4,755 research outputs found
An Algorithm for Distributing Coalitional Value Calculations among Cooperating Agents
The process of forming coalitions of software agents generally requires calculating a value for every possible coalition which indicates how beneficial that coalition would be if it was formed. Now, instead of having a single agent calculate all these values (as is typically the case), it is more efficient to distribute this calculation among the agents, thus using all the computational resources available to the system and avoiding the existence of a single point of failure. Given this, we present a novel algorithm for distributing this calculation among agents in cooperative environments. Specifically, by using our algorithm, each agent is assigned some part of the calculation such that the agents’ shares are exhaustive and disjoint. Moreover, the algorithm is decentralized, requires no communication between the agents, has minimal memory requirements, and can reflect variations in the computational speeds of the agents. To evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithm, we compare it with the only other algorithm available in the literature for distributing the coalitional value calculations (due to Shehory and Kraus). This shows that for the case of 25 agents, the distribution process of our algorithm took less than 0.02% of the time, the values were calculated using 0.000006% of the memory, the calculation redundancy was reduced from 383229848 to 0, and the total number of bytes sent between the agents dropped from 1146989648 to 0 (note that for larger numbers of agents, these improvements become exponentially better)
Non-centralized Control for Flow-based Distribution Networks: A Game-theoretical Insight
This paper solves a data-driven control problem for a flow-based distribution network with two objectives: a resource allocation and a fair distribution of costs. These objectives represent both cooperation and competition directions. It is proposed a solution that combines either a centralized or distributed cooperative game approach using the Shapley value to determine
a proper partitioning of the system and a fair communication cost distribution. On the other hand, a decentralized noncooperative game approach computing the Nash equilibrium is used to achieve the control objective of the resource allocation under a non-complete information topology. Furthermore, an invariant-set property is presented and the closed-loop system stability is analyzed for the non cooperative game approach. Another contribution regarding the cooperative game approach is an alternative way to compute the Shapley value for the proposed specific characteristic function. Unlike the classical
cooperative-games approach, which has a limited application due to the combinatorial explosion issues, the alternative method allows calculating the Shapley value in polynomial time and hence can be applied to large-scale problems.Generalitat de Catalunya FI 2014Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2016-76493-C3-3-RMinisterio de Ciencia y Educación DPI2008-05818Proyecto europeo FP7-ICT DYMASO
Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom
We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original Owen's one by replacement of the additivity and null-player axioms via marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization of the Owen value suggested by Winter for games with level structure is valid as well
Contractually stable networks
We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency.networks, coalition structures, contractual stability, allocation rules.
MIMO-OFDM Based Energy Harvesting Cooperative Communications Using Coalitional Game Algorithm
This document is the Accepted Manuscript version. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.In this paper, we consider the problem of cooperative communication between relays and base station in an advanced MIMO-OFDM framework, under the assumption that the relays are supplied by electric power drawn from energy harvesting (EH) sources. In particular, we focus on the relay selection, with the goal to guarantee the required performance in terms of capacity. In order to maximize the data throughput under the EH constraint, we model the transmission scheme as a non-transferable coalition formation game, with characteristic function based on an approximated capacity expression. Then, we introduce a powerful mathematical tool inherent to coalitional game theory, namely: the Shapley value (Sv) to provide a reliable solution concept to the game. The selected relays will form a virtual dynamically-configuredMIMO network that is able to transmit data to destination using efficient space-time coding techniques. Numerical results, obtained by simulating the EH-powered cooperativeMIMO-OFDMtransmission with Algebraic Space-Time Coding (ASTC), prove that the proposed coalitional game-based relay selection allows to achieve performance very close to that obtained by the same system operated by guaranteed power supply. The proposed methodology is finally compared with some recent related state-of-the-art techniques showing clear advantages in terms of link performance and goodput.Peer reviewe
Algorithms for Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation in the Real World
Coalition formation typically involves the coming together of multiple,
heterogeneous, agents to achieve both their individual and collective goals. In
this paper, we focus on a special case of coalition formation known as
Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (GCCF) whereby a network connecting the
agents constrains the formation of coalitions. We focus on this type of problem
given that in many real-world applications, agents may be connected by a
communication network or only trust certain peers in their social network. We
propose a novel representation of this problem based on the concept of edge
contraction, which allows us to model the search space induced by the GCCF
problem as a rooted tree. Then, we propose an anytime solution algorithm
(CFSS), which is particularly efficient when applied to a general class of
characteristic functions called functions. Moreover, we show how CFSS can
be efficiently parallelised to solve GCCF using a non-redundant partition of
the search space. We benchmark CFSS on both synthetic and realistic scenarios,
using a real-world dataset consisting of the energy consumption of a large
number of households in the UK. Our results show that, in the best case, the
serial version of CFSS is 4 orders of magnitude faster than the state of the
art, while the parallel version is 9.44 times faster than the serial version on
a 12-core machine. Moreover, CFSS is the first approach to provide anytime
approximate solutions with quality guarantees for very large systems of agents
(i.e., with more than 2700 agents).Comment: Accepted for publication, cite as "in press
Feature Selection via Coalitional Game Theory
We present and study the contribution-selection algorithm (CSA), a novel algorithm for feature selection. The algorithm is based on the multiperturbation shapley analysis (MSA), a framework that relies on game theory to estimate usefulness. The algorithm iteratively estimates the usefulness of features and selects them accordingly, using either forward selection or backward elimination. It can optimize various performance measures over unseen data such as accuracy, balanced error rate, and area under receiver-operator-characteristic curve. Empirical comparison with several other existing feature selection methods shows that the backward elimination variant of CSA leads to the most accurate classification results on an array of data sets
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