403 research outputs found
Exploring the limits of incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency in complex economic environments
In this dissertation auction formats are developed and discussed that focus on three specific economic environments. Regarding the impossibility results from mechanism design, the main task for the implementation of auction designs is to balance allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility – the main characteristics a mechanism should provide.
Therefore, the dissertation investigates the limits of conceivable relaxations of allocative efficiency and incentive compatibility for complex settings such as double auctions, interdependent-valuation environments and electricity market designs. The overall aim is to carefully weigh up the advantages and disadvantages for either relaxing allocative efficiency or respectively incentive compatibility.:Preface … 7
1. Introduction … 8
1.1. Applications of auction design … 8
1.2. Optimal use of information in allocation processes … 12
1.3. Modeling non-cooperative situations … 14
1.4. Motivation for the dissertation … 16
2. An Incentive Compatible Double Auction for Multi-Unit Markets with Heterogeneous Goods … 21
2.1. Introduction into double auctions … 21
2.2. Setting of a multi-unit market with heterogeneous goods … 25
2.3. Concept of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 29
2.4. Definition of the allocation rule … 31
2.5. Creation of the price vector and the trading bundles … 37
2.6. Characteristics of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 40
2.7. Discussion of the properties of the Incentive Compatible Double Auction (ICDA) … 43
3. An Alternating-Price Auction for Interdependent-Valuation
Environments … 46
3.1. Introduction into ex-post efficient auction design … 46
3.2. Setting of an interdependent-valuation environment … 50
3.3. Concept of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) … 54
3.4. Characteristics of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) 62
3.5. Discussion of the properties of the Alternating-Price Auction (APA) … 64
4. Facilitating Short-Term and Long-Term Efficiency with an Integrated Electricity Market Design … 66
4.1. Introduction into electricity market designs … 66
4.2. Setting of an electricity market … 72
4.3. Concept of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 78
4.4. Characteristics of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 88
4.5. Discussion of the properties of the Integrated Electricity Market Design (IEMD) … 91
5. Conclusion ... 94
Reference List … 9
A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS
The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing
Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1
This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing
Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Market-Based Allocation of Grid Services
The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational services is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic service provisioning and usage of Grid services, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems.
The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a bidding agent framework for implementing artificial bidding agents, supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation as well as automated bid generation by the requesting and provisioning of Grid services. Secondly, we introduce a novel consumer-side bidding strategy, which enables a goal-oriented and strategic behavior by the generation and submission of consumer service requests and selection of provider offers. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare the Q-strategy, implemented within the presented framework, against the Truth-Telling bidding strategy in three mechanisms – a centralized CDA, a decentralized on-line machine scheduling and a FIFO-scheduling mechanisms
Environmental analysis for application layer networks
Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechners über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt
Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions over Continuous Goods
This paper investigates reverse auctions that involve continuous values of
different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage
costs. We seek to design the payment rules and conditions under which
coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to
obtain higher collective utility. Under the incentive-compatible
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we show that coalition-proof outcomes are
achieved if the submitted bids are convex and the constraint sets are of a
polymatroid-type. These conditions, however, do not capture the complexity of
the general class of reverse auctions under consideration. By relaxing the
property of incentive-compatibility, we investigate further payment rules that
are coalition-proof without any extra conditions on the submitted bids and the
constraint sets. Since calculating the payments directly for these mechanisms
is computationally difficult for auctions involving many participants, we
present two computationally efficient methods. Our results are verified with
several case studies based on electricity market data
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