An Anatomy of the French Labour Market

[Excerpt] Over the last decades, many European countries have experienced high and persistent unemployment rates. The bulk of labour market research has tackled this issue by emphasizing the effect of employment protection legislation, hereafter EPL, on labour market performance. As a result, the importance of labour market flexibility has been widely acknowledged. This view can be summarized by the expressed desire of the E.U. council to give member States incentives to “review and, where appropriate, reform overly restrictive elements in employment legislation that affect labour market dynamics [...] and to undertake other appropriate measures to promote a better balance between work and private life and between flexibility and security”. It is however striking that most of the reforms undertaken have contrasted sharply with this latter recommendation by favouring reforms at the margin. Those reforms have fostered two-tier systems, as the increase in labour market flexibility has taken place mainly through a series of marginal reforms that liberalized the use of fixed-term and/or non-standard employment contracts. Two-tier systems have promoted the emergence of dual employment protection which can be broadly defined as the coexistence of both long-term contracts, which benefit from stringent protection, and short-term contracts with little or no protection. It is often argued that this combination creates labour market segmentation, traps workers in a recurring sequence of frequent unemployment spells, favours unequal repartition of risk between workers and enhances inequalities. In particular, two-tier systems create excess labour turnover as they increase the incentives to create temporary rather than permanent jobs, reduce job destruction for stable jobs, but increase churning for temporary jobs. For instance in countries with stringent legal constraints on the termination of permanent jobs, such as France or Spain, it turns out that about 70 per cent to 90 per cent of entries into employment are in temporary jobs with very short duration (on average less than one month and a half in France). If excess labour turnover and its consequences are a concern for the economy as a whole, the dramatic spread of temporary jobs is even more a concern for young/less experienced workers as they are more likely to be negatively affected by the adverse effects of dual employment protection. The French labour market is no exception and has faced similar trends during the 1990s. Given the pervasiveness of temporary jobs on the labour market and their consequences on the society and economic outcomes, it is urgent to understand how two-tier systems shape the functioning of the labour market. This is the very purpose of the present report. After having described in details the salient features of the French dual labour market and having discussed the legislation at the root of French dualism, we review the different mechanisms through which dualism affect labour markets: labour market dynamics, wage inequality, human capital accumulation, job satisfaction, social integration and health. We consider whenever possible both theoretical insights and empirical evaluations. We finally conclude this report by providing possible directions to reform the labour market

Labour market institutions and labour market performance: A survey of the literature

This paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions. It describes the different empirical approaches used to explore the nexus between labour market institutions and labour market performance. It stresses that the effect of institutions is complex in both stock and flow models and that it is also crucial to take into account the interactions they generate among themselves and with macroeconomic shocks.labour market performance, labour market institutions, redistributive policies, unemployment dynamics, Arpaia, Mourre

Image sharing privacy policy on social networks using A3P

User Image sharing social site maintaining privacy has become a major problem, as demonstrated by a recent wave of publicized incidents where users inadvertently shared personal information. In light of these incidents, the need of tools to help users control access to their shared content is apparent. Toward addressing this need an Adaptive Privacy Policy Prediction (A3P) system to help users compose privacy settings for their images. The solution relies on an image classification framework for image categories which may be associated with similar policies and on a policy prediction algorithm to automatically generate a policy for each newly uploaded image, also according to user’s social features. Image Sharing takes place both among previously established groups of known people or social circles and also increasingly with people outside the users social circles, for purposes of social discovery-to help them identify new peers and learn about peers interests and social surroundings, Sharing images within online content sharing sites, therefore, may quickly lead to unwanted disclosure. The aggregated information can result in unexpected exposure of one’s social environment and lead to abuse of one’s personal information

Product market regulation, firm size, unemployment and informality in developing economies

This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations on informality and unemployment in a general framework where formal and informal firms are subject to the same externalities, differing only with respect to some parameter values. Both formal and informal firms have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching friction in the labor market, and wages are determined through bargaining between large firms and their workers. The informal sector is found to be endogenously more competitive than the formal one. We find that lower strictness of product or labor market regulations lead to a simultaneous reduction in informality and unemployment. The difference between these two policy options lies on their effect on wages. Lessening product market strictness increases wages in both sector but also increases the formal sector wage premium. The opposite is true for labor market regulation. Finally, we show that the so-called overhiring externality due to wage bargaining translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector.Informality; Product and Labor Market Imperfections; Firm Size

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.Adverse selection, turnover costs, unemployment, worker flows, matching models, discrimination

Global supply-chain effects of COVID-19 control measures

Countries have sought to stop the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) by severely restricting travel and in-person commercial activities. Here, we analyse the supply-chain effects of a set of idealized lockdown scenarios, using the latest global trade modelling framework. We find that supply-chain losses that are related to initial COVID-19 lockdowns are largely dependent on the number of countries imposing restrictions and that losses are more sensitive to the duration of a lockdown than its strictness. However, a longer containment that can eradicate the disease imposes a smaller loss than shorter ones. Earlier, stricter and shorter lockdowns can minimize overall losses. A ‘go-slow’ approach to lifting restrictions may reduce overall damages if it avoids the need for further lockdowns. Regardless of the strategy, the complexity of global supply chains will magnify losses beyond the direct effects of COVID-19. Thus, pandemic control is a public good that requires collective efforts and support to lower-capacity countries

Global supply-chain effects of COVID-19 control measures

Countries have sought to stop the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) by severely restricting travel and in-person commercial activities. Here, we analyse the supply-chain effects of a set of idealized lockdown scenarios, using the latest global trade modelling framework. We find that supply-chain losses that are related to initial COVID-19 lockdowns are largely dependent on the number of countries imposing restrictions and that losses are more sensitive to the duration of a lockdown than its strictness. However, a longer containment that can eradicate the disease imposes a smaller loss than shorter ones. Earlier, stricter and shorter lockdowns can minimize overall losses. A ‘go-slow’ approach to lifting restrictions may reduce overall damages if it avoids the need for further lockdowns. Regardless of the strategy, the complexity of global supply chains will magnify losses beyond the direct effects of COVID-19. Thus, pandemic control is a public good that requires collective efforts and support to lower-capacity countries

A Benes Based NoC Switching Architecture for Mixed Criticality Embedded Systems

Multi-core, Mixed Criticality Embedded (MCE) real-time systems require high timing precision and predictability to guarantee there will be no interference between tasks. These guarantees are necessary in application areas such as avionics and automotive, where task interference or missed deadlines could be catastrophic, and safety requirements are strict. In modern multi-core systems, the interconnect becomes a potential point of uncertainty, introducing major challenges in proving behaviour is always within specified constraints, limiting the means of growing system performance to add more tasks, or provide more computational resources to existing tasks. We present MCENoC, a Network-on-Chip (NoC) switching architecture that provides innovations to overcome this with predictable, formally verifiable timing behaviour that is consistent across the whole NoC. We show how the fundamental properties of Benes networks benefit MCE applications and meet our architecture requirements. Using SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA), formal properties are defined that aid the refinement of the specification of the design as well as enabling the implementation to be exhaustively formally verified. We demonstrate the performance of the design in terms of size, throughput and predictability, and discuss the application level considerations needed to exploit this architecture

Product market regulation, firm size, unemployment and informality in developing economies

This paper studies the impact of product and labor market regulations on informality and unemployment in a general framework where formal and informal firms are subject to the same externalities, differing only with respect to some parameter values. Both formal and informal firms have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching friction in the labor market, and wages are determined through bargaining between large firms and their workers. The informal sector is found to be endogenously more competitive than the formal one. We find that lower strictness of product or labor market regulations lead to a simultaneous reduction in informality and unemployment. The difference between these two policy options lies on their effect on wages. Lessening product market strictness increases wages in both sector but also increases the formal sector wage premium. The opposite is true for labor market regulation. Finally, we show that the so-called overhiring externality due to wage bargaining translates into a smaller relative size of the informal sector.Informality; Product and Labor Market Imperfections; Firm Size