Bargaining power and supply base diversification

In this paper, the authors examine a supply base diversification problem faced by a buyer who periodically holds auctions to award short term supply contracts among a cohort of suppliers (i.e., the supply base). To mitigate significant cost shocks to procurement, the buyer can diversify her supply base by selecting suppliers from different regions. The authors find that the optimal degree of supply base diversification depends on the buyer’s bargaining power, i.e., the buyer’s ability to choose the auction mechanism. At one extreme, when the buyer has full bargaining power and thus can dictatorially implement the optimal mechanism, she prefers to fully diversify. At the other extreme, when the buyer uses a reverse English auction with no reserve price due to her lack of bargaining power, she may consider protecting herself against potential price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers by using a less diversified supply base. The authors find that in general the more bargaining power the buyer has to control price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers the more she prefers a diversified supply base. This insight is shown to be robust to correlation between regional costs, asymmetry across regions, and intermediate levels of bargaining power.supply base diversification; supplier; buyer; procurement; bargaining

An optimization model for strategic supply chain design under stochastic capacity disruptions

This Record of Study contains the details of an optimization model developed for Shell Oil Co. This model will be used during the strategic design process of a supply chain for a new technology commercialization. Unlike traditional supply chain deterministic optimization, this model incorporates different levels of uncertainty at suppliers’ nominal capacity. Because of the presence of uncertainty at the supply stage, the objective of this model is to define the best diversification and safety stock level allocated to each supplier, which minimize the total expected supply chain cost. We propose a Monte Carlo approach for scenario generation, a two-stage non-linear formulation and the Sample Average Approximation (SAA) procedure to solve the problem near optimality. We also propose a simple heuristic procedure to avoid the nonlinearity issue. The sampling and heuristic optimization procedures were implemented in a spreadsheet with a user’s interface. The main result of this development is the analysis of the impact of diversification in strategic sourcing decisions, in the presence of stochastic supply disruptions

Strategic Analysis of Dual Sourcing and Dual Channel with an Unreliable Alternative Supplier

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/148383/1/poms12938_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/148383/2/poms12938.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/148383/3/poms12938-sup-0001-AppendixS1.pd

Efficient Supply Chain Contracting with Loss-averse Players in Presence of Multiple Plausible Breaches

The legal literature distinguishes between the liquidated damage and the penalty clauses in contracts, and holds that penalties designed for the prevention of breach are excessive compared to the liquidated damages. In an efficient supply chain contract, the penalty must satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the signatories. Considering loss-averse players, we have calculated optimal penalties in a supply chain contract and compared those with the liquidated damages. Two possible breaches are considered – a breach in quality of the delivery and a breach in the process. In the absence of any penalty, a process breach reduces the supplier’s delivery risk and cost of delivery. Determining the parametric conditions for efficient contracts, numerically we show the effects of various variables on the zone of efficient contract. We show that the optimal penalties need not be excessive compared to the liquidated damages

Yield Uncertainty and Strategic Formation of Supply Chain Networks

How does supply uncertainty affect the structure of supply chain networks? To answer this question we consider a setting where retailers and suppliers must establish a costly relationship with each other prior to engaging in trade. Suppliers, with uncertain yield, announce wholesale prices, while retailers must decide which suppliers to link to based on their wholesale prices. Subsequently, retailers compete with each other in Cournot fashion to sell the acquired supply to consumers. We find that in equilibrium retailers concentrate their links among too few suppliers, i.e., there is insufficient diversification of the supply base. We find that either reduction of supply variance or increase of mean supply, increases a supplier's profit. However, these two ways of improving service have qualitatively different effects on welfare: improvement of the expected supply by a supplier makes everyone better off, whereas improvement of supply variance lowers consumer surplus

Bargaining Power and Supply Base Diversification

We examine a supply base diversification problem faced by a buyer who periodically holds auctions to award short term supply contracts among a cohort of suppliers (i.e., the supply base). To mitigate significant cost shocks to procurement, the buyer can diversify her supply base by selecting suppliers from different regions. We find that the optimal degree of supply base diversification depends on the buyer’s bargaining power, i.e., the buyer’s ability to choose the auction mechanism. At one extreme, when the buyer has full bargaining power and thus can dictatorially implement the optimal mechanism, she prefers to fully diversify. At the other extreme, when the buyer uses a reverse English auction with no reserve price due to her lack of bargaining power, she may consider protecting herself against potential price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers by using a less diversified supply base. We find that in general the more bargaining power the buyer has to control price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers the more she prefers a diversified supply base. This insight is shown to be robust to correlation between regional costs, asymmetry across regions, and intermediate levels of bargaining power.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61192/1/1118_Beil.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/61192/4/1118r_Beil.pd

Vulnerability and Bargaining Power in EU-Russia Gas Relations

This report contains three separate papers, each addressing selected issues concerning natural gas policy and security of gas supply in Europe. The over-arching themes are vulnerability (to supply disruptions, to supplier pricing power) and fragmentation; and measures designed to overcome them, namely interconnection and consolidation of bargaining power. The first paper contains a review of some of the economic effects of, and subsequent policy reactions to, the January 2009 cut of Russian gas supplies through the Ukraine Corridor, with a particular focus on Bulgaria and on EU policy. The second paper provides an analysis of the current state of gas relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, with a focus on the Ukrainian perspective and on recent political developments in that country. The third paper provides an analysis of the case for consolidating buyer power in line with the concept of an EU Gas Purchasing Agency.Natural gas, security of supply, supply disruption, interconnector, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, European Union, energy policy, fragmentation, bargaining power, countervailing power, gas purchasing agency