1,545 research outputs found
Dispelling Myths on Superposition Attacks: Formal Security Model and Attack Analyses
It is of folkloric belief that the security of classical cryptographic
protocols is automatically broken if the Adversary is allowed to perform
superposition queries and the honest players forced to perform actions
coherently on quantum states. Another widely held intuition is that enforcing
measurements on the exchanged messages is enough to protect protocols from
these attacks.
However, the reality is much more complex. Security models dealing with
superposition attacks only consider unconditional security. Conversely,
security models considering computational security assume that all supposedly
classical messages are measured, which forbids by construction the analysis of
superposition attacks. Boneh and Zhandry have started to study the quantum
computational security for classical primitives in their seminal work at
Crypto'13, but only in the single-party setting. To the best of our knowledge,
an equivalent model in the multiparty setting is still missing.
In this work, we propose the first computational security model considering
superposition attacks for multiparty protocols. We show that our new security
model is satisfiable by proving the security of the well-known One-Time-Pad
protocol and give an attack on a variant of the equally reputable Yao Protocol
for Secure Two-Party Computations. The post-mortem of this attack reveals the
precise points of failure, yielding highly counter-intuitive results: Adding
extra classical communication, which is harmless for classical security, can
make the protocol become subject to superposition attacks. We use this newly
imparted knowledge to construct the first concrete protocol for Secure
Two-Party Computation that is resistant to superposition attacks. Our results
show that there is no straightforward answer to provide for either the
vulnerabilities of classical protocols to superposition attacks or the adapted
countermeasures.Comment: 46 page
Quantum Cryptography Beyond Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum cryptography is the art and science of exploiting quantum mechanical
effects in order to perform cryptographic tasks. While the most well-known
example of this discipline is quantum key distribution (QKD), there exist many
other applications such as quantum money, randomness generation, secure two-
and multi-party computation and delegated quantum computation. Quantum
cryptography also studies the limitations and challenges resulting from quantum
adversaries---including the impossibility of quantum bit commitment, the
difficulty of quantum rewinding and the definition of quantum security models
for classical primitives. In this review article, aimed primarily at
cryptographers unfamiliar with the quantum world, we survey the area of
theoretical quantum cryptography, with an emphasis on the constructions and
limitations beyond the realm of QKD.Comment: 45 pages, over 245 reference
Attacking Group Protocols by Refuting Incorrect Inductive Conjectures
Automated tools for finding attacks on flawed security protocols often fail to deal adequately with group protocols. This is because the abstractions made to improve performance on fixed 2 or 3 party protocols either preclude the modelling of group protocols all together, or permit modelling only in a fixed scenario, which can prevent attacks from being discovered. This paper describes Coral, a tool for finding counterexamples to incorrect inductive conjectures, which we have used to model protocols for both group key agreement and group key management, without any restrictions on the scenario. We will show how we used Coral to discover 6 previously unknown attacks on 3 group protocols
Unconditionally Secure Bit Commitment
We describe a new classical bit commitment protocol based on cryptographic
constraints imposed by special relativity. The protocol is unconditionally
secure against classical or quantum attacks. It evades the no-go results of
Mayers, Lo and Chau by requiring from Alice a sequence of communications,
including a post-revelation verification, each of which is guaranteed to be
independent of its predecessor.Comment: Typos corrected. Reference details added. To appear in Phys. Rev.
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Composability in quantum cryptography
In this article, we review several aspects of composability in the context of
quantum cryptography. The first part is devoted to key distribution. We discuss
the security criteria that a quantum key distribution protocol must fulfill to
allow its safe use within a larger security application (e.g., for secure
message transmission). To illustrate the practical use of composability, we
show how to generate a continuous key stream by sequentially composing rounds
of a quantum key distribution protocol. In a second part, we take a more
general point of view, which is necessary for the study of cryptographic
situations involving, for example, mutually distrustful parties. We explain the
universal composability framework and state the composition theorem which
guarantees that secure protocols can securely be composed to larger
applicationsComment: 18 pages, 2 figure
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