A First Look at the Crypto-Mining Malware Ecosystem: A Decade of Unrestricted Wealth

Illicit crypto-mining leverages resources stolen from victims to mine cryptocurrencies on behalf of criminals. While recent works have analyzed one side of this threat, i.e.: web-browser cryptojacking, only commercial reports have partially covered binary-based crypto-mining malware. In this paper, we conduct the largest measurement of crypto-mining malware to date, analyzing approximately 4.5 million malware samples (1.2 million malicious miners), over a period of twelve years from 2007 to 2019. Our analysis pipeline applies both static and dynamic analysis to extract information from the samples, such as wallet identifiers and mining pools. Together with OSINT data, this information is used to group samples into campaigns. We then analyze publicly-available payments sent to the wallets from mining-pools as a reward for mining, and estimate profits for the different campaigns. All this together is is done in a fully automated fashion, which enables us to leverage measurement-based findings of illicit crypto-mining at scale. Our profit analysis reveals campaigns with multi-million earnings, associating over 4.4% of Monero with illicit mining. We analyze the infrastructure related with the different campaigns, showing that a high proportion of this ecosystem is supported by underground economies such as Pay-Per-Install services. We also uncover novel techniques that allow criminals to run successful campaigns.Comment: A shorter version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of 19th ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC 2019). This is the full versio

Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences

In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks, highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control (C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages. Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor

Management and Security of IoT systems using Microservices

Devices that assist the user with some task or help them to make an informed decision are called smart devices. A network of such devices connected to internet are collectively called as Internet of Things (IoT). The applications of IoT are expanding exponentially and are becoming a part of our day to day lives. The rise of IoT led to new security and management issues. In this project, we propose a solution for some major problems faced by the IoT devices, including the problem of complexity due to heterogeneous platforms and the lack of IoT device monitoring for security and fault tolerance. We aim to solve the above issues in a microservice architecture. We build a data pipeline for IoT devices to send data through a messaging platform Kafka and monitor the devices using the collected data by making real time dashboards and a machine learning model to give better insights of the data. For proof of concept, we test the proposed solution on a heterogeneous cluster, including Raspberry Pi’s and IoT devices from different vendors. We validate our design by presenting some simple experimental results

Adversarial behaviours knowledge area

The technological advancements witnessed by our society in recent decades have brought improvements in our quality of life, but they have also created a number of opportunities for attackers to cause harm. Before the Internet revolution, most crime and malicious activity generally required a victim and a perpetrator to come into physical contact, and this limited the reach that malicious parties had. Technology has removed the need for physical contact to perform many types of crime, and now attackers can reach victims anywhere in the world, as long as they are connected to the Internet. This has revolutionised the characteristics of crime and warfare, allowing operations that would not have been possible before. In this document, we provide an overview of the malicious operations that are happening on the Internet today. We first provide a taxonomy of malicious activities based on the attacker’s motivations and capabilities, and then move on to the technological and human elements that adversaries require to run a successful operation. We then discuss a number of frameworks that have been proposed to model malicious operations. Since adversarial behaviours are not a purely technical topic, we draw from research in a number of fields (computer science, criminology, war studies). While doing this, we discuss how these frameworks can be used by researchers and practitioners to develop effective mitigations against malicious online operations.Published versio

The Australian Cyber Security Centre threat report 2015

Introduction: The number, type and sophistication of cyber security threats to Australia and Australians are increasing. Due to the varied nature of motivations for cyber adversaries targeting Australian organisations, organisations could be a target for malicious activities even if they do not think the information held on their networks is valuable, or that their business would be of interest to cyber adversaries. This first unclassified report by the ACSC describes the range of cyber adversaries targeting Australian networks, explains their motivations, the malicious activities they are conducting and their impact, and provides specific examples of activity targeting Australian networks during 2014. This report also offers mitigation advice on how organisations can defend against these activities. The ACSC’s ability to detect and defend against sophisticated cyber threats continues to improve. But cyber adversaries are constantly improving their tradecraft in their attempts to defeat our network defences and exploit the new technologies we embrace. There are gaps in our understanding of the extent and nature of malicious activity, particularly against the business sector. The ACSC is reaching out to industry to build partnerships to improve our collective understanding. Future iterations of the Threat Report will benefit from these partnerships and help to close gaps in our knowledge

Network traffic analysis for threats detection in the Internet of Things

As the prevalence of the Internet of Things (IoT) continues to increase, cyber criminals are quick to exploit the security gaps that many devices are inherently designed with. Users cannot be expected to tackle this threat alone, and many current solutions available for network monitoring are simply not accessible or can be difficult to implement for the average user, which is a gap that needs to be addressed. This article presents an effective signature-based solution to monitor, analyze, and detect potentially malicious traffic for IoT ecosystems in the typical home network environment by utilizing passive network sniffing techniques and a cloud application to monitor anomalous activity. The proposed solution focuses on two attack and propagation vectors leveraged by the infamous Mirai botnet, namely DNS and Telnet. Experimental evaluation demonstrates the proposed solution can detect 98.35 percent of malicious DNS traffic and 99.33 percent of Telnet traffic for an overall detection accuracy of 98.84 percent