Applications of Intuitionistic Logic in Answer Set Programming

We present some applications of intermediate logics in the field of Answer Set Programming (ASP). A brief, but comprehensive introduction to the answer set semantics, intuitionistic and other intermediate logics is given. Some equivalence notions and their applications are discussed. Some results on intermediate logics are shown, and applied later to prove properties of answer sets. A characterization of answer sets for logic programs with nested expressions is provided in terms of intuitionistic provability, generalizing a recent result given by Pearce. It is known that the answer set semantics for logic programs with nested expressions may select non-minimal models. Minimal models can be very important in some applications, therefore we studied them; in particular we obtain a characterization, in terms of intuitionistic logic, of answer sets which are also minimal models. We show that the logic G3 characterizes the notion of strong equivalence between programs under the semantic induced by these models. Finally we discuss possible applications and consequences of our results. They clearly state interesting links between ASP and intermediate logics, which might bring research in these two areas together.Comment: 30 pages, Under consideration for publication in Theory and Practice of Logic Programmin

Embedding Non-Ground Logic Programs into Autoepistemic Logic for Knowledge Base Combination

In the context of the Semantic Web, several approaches to the combination of ontologies, given in terms of theories of classical first-order logic and rule bases, have been proposed. They either cast rules into classical logic or limit the interaction between rules and ontologies. Autoepistemic logic (AEL) is an attractive formalism which allows to overcome these limitations, by serving as a uniform host language to embed ontologies and nonmonotonic logic programs into it. For the latter, so far only the propositional setting has been considered. In this paper, we present three embeddings of normal and three embeddings of disjunctive non-ground logic programs under the stable model semantics into first-order AEL. While the embeddings all correspond with respect to objective ground atoms, differences arise when considering non-atomic formulas and combinations with first-order theories. We compare the embeddings with respect to stable expansions and autoepistemic consequences, considering the embeddings by themselves, as well as combinations with classical theories. Our results reveal differences and correspondences of the embeddings and provide useful guidance in the choice of a particular embedding for knowledge combination.Comment: 52 pages, submitte

Bisimulation and expressivity for conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief

Plausibility models are Kripke models that agents use to reason about knowledge and belief, both of themselves and of each other. Such models are used to interpret the notions of conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. The logic of conditional belief contains that modality and also the knowledge modality, and similarly for the logic of degrees of belief and the logic of safe belief. With respect to these logics, plausibility models may contain too much information. A proper notion of bisimulation is required that characterises them. We define that notion of bisimulation and prove the required characterisations: on the class of image-finite and preimage-finite models (with respect to the plausibility relation), two pointed Kripke models are modally equivalent in either of the three logics, if and only if they are bisimilar. As a result, the information content of such a model can be similarly expressed in the logic of conditional belief, or the logic of degrees of belief, or that of safe belief. This, we found a surprising result. Still, that does not mean that the logics are equally expressive: the logics of conditional and degrees of belief are incomparable, the logics of degrees of belief and safe belief are incomparable, while the logic of safe belief is more expressive than the logic of conditional belief. In view of the result on bisimulation characterisation, this is an equally surprising result. We hope our insights may contribute to the growing community of formal epistemology and on the relation between qualitative and quantitative modelling

Logic Programming with Default, Weak and Strict Negations

This paper treats logic programming with three kinds of negation: default, weak and strict negations. A 3-valued logic model theory is discussed for logic programs with three kinds of negation. The procedure is constructed for negations so that a soundness of the procedure is guaranteed in terms of 3-valued logic model theory.Comment: 14 pages, to appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP

Characterizing downwards closed, strongly first order, relativizable dependencies

In Team Semantics, a dependency notion is strongly first order if every sentence of the logic obtained by adding the corresponding atoms to First Order Logic is equivalent to some first order sentence. In this work it is shown that all nontrivial dependency atoms that are strongly first order, downwards closed, and relativizable (in the sense that the relativizations of the corresponding atoms with respect to some unary predicate are expressible in terms of them) are definable in terms of constancy atoms. Additionally, it is shown that any strongly first order dependency is safe for any family of downwards closed dependencies, in the sense that every sentence of the logic obtained by adding to First Order Logic both the strongly first order dependency and the downwards closed dependencies is equivalent to some sentence of the logic obtained by adding only the downwards closed dependencies

Modular Logic Programming: Full Compositionality and Conflict Handling for Practical Reasoning

With the recent development of a new ubiquitous nature of data and the profusity of available knowledge, there is nowadays the need to reason from multiple sources of often incomplete and uncertain knowledge. Our goal was to provide a way to combine declarative knowledge bases – represented as logic programming modules under the answer set semantics – as well as the individual results one already inferred from them, without having to recalculate the results for their composition and without having to explicitly know the original logic programming encodings that produced such results. This posed us many challenges such as how to deal with fundamental problems of modular frameworks for logic programming, namely how to define a general compositional semantics that allows us to compose unrestricted modules. Building upon existing logic programming approaches, we devised a framework capable of composing generic logic programming modules while preserving the crucial property of compositionality, which informally means that the combination of models of individual modules are the models of the union of modules. We are also still able to reason in the presence of knowledge containing incoherencies, which is informally characterised by a logic program that does not have an answer set due to cyclic dependencies of an atom from its default negation. In this thesis we also discuss how the same approach can be extended to deal with probabilistic knowledge in a modular and compositional way. We depart from the Modular Logic Programming approach in Oikarinen & Janhunen (2008); Janhunen et al. (2009) which achieved a restricted form of compositionality of answer set programming modules. We aim at generalising this framework of modular logic programming and start by lifting restrictive conditions that were originally imposed, and use alternative ways of combining these (so called by us) Generalised Modular Logic Programs. We then deal with conflicts arising in generalised modular logic programming and provide modular justifications and debugging for the generalised modular logic programming setting, where justification models answer the question: Why is a given interpretation indeed an Answer Set? and Debugging models answer the question: Why is a given interpretation not an Answer Set? In summary, our research deals with the problematic of formally devising a generic modular logic programming framework, providing: operators for combining arbitrary modular logic programs together with a compositional semantics; We characterise conflicts that occur when composing access control policies, which are generalisable to our context of generalised modular logic programming, and ways of dealing with them syntactically: provided a unification for justification and debugging of logic programs; and semantically: provide a new semantics capable of dealing with incoherences. We also provide an extension of modular logic programming to a probabilistic setting. These goals are already covered with published work. A prototypical tool implementing the unification of justifications and debugging is available for download from http://cptkirk.sourceforge.net

Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge (Extended Version)

This chapter argues that epistemologists should replace a “standard alternatives” picture of knowledge, assumed by many fallibilist theories of knowledge, with a new “multipath” picture of knowledge. The chapter first identifies a problem for the standard picture: fallibilists working with this picture cannot maintain even the most uncontroversial epistemic closure principles without making extreme assumptions about the ability of humans to know empirical truths without empirical investigation. The chapter then shows how the multipath picture, motivated by independent arguments, saves fallibilism from this problem. The multipath picture is based on taking seriously the idea that there can be multiple paths to knowing some propositions about the world. An overlooked consequence of fallibilism is that these multiple paths to knowledge may involve ruling out different sets of alternatives, which should be represented in a fallibilist picture of knowledge. The chapter concludes by considering inductive knowledge and strong epistemic closure from this multipath perspective

A System of Interaction and Structure

This paper introduces a logical system, called BV, which extends multiplicative linear logic by a non-commutative self-dual logical operator. This extension is particularly challenging for the sequent calculus, and so far it is not achieved therein. It becomes very natural in a new formalism, called the calculus of structures, which is the main contribution of this work. Structures are formulae submitted to certain equational laws typical of sequents. The calculus of structures is obtained by generalising the sequent calculus in such a way that a new top-down symmetry of derivations is observed, and it employs inference rules that rewrite inside structures at any depth. These properties, in addition to allow the design of BV, yield a modular proof of cut elimination.Comment: This is the authoritative version of the article, with readable pictures, in colour, also available at . (The published version contains errors introduced by the editorial processing.) Web site for Deep Inference and the Calculus of Structures at <http://alessio.guglielmi.name/res/cos