Future Agribusiness Challenges: Strategic Uncertainty, Innovation and Structural Change

The IFAMR is published by the International Food and Agribusiness Management Association.(IFAMA) www.ifama.orgStrategic uncertainty, innovation, structural change, Agribusiness, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies, Risk and Uncertainty, ISSN #: 1559-2448,

Bundled Payment vs. Fee-for-Service: Impact of Payment Scheme on Performance

Healthcare reimbursements in the United States have been traditionally based on a fee-for-service (FFS) scheme, providing incentives for high volume of care, rather than efficient care. The new healthcare legislation tests new payment models that remove such incentives, such as the bundled payment (BP) system. We consider a population of patients (beneficiaries). The provider may reject patients based on the patient’s cost profile and selects the treatment intensity based on a risk-averse utility function. Treatment may result in success or failure, where failure means that unforeseen complications require further care. Our interest is in analyzing the effect of different payment schemes on outcomes such as the presence and extent of patient selection, the treatment intensity, the provider’s utility and financial risk, and the total system payoff. Our results confirm that FFS provides incentives for excessive treatment intensity and results in suboptimal system payoff. We show that BP could lead to suboptimal patient selection and treatment levels that may be lower or higher than desirable for the system, with a high level of financial risk for the provider. We also find that the performance of BP is extremely sensitive to the bundled payment value and to the provider’s risk aversion. The performance of both BP and FFS degrades when the provider becomes more risk averse. We design two payment systems, hybrid payment and stop-loss mechanisms, that alleviate the shortcomings of FFS and BP and may induce system optimum decisions in a complementary manner. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management

Russian market power on the EU gas market: can Gazprom do the same as in Urkaine?

In the course of 2006, Gazprom sharply increased gas prices for Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. This paper assesses (i) to what extent Europe is vulnerable to similar use of market power by Russia, and (ii) to what extent the construction of strategic gas storage could help Europe to reduce its vulnerability. The European market for imported gas is described by differentiated Cournot competition between Russia and other – potentially more reliable – suppliers, in particular LNG imports. The results show that Russian market power is limited, because demand is not completely inelastic even in the short run. Moreover, if Russia’s unreliability increases (or if European short-run demand elasticity decreases) Russia gives away more and more of its expected profits to the other suppliers. For Europe, buying gas from more reliable suppliers at a price premium turns out to be more attractive than building storage capacity.

Managing Risk in Farming: Concepts, Research, and Analysis

The risks confronted by grain and cotton farmers are of particular interest, given the changing role of the Government after passage of the 1996 Farm Act. With the shift toward less government intervention in the post-1996 Farm Act environment, a more sophisticated understanding of risk and risk management is important to help producers make better decisions in risky situations and to assist policymakers in assessing the effectiveness of different types of risk protection tools. In response, this report provides a rigorous, yet accessible, description of risk and risk management tools and strategies at the farm level. It also provides never-before-published data on farmers' assessments of the risks they face, their use of alternative risk management strategies, and the changes they would make if faced with financial difficulty. It also compares price risk across crops and time periods, and provides detailed information on yield variability.crop insurance, diversification, futures contracts, leasing, leveraging, liquidity, livestock insurance, marketing contracts, options contracts, production contracts, revenue insurance, risk, vertical integration, Farm Management, Risk and Uncertainty,

Limited Liability and the Known Unknown

Limited liability is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, limited lia-bility may help overcome investors’ risk aversion and facilitate capital formation and economic growth. On the other hand, limited liability is widely believed to contribute to excessive risk-taking and externaliza-tion of losses to the public. The externalization problem can be mitigated imperfectly through existing mechanisms such as regulation, mandatory insurance, and minimum capital requirements. These mechanisms would be more effective if information asymmetries between industry and poli-cymakers were reduced. Private businesses typically have better infor-mation about industry-specific risks than policymakers. A charge for limited liability entities—resembling a corporate income tax but calibrated to risk levels—could have two salutary effects. First, a well-calibrated limited liability tax could help compensate the public fisc for risks and reduce externalization. Second, a limited liability tax could force private industry actors to reveal information to policymakers and regulators, thereby dynamically improving the public response to externalization risk. Charging firms for limited liability at initially similar rates will lead relatively low-risk firms to forgo limited liability, while relatively high-risk firms will pay for limited liability. Policymakers will then be able to focus on the industries whose firms have self-identified as high risk, and thus develop more finely tailored regulatory responses. Because the ben-efits of making the proper election are fully internalized by individual firms, whereas the costs of future regulation or limited liability tax changes will be borne collectively by industries, firms will be unlikely to strategically mislead policymakers in electing limited or unlimited lia-bility. By helping to reveal private information and focus regulators’ at-tention, a limited liability tax could accelerate the pace at which poli-cymakers learn, and therefore, the pace at which regulations improve

A FARM-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF SPECIALTY CROP PRODUCTION IN KENTUCKY

Special purpose crops are those with traits designed to meet the specificdemands of an end user. A mean-variance (E-V) mathematical programming modeland sensitivity analysis are used to quantify and discuss the potential net returns andrisk associated with the adoption of special purpose crops at the farm level.Furthermore, a spreadsheet-based decision aid is developed to assist farmers in thedecision of whether or not to produce high-oil corn on their operation.Results from this study indicate that the profitability of high-oil corn is verymarginal, dependent upon the ability of the crop to yield as well as conventional corn,and gain significant premiums. The potential of marketing this crop through aproducer-owned cooperative seems promising

Climate Smart Agriculture: Building Resilience to Climate Change

The book uses an economic lens to identify the main features of climate-smart agriculture (CSA), its likely impact, and the challenges associated with its implementation. Drawing upon theory and concepts from agricultural development, institutional, and resource economics, this book expands and formalizes the conceptual foundations of CSA. Focusing on the adaptation/resilience dimension of CSA, the text embraces a mixture of conceptual analyses, including theory, empirical and policy analysis, and case studies, to look at adaptation and resilience through three possible avenues: ex-ante reduction of vulnerability, increasing adaptive capacity, and ex-post risk coping. The book is divided into three sections. The first section provides conceptual framing, giving an overview of the CSA concept and grounding it in core economic principles. The second section is devoted to a set of case studies illustrating the economic basis of CSA in terms of reducing vulnerability, increasing adaptive capacity and ex-post risk coping. The final section addresses policy issues related to climate change. Providing information on this new and important field in an approachable way, this book helps make sense of CSA and fills intellectual and policy gaps by defining the concept and placing it within an economic decision-making framework. This book will be of interest to agricultural, environmental, and natural resource economists, development economists, and scholars of development studies, climate change, and agriculture. It will also appeal to policy-makers, development practitioners, and members of governmental and non-governmental organizations interested in agriculture, food security and climate change

Smallholder Participation in Agricultural Value Chains: Comparative Evidence from Three Continents

Supermarkets, specialized wholesalers, and processors and agro-exporters’ agricultural value chains have begun to transform the marketing channels into which smallholder farmers sell produce in low-income economies. We develop a conceptual framework through which to study contracting between smallholders and a commodity-processing firm. We then conduct an empirical meta-analysis of agricultural value chains in five countries across three continents (Ghana, India, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nicaragua). We document patterns of participation, the welfare gains associated with participation, reasons for non-participation, the significant extent of contract non-compliance, and the considerable dynamism of these value chains, as farmers and firms enter and exit frequently.

Contracts, Quality, and Default: Endogenizing a Buyer's Rejection Rate

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/06/07.Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis,

The floating contract between risk-averse supply chain partners in a volatile commodity price environment

In this dissertation, two separate but closely related decision making problems in environments of volatile commodity prices are addressed. In the first problem, a risk-averse commodity user\u27s purchasing policy and his risk-neutral supplier\u27s pricing decision, where the user can purchase his needs through contract with his supplier as well as directly from the spot market, are analyzed. The commodity user is assumed to be the supplier\u27s sole client, and the supplier can always expand capacity, at a cost to the user, to accommodate the user\u27s demand in excess of initially reserved capacity. In the more generalized second problem, both parties (commodity user and supplier) are assumed to be risk averse, and both can directly access the spot market. In addition to making pricing decisions, the supplier is also faced with the challenge of establishing the right combination of in-house production and spot market engagements to manage her risk of exposure to spot price volatility under the contract. While the supplier has a frictionless buy and sell access to the spot market, the user can only access this market for buying purposes and incurs an access fee that is linearly increasing in the purchased volume. In both problems, by adopting the mean-variance criterion to reflect aversion to risk, the decisions of both parties are explicitly characterized. Based on analytical results and numerical studies, managerial insights as to how changes in the model\u27s parameters would affect each party\u27s decisions are offered at length, and the implications of these results to the manager are discussed. A focal point for the dissertation is the consideration of a floating contract, the landing price of which is contingent on the realization of the commodity\u27s spot market price at the time of delivery. It was found that if properly designed, not only can this dynamic pricing arrangement strategically position a long-term supplier against spot market competition, but it also has the added benefit of leading to improved supply chain expected profits compared to a locked-in contract price setting. Another key finding is that when making her pricing decisions, the supplier runs the risk of overestimating the commodity user\u27s vulnerability at higher levels of the user\u27s aversion to risk as well as at higher volatility of spot prices