826,624 research outputs found

    Subjective and objective performance evaluation

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    We study executive compensation in an environment in which firms compete offering contingent contracts to managers with private information about their ability. We ask whether equilibrium executive compensation depends on subjective evaluations, i.e., on assessments made by the firm which are based on noncontractible information. We also allow for objective (i.e., contractible) performance measures and we depart from the rest of the literature on the topic by assuming that subjective evaluations are made before the uncertainty on the objective performance measures is resolved. We find that even in this case, equilibrium contracts ignore subjective evaluations regardless of their informativeness

    Objective versus Subjective Performance Evaluations

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    Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue. While the most plausible explanation for this practice is lack of adequate objective measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might sometimes also be used to withhold information from the worker. I furthermore argue that withholding information is particularly important under circumstances where the credibility issue is small. The statements are derived from a two-stage principal-agent model in which the stochastic relationship between effort and performance is unknown

    Subjective Evaluations with Performance Feedback

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    This paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations: their incentive role and their feedback role. The paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction, as long as there exists some verifiable measure of performance. It also shows that while subjective pay is helpful, it cannot achieve full efficiency. However, fully efficient incentives are achievable if the firm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers. With a small number of workers, a forced distribution is valuable only if the verifiable measure is poor.Subjective Evaluations, Performance Feedback, Optimal Contracts

    Subjective Performance Evaluation and Inequality Aversion

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    Many firms use subjective performance appraisal systems due to lack of objective performance measures. In these cases, supervisors usually have to rate the performance of their subordinates. Using such systems, it is a well established fact that many supervisors tend to assess the employees too good (leniency bias) and that the appraisals hardly vary across employees of a certain supervisor (centrality bias). We explain these two biases in a model with a supervisor, who has preferences for the utility of her inequality averse subordinates, and discuss determinants of the size of the biases. Extensions of the basic model include the role of supervisor’s favoritism of one particular agent and the endogenous effort choice of agents. Whether inequality averse agents exert higher efforts then purely self-oriented ones, depends on the size of effort costs and inequality aversion.appraisals, inequality aversion, performance evaluation, centrality bias, leniency bias

    Subjective Performance Evaluations, Self-esteem, and Ego-threats in Principal-agent Relations

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    We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and principals benefiting from a real effort task in which the agents’ effort/performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. We find that agents sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self-evaluations even if the agents’ payoff is independent of the principals’ feedback. Based on our experimental analysis we propose a principal-agent model with subjective performance evaluations that accommodates this finding. We analyze the agents’ (optimal) behavior, optimal contracts, and social welfare in this environment.contracts; subjective performance evaluations; self-esteem; ego-threats

    Too sick to drive : how motion sickness severity impacts human performance

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    There are multiple concerns surrounding the development and rollout of self-driving cars. One issue has largely gone unnoticed - the adverse effects of motion sickness as induced by self-driving cars. The literature suggests conditionally, highly and fully autonomous vehicles will increase the onset likelihood and severity of motion sickness. Previous research has shown motion sickness can have a significant negative impact on human performance. This paper uses a simulator study design with 51 participants to assess if the scale of motion sickness is a predictor of human performance degradation. This paper finds little proof that subjective motion sickness severity is an effective indicator of the scale of human performance degradation. The performance change of participants with lower subjective motion sickness is mostly statistically indistinguishable from those with higher subjective sickness. Conclusively, those with even acute motion sickness may be just as affected as those with higher sickness, considering human performance. Building on these results, it could indicate motion sickness should be a consideration for understanding user ability to regain control of a self-driving vehicle, even if not feeling subjectively unwell. Effectiveness of subjective scoring is discussed and future research is proposed to help ensure the successful rollout of self-driving vehicles

    The dissociation of subjective measures of mental workload and performance

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    Dissociation between performance and subjective workload measures was investigated in the theoretical framework of the multiple resources model. Subjective measures do not preserve the vector characteristics in the multidimensional space described by the model. A theory of dissociation was proposed to locate the sources that may produce dissociation between the two workload measures. According to the theory, performance is affected by every aspect of processing whereas subjective workload is sensitive to the amount of aggregate resource investment and is dominated by the demands on the perceptual/central resources. The proposed theory was tested in three experiments. Results showed that performance improved but subjective workload was elevated with an increasing amount of resource investment. Furthermore, subjective workload was not as sensitive as was performance to differences in the amount of resource competition between two tasks. The demand on perceptual/central resources was found to be the most salient component of subjective workload. Dissociation occurred when the demand on this component was increased by the number of concurrent tasks or by the number of display elements. However, demands on response resources were weighted in subjective introspection as much as demands on perceptual/central resources. The implications of these results for workload practitioners are described

    Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

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    Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. Naturally, objective and subjective measures often are substitutes, sometimes strikingly so: we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible (because the firm's fallback position after reneging on an implicit contact is too attractive). We also show, however, that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other: if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures (because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship, and so reduce the firm's incentive to renege). We also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures, and provide case-study evidence consistent with our analyses.

    Effect of time span and task load on pilot mental workload

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    Two sets of simulations designed to examine how a pilot's mental workload is affected by continuous manual-control activity versus discrete mental tasks that included the length of time between receiving an assignment and executing it are described. The first experiment evaluated two types of measures: objective performance indicators and subjective ratings. Subjective ratings for the two missions were different, but the objective performance measures were similar. In the second experiments, workload levels were increased and a second performance measure was taken. Mental workload had no influence on either performance-based workload measure. Subjective ratings discriminated among the scenarios and correlated with performance measures for high-workload flights. The number of mental tasks performed did not influence error rates, although high manual workloads did increase errors

    Relating Objective and Subjective Performance Measures for AAM-based Visual Speech Synthesizers

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    We compare two approaches for synthesizing visual speech using Active Appearance Models (AAMs): one that utilizes acoustic features as input, and one that utilizes a phonetic transcription as input. Both synthesizers are trained using the same data and the performance is measured using both objective and subjective testing. We investigate the impact of likely sources of error in the synthesized visual speech by introducing typical errors into real visual speech sequences and subjectively measuring the perceived degradation. When only a small region (e.g. a single syllable) of ground-truth visual speech is incorrect we find that the subjective score for the entire sequence is subjectively lower than sequences generated by our synthesizers. This observation motivates further consideration of an often ignored issue, which is to what extent are subjective measures correlated with objective measures of performance? Significantly, we find that the most commonly used objective measures of performance are not necessarily the best indicator of viewer perception of quality. We empirically evaluate alternatives and show that the cost of a dynamic time warp of synthesized visual speech parameters to the respective ground-truth parameters is a better indicator of subjective quality
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