43,054 research outputs found

    Think Tank Review Issue 76 March 2020

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    Access Profit-Sharing Regulation with Information Transmission and Acquisition

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    The paper analyses how information acquisition and transmission issues affect the determination of the optimal access pro.t-sharing plan in regulated network industries. It considers a regulated upstream monopoly with cost uncertainty and a downstream unregulated duopoly. It will be shown that, under an access price cap regulatory mechanism, the transfer of a sufficiently high share of access profits to consumers induces an integrated upstream monopolist to transmit to his downstream rival the information privately acquired on the upstream cost and this, in turn, may negatively affect welfare. On account of these effects the optimal access profit-sharing plan will depend on the variance and shape of cost distribution, on information acquisition costs as well as on the regulator’s redistributive concerns.Access price cap regulation, profit-sharing, information transmission and acquisition

    Investment Size and Firm’s Value Under Profit Sharing Regulation

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    In this article we analyse the effects of different regulatory schemes (price cap and profit sharing) on a firm’s investment of endogenous size. Using a real option approach in continuous time, we show that profit sharing does not affect a firm’s start-up decision relative to a pure price cap scheme. Unless the threshold after which profit sharing intervenes is very high, however, introducing a profit sharing element delays further investments: this decreases the present value of total investment. We also evaluate the reduction in the firm’s value due to profit sharing, linking this reduction to the option value of future investments.Regulation, Investment, Profit sharing, Real options, RPI-x

    Optimal Price Regulation for Natural and Legal Monopolies

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    Optimal price regulation for natural and legal monopolies is an impossible task. The still difficult .task of good price regulation can be systematized by considering separately price level and price structure of the regulated firm. Various methods of price level and price structure regulation are evaluated and then considered for the regulation of electricity transmission, both in the context of an independent transmission company and of vertical integration between transmission and most of the generation capacity. The regulatory approach suggested uses price caps defined on two-part tariffs. This way, flexibility for short-term capacity utilization can be combined with incentives for investments in new transmission capacity.

    Price-Capping Regulation as a Protectionist Strategy in Developing Countries

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    In developing countries undergoing liberalising economic reforms, there are typically local incumbents facing the loss of protection. Strategic lobbying by such firms for a price-capping regulatory regime is, under certain conditions, one way in which they can deter entry by competitors who are likely to be foreign firms. We show that a regulatory price can be set such that the net profit of the entrant is lower than the entry cost thus deterring entry. We then show that it is possible for the profit of the incumbent to be greater under regulation which deters entry than under unregulated duopoly. Counter-intuitively, we further discover that lobbying for regulation is to be expected where the incumbent firm is relatively cost-efficient. Finally, we consider the case of multiple incumbents threatened by entry. We observe a co- ordination problem and consider the possibility of co-operation in lobbying. We then show that such co-operation, if possible, is always preferable to non-co-operation.Price-capping, regulation, lobbying, incumbents, entrants, free-riding, co-operation

    "The European Community and Japan: Bi(tri)lateral Trade in World Context"

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    This paper first examines the institutional context of EC trade policy and assesses the real level of protection that policy has afforded. It then examines the question of how "common" the policy has in fact been and how it has related to competition policy, devoting a special section to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The next two sections discuss crucial issues in the trilateral relationship between the EC, Japan, and the US by focusing on the manufacturing sectors of electronics and cars. In shifting the perspective towards the future this paper focuses first on the concept of "strategic trade policy" and then at the special issues raised by the reform process that "1992 has brought, if it has, in Eastern Europe. The paper ends by posing two fundamental and interrelated questions. Has "1992" brought the European Community closer to the rest of the world? And what is the future position of Europe in the international division of labor

    Regulation, generic competition and pharmaceutical prices: Theory and evidence from a natural experiment

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    We study the impact of regulatory regimes on generic competition and pharmaceutical pricing using a unique policy experiment in Norway, where reference pricing (RP) replaced price cap regulation in 2003 for a sub-sample of off-patent products. We exploit a detailed panel dataset at product level covering a wide set of off-patent drugs before and after the policy reform. Off-patent drugs not subject to reference pricing serve as our control group. We find that RP leads to lower relative prices, with the effect being driven by strong brand-name price reductions, and not increases in generic prices. We also find that RP increases generic competition, resulting in lower brand-name market shares. Finally, we show that RP has a strong negative effect on average prices at molecule level, suggesting significant cost-savings.Pharmaceuticals, Regulation, Generic Competition.

    Characterisation framework of key policy, regulatory and governance dynamics and impacts upon European food value chains: Fairer trading practices, food integrity, and sustainability collaborations. : VALUMICS project “Understanding Food Value Chains and Network Dynamics” funded by EU Horizon 2020 G.A. No 727243. Deliverable D3.3

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    The report provides a framework that categorises the different European Union (EU) policies, laws and governance actions identified as impacting upon food value chains in the defined areas of: fairer trading practices, food integrity (food safety and authenticity), and sustainability collaborations along food value chains. A four-stage framework is presented and illustrated with examples. The evidence shows that European Union policy activity impacting upon food value chain dynamics is increasing, both in terms of the impacts of policies upon the chains, and, in terms of addressing some of the more contentious outcomes of these dynamics. A number of policy priorities are at play in addressing the outcomes of food value chain dynamics. unevenness of the distribution of profit within food value chains, notably to farmers. Regulation of food safety and aspects of authenticity has been a key focus for two decades to ensure a functioning single market while ensuring consumer health and wellbeing. A food chain length perspective has been attempted, notably through regulations such as the General Food Law, and the rationalisation of the Official Controls on food and feed safety. However, there are still gaps in the effective monitoring and transparency of food safety and of food integrity along value chains, as exemplified by misleading claims and criminal fraud. This has led to renewed policy actions over food fraud, in particular. EU regulations, policies and related governance initiatives provide an important framework for national-level actions for EU member states and for EEA members. The more tightly EU-regulated areas, such as food safety, see fewer extra initiatives, but where there is a more general strategic policy and governance push, such as food waste reduction or food fraud, there is greater independent state-level activity. Likewise, there is much more variation in the application of both national and European (Competition) law to govern unfair trading practices impacting upon food value chains. This report presents the findings of a survey of members from the VALUMICS stakeholder platform, that were policy facing food value chain stakeholders across selected European countries, including both EU and EEA Member States. The survey was conducted to check the significance of the main policies identified in the mapping exercise at EU and national levels and so to incorporate the views of stakeholders in the research. The responses suggest the policy concerns identified in EU and national-level research resonate with food value chain stakeholders in participating nations. The report concludes by exploring in more detail how the themes of fairness and of transparency are being handled in the policy activities presented. Highlighted are the ways that both fairness and transparency can be extended within the existing frameworks of EU policy activity. The findings in this report provide an important context for further and detailed research analysis of the workings and dynamics of European food value chains under the VALUMICS project

    Price-Capping regulation as a protectionist strategy in developing countries

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    In developing countries undergoing liberalising reforms, there are typically local incumbents facing the loss of protection. Strategic lobbying by such firms for a price-capping regulatory regime can deter entry. We show that a regulatory price can be set such that the net profit of the entrant is lower than the entry cost thus deterring entry and that it is possible for the profit of the incumbent to be greater under regulation than under unregulated duopoly. We consider the case of multiple incumbents threatened by entry and also extend our analysis to incorporate lobbying by the entrant.entrant, incumbent, lobbying, price-capping regulation

    Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation

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    Performance-based regulation (PBR) is influenced by the Bayesian and non-Bayesian incentive mechanisms. While Bayesian incentives are impractical, the insights from their properties can be combined with practical non-Bayesian mechanisms for application to transmission pricing. This combination suggests an approach based on the distinction between ultra-short, short and long periods. Ultra-short periods are marked by real-time pricing of point-to-point transmission services. Pricing in short periods involves fixed fees and adjustments via price-cap formulas or profit sharing. Productivity-enhancing incentives have to be tempered by long-term commitment considerations, so that profit sharing may dominate pure price caps. Investment incentives require long-term adjustments based on rate-of-return regulation with a “used and useful” criterion.
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