastern Ukraine have started to look for either international protection on the territory of the EU or possible ways to pursue economic migration. Taking into account the unresolved refugee crisis in Europe, the international community has a particular interest in making sure the situation in Ukraine does not get out of hand. In this regard, the effectiveness of the assistance to the Ukrainian state and its civil society provided by international donors is of paramount importance. Whereas the migration crisis has revealed new challenges faced by the Ukrainian state as it is undergoing the process of reform, it has also contributed to an increase in the public activity of Ukrainian citizens. Some of the most active IDPs have managed to find their place in the new reality (within the country or outside Ukraine), however, many have failed to cope with the displacement and are still struggling with huge economic and social problems. In some places, basic humanitarian aid is still required, yet IDPs today generally face other problems, most frequently difficulties in finding a job and the lack of proper housing. There are several reasons for IDPs’ critical situation on the labor market: the unfavorable condition of the Ukrainian economy, skills that do not fit the Ukrainian economy (a consequence of the fact that Donbas was dominated by heavy industry and the mining industry, in particular), and sometimes the inactivity of the displaced people themselves (an effect of living many years under non- democratic rule in the region). This paper aims at analyzing the socio-economic reality of IDPs in Ukraine as well as the state’s response to their challenges from the perspective of the IDP community. In addition, it presents how Ukrainian NGOs assess donor support for IDPs and what Ukrainian civil society expects from the international community in those areas where assistance is needed most

Study of the Outcomes and Impacts of the Global Forum on Migration and Development and Civil Society Days

In November 2011, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and accompanying Civil Society Days (CSD) completed their fifth year of operation, with the aim of improving migration policy coherence and enhancing the benefits of migration to sending and receiving countries, and to migrants themselves. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the largest non-governmental donor to this process, commissioned this study to retrospectively assess the outcomes and impact of the CSD and GFMD on policies, practices, issue framing, and government-civil society cooperation; and to prospectively draw lessons learned for the future of the GFMD and CSD. The evaluation took place from November 2011 through September 2012, allowing the team to observe the CSD and GFMD in Geneva, conduct an in-depth case study in Mexico, distribute online surveys to participants, conduct interviews at the UN offices in New York, and conduct key informant interviews by phone. Using a mixed method approach, combining quantitative survey data with qualitative key informant interviews and an extensive document review, the team has worked to triangulate data and strengthen the validity of findings. This study is geared towards the main stakeholders of the GFMD and CSD, including governments, civil society representatives, and donors. It is hoped that the aforementioned stakeholders will be able to utilize the findings, conclusions, and recommendations within this report to better inform their work in migration and development moving forward -- both within and outside of the GFMD and CSD processes

Climate Justice and Women's Rights: A Guide to Supporting Grassroots Women's Action

This Guide emerged from a "Summit on Women and Climate" in Bali, Indonesia, and aims to increase timely and appropriate funding for worldwide climate action initiatives led by women and their communities. The Guide is not a comprehensive resource on climate change or women's rights. Instead, it addresses an urgent need within the funding community and offers concrete, practical guidance that: Orients grantmakers to the importance of funding at the intersection of climate justice and women's rights.Draws lessons from specific examples of funding for women's climate change initiatives.Provides guidance on how funders can collaborate to direct timely and appropriate funding to women and their communities.Advocates for bringing women's voices into climate change policy discussions.Highlights the strong impact that small (less than $10,000) to medium-sized ($10,000-$50,000) grants can make in women-organized efforts to address climate change at the community level, across geographic boundaries and in global climate policy. Grassroots women's climate activism is becoming increasingly critical to women's collective and individual rights, freedom and survival

Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in Their Countries of Origin.

This paper analyzes the impact of established Diaspora on the reduction of poverty, and identifies ways in which policy interventions, especially from donors of official development assistance, might strengthen that impact. The new policy interest in Diasporas reflects a broader concern with globalization, and specifically the very recent appreciation of the volume of remittances to developing countries by emigrant workers and their descendents. Remittances, however, are far from being the only vehicle for Diaspora influence on the incidence of poverty in their home countries

Issue 17: Private Sponsorship in Canada: The Resettlement of Syrian Refugees in the Kitchener-Waterloo Region

The number of refugees in need of resettlement in the world is estimated to surpass 1.44 million people in 2020, with Syrians currently representing 40% of refugees in need of resettlement. In late 2015, the Canadian government made a commitment to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees and, since then, there has been abundant research analysing the large-scale resettlement process, its successes, limitations, and lessons for future policymaking and host communities. This Policy Points contributes to these analyses by unpacking the particular lessons from the Kitchener-Waterloo region, and highlighting the resettlement experiences of privately sponsored Syrian refugees in this area. It draws on policy, program, and scholarly documents, and on a selection of 55 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with mainly privately sponsored (and some government-assisted) Syrian refugees on their experiences of resettlement in southern Ontario, Canada. In this Policy Points, we emphasize that strong leadership by governments and civil society groups and organizations is crucial in the private sponsorship of Syrians, and that more policy attention and research are needed to improve the private sponsorship program in the K-W region

Diaspora Philanthropy: Influences, Initiatives, and Issues

Analyzes the evolution of the interest in and practice of giving by diasporas in the United States to their countries of origin, organizations and models promoting it, influencing factors, and promising strategies and initiatives for increasing impact

Immigrant Integration in Los Angeles: Strategic Directions for Funders

Provides an overview of the immigrant population; their contributions and challenges; the need for leadership development and other efforts to support their economic mobility, civic participation, and integration; and strategies for funding such efforts

Divided Diasporas: Southern Africans in Canada

The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy. The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time. Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50- 75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%). Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of employment. The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy first. Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct abuse. The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the economic conditions there. The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant enterprises. The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis

Harnessing Migration for Inclusive Growth and Development in Southern Africa

The primary goal of this study is to present the results of a comprehensive scope of key opportunities and challenges for harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development at the regional level in Southern Africa. The main objectives were as follows: Provide an overview of regional migration stocks and flows identifying regional trends, drivers and impacts from existing research literature and official data; Profile migrant characteristics at the regional level including demographic composition, types of migration and occupational profile; Examine the relevance of multilateral, continental and regional migration instruments, policies, protocols, agreements and forums with a view to identifying actions required to move the regional migration management agenda forward and align with the goal of enhancing migration for inclusive growth and development in Southern Africa; Analyze the key initiatives, opportunities and obstacles to developing a coherent, integrated and rights-regarding approach to migration management including areas of common commitment and ownership, and points of actual and potential conflict and disagreement between states; Conduct a gender analysis of regional migration dynamics including gender dimensions of migration, challenges, dangers and vulnerabilities confronting migrant women and other vulnerable groups, and gender analysis of migration management in Southern Africa; Identify potential programming areas that are weak or underdeveloped. The report relies on data and information from four main sources: (a) existing research literature and data on regional migration dynamics and trends in Southern Africa; (b) official data sources, where available, to identify current patterns, trends and types of migration; (c) bilateral global migration data sets compiled by the UNDP and the World Bank; and (d) a programme of field research involving key informant interviews and consultations with stakeholders, international organizations and donors, national government departments, and representatives from civil society, business, labour and the academy. Country visits were undertaken to South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe. A total of 60 interviews were conducted with 86 interviewees. The first two sections of the report outline the objectives and methodology of the research. The third section provides a contextual analysis of regional migration in Southern Africa to demonstrate that migration is a quintessentially regional issue and development challenge. There are a number of reasons why a regional – as opposed to a purely national – conceptual and policy approach to migration is desirable and necessary: Cross-border movements of people have a long history and constitute one of the major mechanisms of regional integration in Southern Africa (along with trade and investment). Goods and capital move relatively freely and legally across the region but people still face considerable obstacles and barriers to movement; Vast differences in levels of development and employment opportunities across the region have led to extremely uneven migration flows. All countries both send and receive migrants but the balance between the two varies significantly. Zimbabwe was a major destination before 2000 but has since become the region’s single largest exporter of migrants. South Africa is the major destination; Temporary, circular migration is the norm in the region with migrants retaining close ties with home countries and communities through formal and informal transfers of cash and goods in the form of remittances. In effect, migration and remittances have become a major source of development finance across the region; The majority of migration movements within and to the Southern African region fall into the category of South-South migration. This form of migration, from one developing country to another, can have positive and simultaneous development impacts on both countries of origin and destination; From a migration management perspective, regional organizations have recognized the importance of regional harmonization and co-ordinated action. However, governments have been slower to recognize the reality of regional migration, leading to a disjuncture between initiatives to facilitate movement and co-ordinate migration for development at the continental and regional level, and national governments that tend to view migration negatively and avoid any binding commitment to regional migration processes and instruments. The analysis of migration trends and flows distinguishes between (a) migration within the Southern African region from one country to another; (b) migration to Southern Africa from other countries, especially the rest of Africa; and (c) migration from Southern Africa to other parts of the globe. Each has implications and opportunities for harnessing migration for development and inclusive growth. For example: All of the countries of Southern Africa host some migrants, with the major migration destinations being South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and Botswana. All are also migrant-sending countries with the major intra-regional senders being Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi and Angola. Even South Africa sends migrants to other countries in the region. In policy terms, this means that although many countries are threatened by what they view as an uncontrolled influx of migrants, they are themselves also migrant senders and beneficiaries of out-migration to other countries. Migration flows within the region have undergone major changes in the last two decades, including a significant decline in forced (refugee) migration, an equally significant increase in migration for economic and livelihood reasons, more diversity in flows including increasing female and youth migration, a decline in formal contract migration to South African mines, and a concomitant increase in unregulated, informalized migration across borders. Data and reliable information on all of these trends and their drivers are largely absent. In total, 53% of all Southern Africa-born migrants are living outside the region. The five major sending countries are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, the DRC and Mauritius. The five major destinations are the United Kingdom, Australia, France, the United States and Portugal. Shared histories and common languages have resulted in the emergence of migration corridors that include South Africa-UK, South Africa-Australia, Angola-Portugal, Zimbabwe-UK and Madagascar-France. The majority of migrants who leave the region are relatively skilled, leading to claims that countries of destination are responsible for a “brain drain” from the region. This argument has largely been replaced by the realization that these migrants are actually a resource with a potentially strong development role to play. Against the backdrop of complex and shifting migration patterns and flows, the report identifies key development-related implications of these migration trends and characteristics and presents relevant information and data on each. This provides substantive context and a link to the programming recommendations later in the report. The five areas are: (a) gender and migration; (b) migrant rights and protections; (c) migration and remittances; (d) migration and informal entrepreneurship and (e) diasporas for development. Although the available information on each area is uneven across the region, evidence is marshalled to suggest that each offers important opportunities for meeting the overall goal of harnessing migration for development and inclusive growth. These areas are united by a focus on the importance and development implications of women’s migration. The major findings from the analysis of these five areas include the following: Southern Africa is undergoing a process of feminization of migration with increased independent women’s migration. The number of female migrants in SADC is now over 2 million. In the major destination country (South Africa), the proportion of female migrants has reached 40% of the total. Gender-disaggregated data on migrant flows and occupations is generally unavailable, although South African data suggests that a migrant woman has only a 56% probability of being employed compared to a migrant man. There is a growing body of case-study evidence on informal temporary migration and the low wage regime and exploitative conditions in sectors such as construction, illicit mining, commercial agriculture and domestic work. For those migrant women who are employed, many are engaged in precarious livelihoods. Some are employed in potentially exploitative conditions with weak oversight or protection of their labour rights, for example as domestic or agricultural workers. Others are engaged in inherently precarious informal occupations such as trading, hair braiding and other beauty services, or craft production and sales, often conducted in unsafe spaces. Related to their precarious working and living conditions, female migrants experience gender-based violence and other health vulnerabilities. Poor treatment of female migrants on the way to and at the workplace exercises an extremely negative impact on the migrants themselves and their households, and is also antithetical to development and inclusive growth in their home countries. Low wages and other forms of financial extortion, for example, significantly reduce the remitting ability of migrants. Precarious employment in the agricultural and domestic service sectors is highly gendered with female migrants being most vulnerable to exploitation by formal and informal labour brokers and recruiters, employers and the authorities (especially the police). There is considerable evidence that remitting is an extremely common practice in Southern Africa. However, much remitting is through informal channels, and accurate data on remittance flows at the regional level is not available. The World Bank calculates that remittance flows to the countries of Southern Africa reached USD1 billion in 2014. Only a third of remittances to Southern African countries come from other countries within the region. Over two-thirds of remittances to Southern African countries therefore come from outside the region. Globally, female migrants send approximately the same per capita amount of remittances as male migrants but women tend to send a higher proportion of their income. Women also usually send money more regularly and for longer periods of time than men. In Southern Africa there is some evidence of distinct gender differences in remitting amounts, frequency and means of remitting, remittance recipients and use of remittances. This suggests that data, research and policy-making on migration and remittances needs to be gender-disaggregated. The number of migrants running small and microenterprises or being employed by these businesses is considerable in towns and cities across the region. In South Africa, as many as one-third of migrants are self-employed in the informal economy. Surveys of migrant entrepreneurs show that the sector is dominated by young people and that women occupy particular niches. Informal business owners have positive development impacts in countries of destination and origin through remittance of business profits, generating employment, rental of business properties, providing cheaper services, supporting formal sector businesses and payment of operating licences to municipalities. The major challenges to business survival and expansion include difficulties of securing start-up capital and business loans from formal financial institutions, especially banks; lack of basic business training and skills; exclusion from formal banking systems; vulnerability to xenophobic attacks and destruction of stock and businesses premises; and hostile operating environments including official harassment, extortion and demands for bribes or protection money. While many governments are developing plans and policies for diaspora engagement, an important information gap concerns the attitudes of diasporas themselves to engagement in development-related activities and initiatives in their countries of origin. A study of the global Zambian diaspora showed that most are interested in making private investments in Zambia, with the greatest sectoral interest in agriculture/horticulture, import/export, manufacturing, tourism and transport. Many expressed interest in contributing to development projects in Zambia related to education, healthcare, infrastructure development, childcare and microfinance initiatives. A study of immigrants from the SADC in Canada found that many felt they have an important role to play in developing their countries of origin. The majority remit money to their country of origin. Preferred avenues of engagement include skills transfer, investing in businesses, participation in development projects, educational exchanges, volunteer work, fundraising for development projects, philanthropy, export and import of goods to and from the country of origin, investing in infrastructural development and providing distance learning. Others specifically mentioned their desire to be involved in activities that would lead to greater empowerment for women and children. The next section of the report examines the policy implications of the information about migration flows and development implications provided in the previous section. There was a considerable degree of unanimity among the stakeholders interviewed for this study on the importance of seeing migration as a regional development issue requiring a co-ordinated regional response in Southern Africa. There was some expectation of a difference in opinion between regional and national stakeholders. However, many of the latter were also willing to acknowledge that migration was not purely an issue of national importance. Where they differed was on who should be driving the agenda: national governments or regional bodies. In principle, there is significant awareness among SADC member states about the need to strengthen efforts aimed at harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development. In practice, little progress has been made on mainstreaming migration and development at the national or regional policy level. Regional efforts to forge a common approach to migration appear promising but, while states appear willing to make initial commitments to agreements, instruments and initiatives, they are generally unwilling to ratify and implement anything that appears to infringe on their national sovereignty or the perceived interests of citizens. At the regional level, there is a paucity of instruments that focus directly on migration and development. An evaluation of the SADC Secretariat’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) has concluded that “the relationship between migration and poverty is under-represented in the plan’s proposed intervention areas and only addressed in a partial and circumscribed manner.” Freedom of intraregional movement has been a principle of the SADC since its foundation, although this is not explicitly tied to positive development outcomes. Despite this objective, unfettered free movement is very far from being a reality. The Secretariat has had no success in getting all member states to ratify its two major regional mobility policy initiatives: the 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the 2005 Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons. Greater regional mobility initiatives are trumped by national immigration policies focused on movement control. SADC member states prefer to act bilaterally in their dealings with each other on migration through instruments such as Joint Permanent Commissions (JPCs) and Memoranda of Understanding. At the level of individual member states, the mandate and expertise required for, and resources devoted to, migration management is often limited to routine and operational capacity requirements, as opposed to a more strategic approach in which migration management is an essential component of development objectives. Little discernible progress has therefore been made with regard to the implementation of a free movement regime by the SADC Secretariat. In part, this is because there is very little data or analysis on exactly what the impact of removing border controls in the region would be. In many ways, the SADC is already a de facto free movement zone and the removal of controls would not have a massive impact on migration flows. What it would do is provide legal channels for those who want to migrate, reduce the opportunities for personal enrichment by corrupt state functionaries on both sides of borders, eliminate current high levels of corruption and abuse in the immigration system and reduce the exploitation of migrants who enjoy few rights and protections. However, free movement is likely to remain politically unpalatable to most states for the foreseeable future. One of the key components of inclusive growth strategies is poverty reduction through productive and decent employment. Given the high levels of poverty and inequality throughout Southern Africa, it is important to view migrant employment rights as an integral part of the inclusive growth agenda. The SADC Secretariat has made various efforts to put in place instruments that commit member states to protecting the rights of migrant workers. A recent study for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) examined the issue of migrant protection and rights in the Southern African region as a whole and identified the various regional-level commitments to protecting migrant rights and the obstacles to their implementation. This report examines various instruments including the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in SADC, the SADC Code on Social Security, ILO Conventions 87, 100, 111 and 182, the Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (Domestic Workers Convention), the SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour, and the SADC Regional Labour Migration Policy Framework and concludes that, as with the effort to implement freedom of movement, ratification and implementation are proving problematical as few member states are willing to ratify the appropriate instruments. A gender analysis of the various African Union (AU) and SADC strategic instruments shows that gender and migration issues feature only in piecemeal fashion. Regional-level instruments, polices and protocols do exist, but these are barely enforced and national laws and institutions take precedence. The persistent limitations of migration governance on the continent are recognized as an obstacle to regional and continental poverty reduction. Furthermore, policies and instruments to protect migrant and gender rights are implemented within a difficult social and political context in which xenophobic and patriarchal attitudes persist. In sum, there are many challenges in advancing gender-sensitive, rights-based migration governance in the SADC region. The scale, complexity and diversity of migration, combined with incomplete and inconsistent data, make it difficult to measure and monitor the gender composition of migrant flows and stocks, or to understand the particular contributions and vulnerabilities of female migrants. A dual focus on empowerment and protection should guide programming and policy development on gender and migration in the region. The final section of the report makes specific recommendations for a future regional programme on harnessing migration for development and inclusive growth. Given the lack of progress at regional and national level in advancing a migration and development agenda, we argue that programming should focus on “demonstration” projects that provide clear evidence of the development impacts of migration for countries of origin and destination. These projects could then be scaled up. In order to establish priority entry points, the report does three things: Presents the results of the stakeholder perceptions of priorities in which knowledge and information gaps were a recurrent theme; Analyzes and categorizes the recommendations for making migration work for development in the SDGs, the Valetta Accord and various AU and SADC agreements, protocols and instruments; Develops a Programming Framework (PF) consisting of 10 core migration and development issues and 27 associated potential entry points; and This analysis leads to the identification of five major entry points in the programming framework under the general rubric of a recommended programme on Gender and Migration for Development and Inclusive Growth in Southern Africa. For each point, the report provides a detailed rationale, examples of similar programmes and likely outcomes. In summary, the five recommended entry points are as follows: Entry Point One: Building a Gendered Knowledge Base on Migration. One of the recurrent themes in the stakeholder interviews was (a) the limited public availability and utility of official data on migration; and (b) the lack of knowledge about regional migration causes, volumes, experiences and impacts. A common failing of official data and the case-study research literature is the absence of systematic and generalizable information on the gendered nature of migration. In order to provide detailed, policy-relevant, gender-disaggregated data on migration and its development impacts, a different methodological approach is needed. There is a need for the collection of national migration data at the household level in countries

Snapshots of the Nepali-Speaking Community in New York City: Demographics and Challenges

As a relatively new community, Nepalis have often been overlooked by service providers or researchers working with and studying Asian or South Asian populations. There has been little comprehensive research done on Nepalis in any regional or national capacity within the United States. This lack of information poses a significant challenge to understanding and meeting the needs of this emergent and highly diverse community.Therefore, the Jankari Research Project was created to initiate a systematic collection of information on the demographics and other issues of importance to the Nepali-speaking communities, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Jankari means knowledge and information in Nepali, and the Jankari Research Project is a participatory action research project to help Adhikaar understand how we can best serve the needs of the Nepali-speaking community in New York City, and also inform other organizations and decision-makers. We sought to understand the reasons for the increase in migration of Nepalis to the New York City area in the past decade, the economic, political and social activities of Nepalis here, and the challenges that they face, especially with regards to work, social services, and health care