Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Comment

The contest-theoretic literature on the attack and defense of networks of targets focuses primarily on pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Hausken\u27s 2008 European Journal of Operational Research article typifies this approach, and many of the models in this literature either build upon this model or utilize similar techniques. We show that Hausken\u27s characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provides necessary conditions for his solution to hold. The complete characterization of mixed-strategy equilibria remains an open problem, although there exist solutions in the literature for special prominent cases

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2012ab) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps.Game theory; Reliability theory; OR in military; Conflict; Contest; Network; Colonel Blotto game

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper consists of three sections. The first section is an introduction which is OK but has no results. The second section, titled “Model and Main Result”, provides no contribution beyond Hausken (2008a). It consists of equations (1)-(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken (2008a), and equation (11) which is equivalent to the requirement u≥0 and U≥0 provided after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). The third section quotes Hausken (2008a) once in one sentence which means that section 3 does not belong as a comment on the paper written by Hausken (2008a). The authors are encouraged to develop a new paper based on many interesting ideas in this note. The new paper should develop further the idea of mixed strategies presented in section 3. The new paper may be titled: “Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems when Allowing Mixed Strategies”.Game theory; Reliability theory; OR in military; Conflict; Contest; Network

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2012ab) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps

Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems: reply to rejoinder

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2012ab) replication of Hausken’s (2008a) equations and parameter restrictions do not enhance our insight into the defense and attack of reliability systems. This reply intends to fill the remaining understanding gaps

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper consists of three sections. The first section is an introduction which is OK but has no results. The second section, titled “Model and Main Result”, provides no contribution beyond Hausken (2008a). It consists of equations (1)-(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken (2008a), and equation (11) which is equivalent to the requirement u≥0 and U≥0 provided after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). The third section quotes Hausken (2008a) once in one sentence which means that section 3 does not belong as a comment on the paper written by Hausken (2008a). The authors are encouraged to develop a new paper based on many interesting ideas in this note. The new paper should develop further the idea of mixed strategies presented in section 3. The new paper may be titled: “Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems when Allowing Mixed Strategies”

Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Reply on Comment

Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper has the potential to advance the research frontier, but has deficiencies. This paper suggests how Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper can be developed into a more substantial paper. Kovenock and Roberson’s (2010) paper consists of three sections. The first section is an introduction which is OK but has no results. The second section, titled “Model and Main Result”, provides no contribution beyond Hausken (2008a). It consists of equations (1)-(10) which are equivalent to equations developed by Hausken (2008a), and equation (11) which is equivalent to the requirement u≥0 and U≥0 provided after equation (17) in Hausken (2008a). The third section quotes Hausken (2008a) once in one sentence which means that section 3 does not belong as a comment on the paper written by Hausken (2008a). The authors are encouraged to develop a new paper based on many interesting ideas in this note. The new paper should develop further the idea of mixed strategies presented in section 3. The new paper may be titled: “Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems when Allowing Mixed Strategies”

RISK ASSESSMENT OF MALICIOUS ATTACKS AGAINST POWER SYSTEMS

The new scenarios of malicious attack prompt for their deeper consideration and mainly when critical systems are at stake. In this framework, infrastructural systems, including power systems, represent a possible target due to the huge impact they can have on society. Malicious attacks are different in their nature from other more traditional cause of threats to power system, since they embed a strategic interaction between the attacker and the defender (characteristics that cannot be found in natural events or systemic failures). This difference has not been systematically analyzed by the existent literature. In this respect, new approaches and tools are needed. This paper presents a mixed-strategy game-theory model able to capture the strategic interactions between malicious agents that may be willing to attack power systems and the system operators, with its related bodies, that are in charge of defending them. At the game equilibrium, the different strategies of the two players, in terms of attacking/protecting the critical elements of the systems, can be obtained. The information about the attack probability to various elements can be used to assess the risk associated with each of them, and the efficiency of defense resource allocation is evidenced in terms of the corresponding risk. Reference defense plans related to the online defense action and the defense action with a time delay can be obtained according to their respective various time constraints. Moreover, risk sensitivity to the defense/attack-resource variation is also analyzed. The model is applied to a standard IEEE RTS-96 test system for illustrative purpose and, on the basis of that system, some peculiar aspects of the malicious attacks are pointed ou