Strategically knowing how

In this paper, we propose a single-agent logic of goal-directed knowing how extending the standard epistemic logic of knowing that with a new knowing how operator. The semantics of the new operator is based on the idea that knowing how to achieve φ means that there exists a (uniform) strategy such that the agent knows that it can make sure φ. We give an intuitive axiomatization of our logic and prove the soundness, completeness, and decidability of the logic. The crucial axioms relating knowing that and knowing how illustrate our understanding of knowing how in this setting. This logic can be used in representing both knowledge-that and knowledge-how

Tableaux for the Logic of Strategically Knowing How

The logic of goal-directed knowing-how extends the standard epistemic logic with an operator of knowing-how. The knowing-how operator is interpreted as that there exists a strategy such that the agent knows that the strategy can make sure that p. This paper presents a tableau procedure for the multi-agent version of the logic of strategically knowing-how and shows the soundness and completeness of this tableau procedure. This paper also shows that the satisfiability problem of the logic can be decided in PSPACE.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2023, arXiv:2307.0400

Group announcement logic

AbstractTwo currently active strands of research on logics for multi-agent systems are dynamic epistemic logic, focusing on the epistemic consequences of actions, and logics of coalitional ability, focusing on what coalitions of agents can achieve by cooperating strategically. In this paper we bridge these topics by considering the question: “what can a coalition achieve by making public announcements?”. We propose an extension of public announcement logic with constructs of the form 〈G〉ϕ, where G is a group of agents, with the intuitive meaning that G can jointly execute a publicly observable action such that ϕ will be true afterwards. Actions here are taken to be truthful public announcements, but turn out also to include sequences of such joint actions as well as protocols with alternating actions by different agents, in response to the actions of others. We also study in detail the difference between ‘knowing how’ (knowing de re) and ‘knowing that’ (knowing de dicto) in our framework: both can elegantly be expressed in the single-agent case. We present several meta-logical properties of this Group Announcement Logic, including a sound and complete axiomatization, expressivity and the complexity of model checking

The Determinants of Attitudes towards Strategic Default on Mortgages

We use survey data to study American households' propensity to default when the value of their mortgage exceeds the value of their house even if they can afford to pay their mortgage (strategic default). The cost of defaulting strategically increases in wealth, but at a decreasing rate. It is driven both by pecuniary and non pecuniary factors, such as views about fairness and morality. Exposure to other people who strategically defaulted increases the propensity to default strategically because it conveys information about the probability of being sued.

Thinking strategically about assessment

Drawing upon the literature on strategy formulation in organisations, this paper argues for a focus on strategy as process. It relates this to the need to think strategically about assessment, a need engendered by resource pressures, developments in learning and the demands of external stakeholders. It is argued that in practice assessment strategies are often formed at the level of practice, but that this produces contradiction and confusion at higher levels. Such tensions cannot be managed away, but they can be reflected on and mitigated. The paper suggests a framework for the construction of assessment strategies at different levels of an institution. However, the main conclusion is that the process of constructing such strategies should be an opportunity for learning and reflection, rather than one of compliance

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice function -- mapping payoff type profiles to outcomes -- can be robustly virtually implemented if there exists a mechanism such that every equilibrium on every type space achieves an outcome arbitrarily close to the social choice function: this definition is equivalent to requiring virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strategies that are strictly dominated for all beliefs. The social choice function is robustly measurable if strategically indistinguishable types receive the same allocation. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability are necessary and sufficient for robust virtual implementation.Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

What are the Best Practices to Follow in Order to Establish and Spread Culture for a Newly Formed Company Post-Merger?

[Excerpt] Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity has seen a significant increase in the past several decades and 68% of executives at US-headquartered corporations believe this pattern will continue. Although human capital can be the largest expense to impact a company’s income statement, it should be looked at with the lens of being an asset to the company and one worth strategically investing in. Knowing this, it is extremely important for a company to be prepared for any large changes to or impacts on their workforce, particularly during a M&A. In addition, a company must address the question of whether or not to integrate cultures post-merger. The answer is determined by the reason for the M&A; are the companies looking to achieve economies of scale or of scope? In other words, it must be clear what the objective of the merger is for both companies: growing the current customer base or gaining a new one