8 research outputs found

    Paradoxes in a Multi-criteria Routing Game

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    International audienceIn this paper, we consider a routing game in a network that contains lossy links. We consider a multi-objective problem where the players have each a weighted sum of a delay cost and a cost for losses. We compute the equilibrium and optimal solution (which are unique). We discover here in addition to the classical Kameda type paradox another paradoxical behavior in which higher loss rates have a positive impact on delay and therefore higher quality links may cause a worse performance even in the case of a single player

    Toll competition in highway transportation networks

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    Within a highway transportation network, the social welfare implications of two different groups of agents setting tolls in competition for revenues are studied. The first group comprises private sector toll road operators aiming to maximise revenues. The second group comprises local governments or jurisdictions who may engage in tax exporting. Extending insights from the public economics literature, jurisdictions tax export because when setting tolls to maximise welfare for their electorate, they simultaneously benefit from revenues from extra-jurisdictional users. Hence the tolls levied by both groups will be higher than those intended solely to internalise congestion, which then results in welfare losses. Therefore the overarching question investigated is the extent of welfare losses stemming from such competition for toll revenues. While these groups of agents are separately studied, the interactions between agents in each group in competition can be modelled within the common framework of Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints. Several solution algorithms, adapting methodologies from microeconomics as well as evolutionary computation, are proposed to identify Nash Equilibrium toll levels. These are demonstrated on realistic transportation networks. As an alternative paradigm to competition, the possibilities for co-operation between agents in each group are also explored. In the case of toll road operators, the welfare consequences of competition could be positive or adverse depending on the interrelationships between the toll roads in competition. The results therefore generalise those previously obtained to a more realistic setting investigated here. In the case of competition between jurisdictions, it is shown that the fiscal externality of tax exporting resulting from their toll setting decisions can substantially reduce the welfare gains from internalising congestion. The ability of regulation, co-operation and bilateral bargaining to reduce the welfare losses are assessed. The research thus contributes to informing debates regarding the appropriate level of institutional governance for toll pricing policies

    Third International Conference on Inverse Design Concepts and Optimization in Engineering Sciences (ICIDES-3)

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    Papers from the Third International Conference on Inverse Design Concepts and Optimization in Engineering Sciences (ICIDES) are presented. The papers discuss current research in the general field of inverse, semi-inverse, and direct design and optimization in engineering sciences. The rapid growth of this relatively new field is due to the availability of faster and larger computing machines

    Graduate School of Engineering and Management Catalog 2018-2019

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    The Graduate Catalog represents the offerings, programs, and requirements in effect at the time of publication

    Collected Papers (on Neutrosophic Theory and Applications), Volume VIII

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    This eighth volume of Collected Papers includes 75 papers comprising 973 pages on (theoretic and applied) neutrosophics, written between 2010-2022 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 102 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 24 countries: Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Abduallah Gamal, Firoz Ahmad, Ahmad Yusuf Adhami, Ahmed B. Al-Nafee, Ali Hassan, Mumtaz Ali, Akbar Rezaei, Assia Bakali, Ayoub Bahnasse, Azeddine Elhassouny, Durga Banerjee, Romualdas Bausys, Mircea Boșcoianu, Traian Alexandru Buda, Bui Cong Cuong, Emilia Calefariu, Ahmet Çevik, Chang Su Kim, Victor Christianto, Dae Wan Kim, Daud Ahmad, Arindam Dey, Partha Pratim Dey, Mamouni Dhar, H. A. Elagamy, Ahmed K. Essa, Sudipta Gayen, Bibhas C. Giri, Daniela Gîfu, Noel Batista Hernández, Hojjatollah Farahani, Huda E. Khalid, Irfan Deli, Saeid Jafari, Tèmítópé Gbóláhàn Jaíyéolá, Sripati Jha, Sudan Jha, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, M. Karthika, Kawther F. Alhasan, Giruta Kazakeviciute-Januskeviciene, Qaisar Khan, Kishore Kumar P K, Prem Kumar Singh, Ranjan Kumar, Maikel Leyva-Vázquez, Mahmoud Ismail, Tahir Mahmood, Hafsa Masood Malik, Mohammad Abobala, Mai Mohamed, Gunasekaran Manogaran, Seema Mehra, Kalyan Mondal, Mohamed Talea, Mullai Murugappan, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Aslam Malik, Muhammad Khalid Mahmood, Nivetha Martin, Durga Nagarajan, Nguyen Van Dinh, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Lewis Nkenyereya, Jagan M. Obbineni, M. Parimala, S. K. Patro, Peide Liu, Pham Hong Phong, Surapati Pramanik, Gyanendra Prasad Joshi, Quek Shio Gai, R. Radha, A.A. Salama, S. Satham Hussain, Mehmet Șahin, Said Broumi, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Selvaraj Ganesan, Shahbaz Ali, Shouzhen Zeng, Manjeet Singh, A. Stanis Arul Mary, Dragiša Stanujkić, Yusuf Șubaș, Rui-Pu Tan, Mirela Teodorescu, Selçuk Topal, Zenonas Turskis, Vakkas Uluçay, Norberto Valcárcel Izquierdo, V. Venkateswara Rao, Volkan Duran, Ying Li, Young Bae Jun, Wadei F. Al-Omeri, Jian-qiang Wang, Lihshing Leigh Wang, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas

    Proceedings of the 9th MIT/ONR workshop on C3 Systems, held at Naval Postgraduate School and Hilton Inn Resort Hotel, Monterey, California June 2 through June 5, 1986

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    GRSN 627729"December 1986."Includes bibliographical references and index.Sponsored by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, Cambridge, Mass., with support from the Office of Naval Research. ONR/N00014-77-C-0532(NR041-519) Sponsored in cooperation with IEEE Control Systems Society, Technical Committee on C.edited by Michael Athans, Alexander H. Levis
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