Reference and Indexicality

Tese arquivada ao abrigo da Portaria nº 227/2017 de 25 de Julho-Registo de Grau EstrangeiroThis thesis is a general defence of a context-dependent description theory of reference with special regards to indexical reference on the basis of a truth-conditional theory of meaning. It consists of two parts. In the first part, the roots of the Frege-Russell view are laid out and contrasted with various aspects of direct reference theory and the New Theory of Reference. Two description-based accounts of the reference of proper names, nominal and external description theory, are defended against various known counter-arguments such as Kripke’s circularity objection and the Church-Langford translation test. It is shown how the resulting analysis of de dicto belief ascriptions can be made compositional, but also argued that compositionality is not mandatory. The second part deals with forms of indexical and non-indexical contextdependence. Taking into account a range of typological data, referential features of indexical expressions like their egocentricity, token-reflexivity, and the vagueness of spatial and temporal indexicals are laid out. Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives is then reformulated, but following Cresswell (1990) it is argued that full quantification over modal indices is needed. Various indicators and demonstratives are analyzed on the basis of a description theory of reference in a variant of first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory and two sorts of reified contexts. Examples analyzed include: I, now, here, actually, we, the former president, the left entrance, context-shifting indexicals, and demonstratives like Japanese are. Finally, essential indexicality is addressed and it is conceded that description theory cannot deal with attitudes de se. In defense of indirect reference it is argued that the cognitive phenomena underlying essential indexicality, as for example I-thoughts, aren’t aspects of the public meaning of natural language expressions and that speaking of a ‘language of thinking’ or ‘reference in thinking’ are unfitting metaphors for general semiotic reasons

Reinterpreting Rigidity : Rigid and Non-Rigid Reference of Proper Names in Alethic, Doxastic, and Mixed Contexts

Työni tarkastelee erisnimien asemaa mahdollisuuksien ja uskomuslauseiden konteksteissa. Sen lähtökohtana on nykyisin yleisesti hyväksytty teoria, jonka mukaan nimet ovat “jäykkiä” aleettisten tai metafyysisten mahdollisuuksien suhteen. Mahdollisten maailmojen semantiikan kehyksessä tämä tarkoittaa sitä, että nimi viittaa samaan olioon jokaisessa mahdollisessa maailmassa. Jäykkyys on usein käsitetty erisnimien semanttiseksi ominaisuudeksi, mikä on tuottanut uusia ongelmia konteksteissa, joissa nimet eivät käyttäydy odotusten mukaan. Tunnetuimpia esimerkkejä ovat propositionaaliset asenteet kuten uskomuslauseet. Tarkoituksenani on näyttää, että oletus jäykkyydestä nimien semanttisena ominaisuutena johtaa hajanaisuuteen, jossa poikkeamia on käsiteltävä tarpeettoman monimutkaisilla teorioilla, jotka voivat erkaantua vahvastikin aleettisen logiikan mallien yksinkertaisuudesta. Sen sijaan jäykkyyden näkeminen modaalisten kontekstien ominaisuutena mahdollistaa propositionaalisten asenteiden ja aleettisten modaalisuuksien yhtenäisemmän käsittelyn. Argumenttini jakautuu kahteen osaan: negatiiviseen teesiin, jonka tarkoitus on osoittaa, että teoria jäykkyydestä nimien semanttisena ominaisuutena on ristiriidassa monien luonnollisen kielen ilmiöiden kanssa, sekä positiiviseen teesiin siitä, miten erisnimiä voidaan kohdella yhtenevästi useissa epäsuorissa konteksteissa. Vastaesimerkkini keskittyvät erityisesti yksinkertaisiin luonnollisen kielen lauseisiin, joissa filosofit kuten Saul Kripke ja Scott Soames ovat väittäneet nimien esiintyvän jäykkinä, sekä erisnimien “demonstratiiviseen” ja “attributiiviseen” käyttöön. Oman teesini kehyksenä on Kathrin Glüerin ja Peter Paginin suhteellisten modaliteettien (relational modalities) semantiikka, joka mahdollistaa kaksitasoisen (aktuaalisen tai mahdollisen) evaluoinnin erisnimille. Tämä semantiikka on uskomuslauseille tietyssä mielessä alimäärittynyt: nimien jäykkyys yksinomaan uskomuskonteksteissa voidaan määrittää kvanttorien avulla, mutta vain puhujan intentio määrittää oikean tulkinnan. Täydennän puhujan intention roolia soveltamalla Jaakko Hintikan individuoinnin teoriaa. Hintikan mukaan nimet eivät voi suoraan viitata jäykästi: puhujan on kyettävä ensin jossain viitekehyksessä tunnistamaan se henkilö tai asia, josta hän puhuu. Nimen referentti on siis tietyssä mielessä tunnettava. Toisin kuin Hintikka, rajaan individuoinnin roolin vain propositionaalisiin asenteisiin tai muihin puhujan suhteen subjektiivisiin konteksteihin. Sen tarkoitus on tarjota pragmaattinen metodi suhteellisten modaliteettien mallien rinnalle täydentämään erisnimien semanttista alimäärittyneisyyttä uskomuslauseiden sekä muiden propositionaalisten asenteiden yhteydessä

Binding bound variables in epistemic contexts

ABSTRACT Quine insisted that the satisfaction of an open modalised formula by an object depends on how that object is described. Kripke's ‘objectual’ interpretation of quantified modal logic, whereby variables are rigid, is commonly thought to avoid these Quinean worries. Yet there remain residual Quinean worries for epistemic modality. Theorists have recently been toying with assignment-shifting treatments of epistemic contexts. On such views an epistemic operator ends up binding all the variables in its scope. One might worry that this yields the undesirable result that any attempt to ‘quantify in’ to an epistemic environment is blocked. If quantifying into the relevant constructions is vacuous, then such views would seem hopelessly misguided and empirically inadequate. But a famous alternative to Kripke's semantics, namely Lewis' counterpart semantics, also faces this worry since it also treats the boxes and diamonds as assignment-shifting devices. As I'll demonstrate, the mere fact that a variable is bound is no obstacle to binding it. This provides a helpful lesson for those modelling de re epistemic contexts with assignment sensitivity, and perhaps leads the way toward the proper treatment of binding in both metaphysical and epistemic contexts: Kripke for metaphysical modality, Lewis for epistemic modality

Chalmers and Semantics

David Chalmers’ two-dimensionalism is an ambitious philosophical program that aims to “ground” or “construct” Fregean meanings and restore “the golden triangle” of apriority, necessity, and meaning that Kripke seemingly broke. This paper aims to examine critically what Chalmers’ theory can in reality achieve. It is argued that the theory faces severe challenges. There are some gaps in the overall arguments, and the reasoning is in some places somewhat circular. Chalmers’ theory is effectively founded on certain strong philosophical assumptions. It is concluded that it is unclear whether the theory can deliver all it promises

Conceivability, Apriority and Modality

I aim to understand whether apriority entails necessity, aposteriority entails contingency and conceivability entails possibility; that is, the relationship between, and the nature of, rationality and modality. The thesis is split into two parts: one on apriority and modality (chs. 2-4), and another on conceivability, apriority/aposteriority and modality (chs. 5 to 7). In Chapter 1, I discuss ‘two-dimensional modal semantics’, arguing that it is ill-equipped to provide a substantive account of rationality and modality, before setting out the basis of such an understanding. I begin the first part of the thesis (in Chapter 2) by outlining a preliminary account of the a priori: it is, strictly, not defeasible by empirical evidence; it involves a kind of necessity (‘rational necessity’); and it is (at least in its prima facie variant) fallible. In Chapter 3 I discuss the contingent a priori, arguing that genuine apriority entails necessity, before placing apriority qua ‘rational necessity’ (and ‘rational modality’ more widely) with respect to other kinds of modality (in Chapter 4). I conclude Part I of the thesis, by arguing that the a priori is not coextensive with, but is grounded in, metaphysical necessity. Part II of the thesis begins with a discussion of the necessary a posteriori (Chapter 5), where I argue that there are no genuine cases, thus aposteriority entails contingency and conceivability entails possibility. I then deal with Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles (Chapter 6), which I claim (as with the necessary a posteriori) pose no genuine problem for conceivability-possibility reasoning. Finally (in Chapter 7), I offer a deeper account of rational modality together with a tentative account of metaphysical modality (and essence). I then conclude that genuine apriority qua rational necessity entails metaphysical necessity; similarly, strictly, aposteriority (rational contingency) entails metaphysical contingency and, (in)conceivability (rational (im)possibility) entails metaphysical (im)possibility

How Things Have to Be

Penelope Mackie and Scott Soames argue, contrary to my Reference and Essence (R&E), that Hilary Putnam was correct that the direct-reference theory of natural-kind terms, taken in conjunction with empirical or otherwise uncontroversial premises, yields non-trivial essentialism, such as the conclusion that water is essentially two-parts hydrogen, one-part oxygen. A controversial distinction is drawn between rigid and non-rigid general terms. A new criterion for general-term rigidity is proposed, and Putnam’s ostensive definition of ‘water’ is reformulated accordingly to generate the consequence that ‘water’ rigidly designates. Mackie and Soames propose a reformulation of Putnam’s ostensive definition that putatively yields the desired result. This reformulation, however, does not correctly explain the meaning of ‘water’ as a substance designator. Furthermore, if taken instead as a redefinition of ‘water’, the essentialism thereby generated is trivial

The Case for Case Studies

This volume demonstrates how to conduct case study research that is both methodologically rigorous and useful to development policy. It will interest scholars and students across the social sciences using case studies, and provide constructive guidance to practitioners in development and public administration