3,212 research outputs found
One Breaker is Enough: Hidden Topology Attacks on Power Grids
A coordinated cyber-attack on grid meter readings and breaker statuses can
lead to incorrect state estimation that can subsequently destabilize the grid.
This paper studies cyber-attacks by an adversary that changes breaker statuses
on transmission lines to affect the estimation of the grid topology. The
adversary, however, is incapable of changing the value of any meter data and
can only block recorded measurements on certain lines from being transmitted to
the control center. The proposed framework, with limited resource requirements
as compared to standard data attacks, thus extends the scope of cyber-attacks
to grids secure from meter corruption. We discuss necessary and sufficient
conditions for feasible attacks using a novel graph-coloring based analysis and
show that an optimal attack requires breaker status change at only ONE
transmission line. The potency of our attack regime is demonstrated through
simulations on IEEE test cases.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figures, Accepted to the IEEE PES General Meeting 201
Jamming aided Generalized Data Attacks: Exposing Vulnerabilities in Secure Estimation
Jamming refers to the deletion, corruption or damage of meter measurements
that prevents their further usage. This is distinct from adversarial data
injection that changes meter readings while preserving their utility in state
estimation. This paper presents a generalized attack regime that uses jamming
of secure and insecure measurements to greatly expand the scope of common
'hidden' and 'detectable' data injection attacks in literature. For 'hidden'
attacks, it is shown that with jamming, the optimal attack is given by the
minimum feasible cut in a specific weighted graph. More importantly, for
'detectable' data attacks, this paper shows that the entire range of relative
costs for adversarial jamming and data injection can be divided into three
separate regions, with distinct graph-cut based constructions for the optimal
attack. Approximate algorithms for attack design are developed and their
performances are demonstrated by simulations on IEEE test cases. Further, it is
proved that prevention of such attacks require security of all grid
measurements. This work comprehensively quantifies the dual adversarial
benefits of jamming: (a) reduced attack cost and (b) increased resilience to
secure measurements, that strengthen the potency of data attacks.Comment: 11 pages, 8 figures, A version of this will appear in HICSS 201
Smart Grid Security: Threats, Challenges, and Solutions
The cyber-physical nature of the smart grid has rendered it vulnerable to a
multitude of attacks that can occur at its communication, networking, and
physical entry points. Such cyber-physical attacks can have detrimental effects
on the operation of the grid as exemplified by the recent attack which caused a
blackout of the Ukranian power grid. Thus, to properly secure the smart grid,
it is of utmost importance to: a) understand its underlying vulnerabilities and
associated threats, b) quantify their effects, and c) devise appropriate
security solutions. In this paper, the key threats targeting the smart grid are
first exposed while assessing their effects on the operation and stability of
the grid. Then, the challenges involved in understanding these attacks and
devising defense strategies against them are identified. Potential solution
approaches that can help mitigate these threats are then discussed. Last, a
number of mathematical tools that can help in analyzing and implementing
security solutions are introduced. As such, this paper will provide the first
comprehensive overview on smart grid security
False Analog Data Injection Attack Towards Topology Errors: Formulation and Feasibility Analysis
In this paper, we propose a class of false analog data injection attack that
can misguide the system as if topology errors had occurred. By utilizing the
measurement redundancy with respect to the state variables, the adversary who
knows the system configuration is shown to be capable of computing the
corresponding measurement value with the intentionally misguided topology. The
attack is designed such that the state as well as residue distribution after
state estimation will converge to those in the system with a topology error. It
is shown that the attack can be launched even if the attacker is constrained to
some specific meters. The attack is detrimental to the system since
manipulation of analog data will lead to a forged digital topology status, and
the state after the error is identified and modified will be significantly
biased with the intended wrong topology. The feasibility of the proposed attack
is demonstrated with an IEEE 14-bus system.Comment: 5 pages, 7 figures, Proc. of 2018 IEEE Power and Energy Society
General Meetin
- …