49 research outputs found

    Optimal Pricing Strategies and Customers’ Equilibrium Behavior in an Unobservable M/M/1 Queueing System with Negative Customers and Repair

    Get PDF
    This work investigates the optimal pricing strategies of a server and the equilibrium behavior of customers in an unobservable M/M/1 queueing system with negative customers and repair. In this work, we consider two pricing schemes. The first is termed the ex-post payment scheme, where the server charges a price that is proportional to the time spent by a customer in the system. The second scheme is the ex-ante payment scheme, where the server charges a flat rate for all services. Based on the reward-cost structure, the server (or system manager) should make optimal pricing decisions in order to maximize its expected profit per time unit in each payment scheme. This study also investigates equilibrium joining/balking behavior under the server’s optimal pricing strategies in the two pricing schemes. We show, given a customer’s equilibrium, that the two pricing schemes are perfectly identical from an economic point of view. Finally, we illustrate the effect of several system parameters on the optimal joining probabilities, the optimal price, and the equilibrium behavior via numerical examples

    EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON QUEUEING THEORY 2016

    Get PDF
    International audienceThis booklet contains the proceedings of the second European Conference in Queueing Theory (ECQT) that was held from the 18th to the 20th of July 2016 at the engineering school ENSEEIHT, Toulouse, France. ECQT is a biannual event where scientists and technicians in queueing theory and related areas get together to promote research, encourage interaction and exchange ideas. The spirit of the conference is to be a queueing event organized from within Europe, but open to participants from all over the world. The technical program of the 2016 edition consisted of 112 presentations organized in 29 sessions covering all trends in queueing theory, including the development of the theory, methodology advances, computational aspects and applications. Another exciting feature of ECQT2016 was the institution of the Takács Award for outstanding PhD thesis on "Queueing Theory and its Applications"

    Equilibrium and Optimal Strategies in M/M/1 Queues with Working Vacations and Vacation Interruptions

    Get PDF
    We consider the customers equilibrium and socially optimal joining-balking behavior in single-server Markovian queues with multiple working vacations and vacation interruptions. Arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a linear reward-cost structure that incorporates their desire for service, as well as their unwillingness for waiting. We consider that the system states are observable, partially observable, and unobservable, respectively. For these cases, we first analyze the stationary behavior of the system and get the equilibrium strategies of the customers and compare them to socially optimal balking strategies numerically

    Optimal Pricing Strategies in Cognitive Radio Networks with Heterogeneous Secondary Users and Retrials

    Get PDF
    In a cognitive radio (CR) system, excessive access services for secondary users (SUs) lead to a substantial increase in congestion and the retrial phenomenon, both of which degrade the performance of CR networks, especially in overload conditions. This paper investigates the price-based spectrum access control policy that characterizes the network operator\u27s provision to heterogeneous and delay-sensitive SUs through pricing strategies. Based on shared-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), the SUs can occupy the dedicated spectrum without degrading the operations of primary users (PUs). The service to transmission of SUs can be interrupted by an arriving PU, while the interrupted SUs join a retrial pool called an orbit, later trying to use the spectrum to complete the service. In the retrial orbit, the interrupted SU competes fairly with other SUs in the orbit. Such a DSA mechanism is formulated as a retrial queue with service interruptions and general service times. Regarding the heterogeneity of delay-sensitive SUs, we consider two cases: the delay-sensitive parameter follows a discrete distribution and a continuous distribution, respectively. In equilibrium, we find that the revenue-optimal price is unique, while there may exist a continuum of equilibria for the socially optimal price. In addition, the socially optimal price is always not greater than the revenue-optimal price, and thus the socially optimal arrival rate is not less than the revenue-optimal one, which is contrary with the conclusion, i.e., the socially optimal and revenue-optimal arrival rates are consistent, drawn in the literature for homogeneous SUs. Finally, we present numerical examples to show the effect of various parameters on the operator\u27s pricing strategies and SUs\u27 behavior

    Strategic queueing behavior for individual and social optimization in managing discrete time working vacation queue with Bernoulli interruption schedule

    Get PDF
    In this paper, we consider a discrete time working vacation queue with a utility function for the reward of receiving the service and the cost of waiting in the system. A more flexible switching mechanism between low and regular service states is introduced to enhance the practical value of the working vacation queue. Under different precision levels of the system information, namely observable, almost unobservable and fully unobservable cases, the utility function is studied from both the individual customer’s and the system administrator’s points of view. By analyzing the steady-state behavior of the system, the associated optimal joining decisions under different information scenarios are obtained. We find that for the fully observable queue, the joining threshold for individual optimization may be less than the one for social optimization in working vacation period. A similar situation also appears in almost unobservable case. Such phenomenon is not possible for the classic first come first served queue due to the fact that there is no vacation time and thus will not cause large fluctuations in customers’ conditional waiting time. Additionally, we also conduct some numerical comparisons to demonstrate the effect of the information levels as well as system parameters on customer joining behavior.This research was partially supported by grant from NSERC DAS programs, National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos.71301111, 71571127, 71402072) and the FSUSE (No.2012RC23).http://www.elsevier.com/locate/caor2017-09-30hb2016Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineerin
    corecore