15,344 research outputs found

    Quantifying the efficiency of price-only contracts in push supply chains over demand distributions of known supports

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    In this paper, we quantify the efficiency of price-only contracts in supply chains with demand distributions by imposing prior knowledge only on the support, namely, those distributions with support [a, b] for 0 < a <_ b < +1. By characterizing the price of anarchy (PoA) under various push supply chain configurations, we enrich the application scope of the PoA concept in supply chain contracts along with complementary managerial insights. One of our major findings is that our quantitative analysis can identify scenarios where the price-only contract actually maintains its efficiency, namely, when the demand uncertainty, measured by the relative range b/a, is relatively low, entailing the price-only contract to be more attractive in this regard

    Competing for shelf space

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    This paper studies competition for shelf space in a multi-supplier retail point. We consider a retailer that seeks to allocate her shelf space to maximize her profit. Because products associated with larger profit margin are granted more shelf space, suppliers can offer the retailer financial incentives to obtain larger space allocations. We analyze the competitive dynamics arising from the scarcity of space, and show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We then demonstrate that the inefficiencies from decentralizing decision-making are limited to 6% with wholesale-price contracts, and that full coordination can be achieved with pay-to-stay fee contracts. We finally investigate how competition is distorted under the practice of category management.Game theory; Supply chain competition; Price of Anarchy; Pricing; Supply contracts;

    The Impact of Cheap Talk on Supply Chain Performance in Case of Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Investigation

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    The use of screening contracts is a common approach to solve supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information. One major assumption in this context is that subjects will rather use their private information strategically than to reveal them truthfully, if they do not get any incentives to do this. This harms supply chain performance. This paper investigates the influence of costless pre-game communication (i.e. communication without any direct incentives) between a supplier and a buyer in a lotsizing framework. A laboratory experiment was conducted to test, whether this costless pre-game communication has (in contradiction to standard game-theory) an influence on supply chain coordination.experimental economics, screening contracts, supply chain coordination

    Supply chain management in industrial production. A retrospective view

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    The article presents a retrospective review on key-issues about how the management discipline evolved up to the current view about supply-chain management (SCM) in industrial production. Specifically, the article resumes: a) the reasons that led to the transition from the traditional procurement policies to the SCM approach, b) the variables involved in the process of defining SCM relations and c) the key managerial principles underlying SCM policies and strategies. In the manufacturing industry the problem of organizing and managing firm’s relationships with supplier has recently become of an unprecedented complexity. The evolution of production systems started around the ‘80s, with the shift from the “flexible” paradigm to the “lean” one, has increased dramatically the intricacy of product and process architecture.. At the same time, the opportunities brought by the technological hybridization of products (that is: opportunities deriving from incorporating complementary technologies within products so to enhance its features and performance) gained a critical role as a competitive advantage. In our view supply chain management, as well as others managerial areas, has undergone a profound change; indeed, in the last 30 years the evolution of the industrial competitive environment has deeply modified the reference framework of supply-chain relationships even in common procurement and/or routine contracts. In the attempt to give an adequate response to changes in the competitive environment, supply policies evolve to become articulate relational strategies based on the strategic assessments of the role and the relevance of the various suppliers. The traditional approach to procurement management is combined with a perspective of value creation, a perspective that goes beyond the traditional “make-or-buy” criteria, since it introduces principles for the assessment of the strategic capability of the suppliers to create value for customer rather than to be able to fulfill its task for the firm. In such a view, firms operating in the same value-chain coordinate their strategies with a view to increase the overall value rather than compete for the allocation of the existing one. Firms’ network of suppliers and the relational capabilities assume a critical role in order to coordinate the value creation processes within the chain.Supply chain management, industrial management

    Multi Site Coordination using a Multi-Agent System

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    A new approach of coordination of decisions in a multi site system is proposed. It is based this approach on a multi-agent concept and on the principle of distributed network of enterprises. For this purpose, each enterprise is defined as autonomous and performs simultaneously at the local and global levels. The basic component of our approach is a so-called Virtual Enterprise Node (VEN), where the enterprise network is represented as a set of tiers (like in a product breakdown structure). Within the network, each partner constitutes a VEN, which is in contact with several customers and suppliers. Exchanges between the VENs ensure the autonomy of decision, and guarantiee the consistency of information and material flows. Only two complementary VEN agents are necessary: one for external interactions, the Negotiator Agent (NA) and one for the planning of internal decisions, the Planner Agent (PA). If supply problems occur in the network, two other agents are defined: the Tier Negotiator Agent (TNA) working at the tier level only and the Supply Chain Mediator Agent (SCMA) working at the level of the enterprise network. These two agents are only active when the perturbation occurs. Otherwise, the VENs process the flow of information alone. With this new approach, managing enterprise network becomes much more transparent and looks like managing a simple enterprise in the network. The use of a Multi-Agent System (MAS) allows physical distribution of the decisional system, and procures a heterarchical organization structure with a decentralized control that guaranties the autonomy of each entity and the flexibility of the network

    Market and Coordination Failures in Poor Rural Economies: Policy Implications for Agricultural and Rural Development

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    This paper argues that the disappointing outcomes of adjustment policies in poor rural economies, principally in sub-Saharan Africa, can be partly attributed to weaknesses in the neo-classical theory which underlies these polices and from associated failures to recognise structural changes (or transitions) in growing agricultural economies. After a brief description of agricultural policy changes in sub Saharan Africa, the mixed achievements of market liberalisation policies are explained using new institutional economic arguments regarding inherent difficulties in economic coordination in poor economies, difficulties which markets themselves cannot overcome. A novel framework is put forward for understanding coordination failure and integrating it with other causes of under-development notably low levels of technical and institutional development and poor governance. The paper concludes by considering the implications of these arguments for development policies in different sub-Saharan economies.development, coordination, markets, institutions, Marketing, O12, O17, Q12,

    Coordination of Decentralized Supply Chains: A Literature Review

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    Due to the fact that the double margin exists in the decentralized supply chain, many papers focus on the coordination of decentralized supply chain. In this paper, we classify these papers into three parts according to the structure of supply chain. The first kind of supply chain consists of one upstream supplier and one downstream retailer. The second one consists of multiple suppliers and a single retailer. The last one refers to the supply chain with multiple suppliers and a single retailer. This paper can enable readers to get the knowledge of existing research on supply chain coordination. We also give some interesting future research concerning this topic

    SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE FRESH PRODUCE INDUSTRY: A MILE TO GO?

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    We investigate the factors that influence vertical coordination in the fresh produce industry. Elaborating on the concept of governance structure, price and non-price coordination systems will be distinguished. Under previous research, there is a specific consideration as to how market conditions and institutional considerations influence the coordination of supply chains. In my presentation for the Food Distribution Research Society in Monterey, California, I analyzed how retail companies in the United States, France, and the Netherlands coordinate their supply chains of fruits and vegetables. Differences in product category and institutional environments do not contribute directly to the explanation of differences found in supply chain coordination systems. Industry-specific factors and firm-resource-based factors may supply a better understanding of these differences.Agribusiness,

    Policy Reform in Sub Saharan Africa

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    Agricultural adjustment policies in sub Saharan Africa have not delivered substantial increases in agricultural growth. We examine alternative explanations for this and argue that transitions and thresholds in agricultural growth processes are not sufficiently recognised and understood in dominant policy discourses. This is a particular problem with market failures for goods and services with private good characteristics and we need a greater emphasis on and understanding of the causes and nature of coordination failures which lead to these market failures. This paper examines core features of poor rural areas, the nature of coordination problems faced by different potential economic actors, the impacts of these problems on markets and economic development, and the ways that these have been addressed or ignored in different policies and policy approaches in Asia and Africa in the last 40 years. We conclude by drawing out the implications for policies seeking to promote pro-poor economic growth in poor rural areas today.Agricultural and Food Policy,
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