43,084 research outputs found
Strategies for prediction under imperfect monitoring
We propose simple randomized strategies for sequential prediction under
imperfect monitoring, that is, when the forecaster does not have access to the
past outcomes but rather to a feedback signal. The proposed strategies are
consistent in the sense that they achieve, asymptotically, the best possible
average reward. It was Rustichini (1999) who first proved the existence of such
consistent predictors. The forecasters presented here offer the first
constructive proof of consistency. Moreover, the proposed algorithms are
computationally efficient. We also establish upper bounds for the rates of
convergence. In the case of deterministic feedback, these rates are optimal up
to logarithmic terms.Comment: Journal version of a COLT conference pape
Supporting group maintenance through prognostics-enhanced dynamic dependability prediction
Condition-based maintenance strategies adapt maintenance planning through the integration of online condition monitoring of assets. The accuracy and cost-effectiveness of these strategies can be improved by integrating prognostics predictions and grouping maintenance actions respectively. In complex industrial systems, however, effective condition-based maintenance is intricate. Such systems are comprised of repairable assets which can fail in different ways, with various effects, and typically governed by dynamics which include time-dependent and conditional events. In this context, system reliability prediction is complex and effective maintenance planning is virtually impossible prior to system deployment and hard even in the case of condition-based maintenance. Addressing these issues, this paper presents an online system maintenance method that takes into account the system dynamics. The method employs an online predictive diagnosis algorithm to distinguish between critical and non-critical assets. A prognostics-updated method for predicting the system health is then employed to yield well-informed, more accurate, condition-based suggestions for the maintenance of critical assets and for the group-based reactive repair of non-critical assets. The cost-effectiveness of the approach is discussed in a case study from the power industry
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps et al. [Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations, Econometrica 72 (2004) 407–432] showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player's reputation is private. The rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and reputations also disappear in sufficiently long discounted finitely repeated games
Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market
We analyze the time-series of prices in the Spanish electricity market by means of a
time varying-transition-probability Markov switching model. Accounting for changes
in demand and cost conditions (which re°ect changes in input costs, capacity avail-
ability and hydro power), we show that the time-series of prices is characterized by
two signi¯cantly di®erent price levels. Based on a Green and Porter (1984)'s type of
model that introduces several institutional details, we construct trigger variables that
a®ect the likelihood of starting a price war. By interpreting the signs of the triggers,
we are able to infer some of the properties of the collusive strategy that ¯rms might
have followed. We obtain more empirical support to Green and Porter's model than
previous studies
Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations
We study the impact of unobservable stochastic replacements for the long-run player in the classical reputation model with a long-run player and a series of short-run players. We provide explicit lower bounds on the Nash equilibrium payoffs of a long-run player, both ex-ante and following any positive probability history. Under general conditions on the convergence rates of the discount factor to one and of the rate of replacement to zero, both bounds converge to the Stackelberg payoff if the type space is sufficiently rich. These limiting conditions hold in particular if the game is played very frequently.Reputation, repeated games, replacements, disappearing reputations JEL Classification Numbers: D80, C73
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships
For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player’s reputation is private.Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games, Commitment, Private Beliefs
- …