2,220 research outputs found

    Strategic Interaction between Operators in the Context of Spectrum Sharing for 5G Networks

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    [EN] 5G networks will make network sharing agreements between mobile operators technically possible. However, depending on the agreed and implemented quality-of-service isolation, the provision of services may lead to unsustainable business cases. In this paper, the economic feasibility of such arrangements is analyzed for the case of two operators. Concretely, while one network operator owns the spectrum, one virtual operator does not, and each one provides service to its subscriber base. Two sharing alternatives, namely, pooling and priority sharing, are studied regarding the profits that each operator gets. We conclude that the network operator is worse off under any circumstances under a pooling agreement, while a lump sum payment may leave the network operator better off under a priority sharing agreement.This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through projects TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R (cosupported by the European Social Fund) and BES-2014-068998 and partially supported by the Salesian Polytechnic University of Ecuador through a Ph.D. scholarship granted to the first author.Sacoto-Cabrera, E.; Sanchis-Cano, Á.; Guijarro, L.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Pla, V. (2018). Strategic Interaction between Operators in the Context of Spectrum Sharing for 5G Networks. Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing (Online). 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/4308913S11

    Game Theoretical Analysis of a Multi-MNO MVNO Business Model in 5G Networks

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    This work has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (MCIU/AEI) and the European Union (FEDER/UE) through Grant PGC2018-094151-B-I00 and partially supported by Politecnica Salesiana University (Salesian Polytechnic University) in Ecuador through a Ph.D. scholarship granted to the first author.Sacoto Cabrera, EJ.; Guijarro, L.; Maillé, P. (2020). Game Theoretical Analysis of a Multi-MNO MVNO Business Model in 5G Networks. Electronics. 9(6):1-26. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics9060933S12696Gruber, H. (2001). Competition and innovation. Information Economics and Policy, 13(1), 19-34. doi:10.1016/s0167-6245(00)00028-7Berne, M., Vialle, P., & Whalley, J. (2019). An analysis of the disruptive impact of the entry of Free Mobile into the French mobile telecommunications market. Telecommunications Policy, 43(3), 262-277. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2018.07.007Nakao, A., Du, P., Kiriha, Y., Granelli, F., Gebremariam, A. A., Taleb, T., & Bagaa, M. (2017). 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    Business Case and Technology Analysis for 5G Low Latency Applications

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    A large number of new consumer and industrial applications are likely to change the classic operator's business models and provide a wide range of new markets to enter. This article analyses the most relevant 5G use cases that require ultra-low latency, from both technical and business perspectives. Low latency services pose challenging requirements to the network, and to fulfill them operators need to invest in costly changes in their network. In this sense, it is not clear whether such investments are going to be amortized with these new business models. In light of this, specific applications and requirements are described and the potential market benefits for operators are analysed. Conclusions show that operators have clear opportunities to add value and position themselves strongly with the increasing number of services to be provided by 5G.Comment: 18 pages, 5 figure

    Public Policy Targets in EU Broadband Markets: The Role of Technological Neutrality

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    The European Commission has recently sought to substantially revise how it regulates the telecommunication industry, with a key goal being to incentivise investment in high-speed broadband networks. Ambitious goals to incentivise investment in high-speed broadband networks have been set across the European Union, initially in the "Digital Agenda for Europe" and more recently in its "Gigabit strategy". These goals reflect the view of many that there are widespread and significant socio-economic benefits associated with broadband. Our analysis explores the consequence of target setting at a European level, in terms of encouraging investment and picking which technology should be adopted within the context of technological neutrality. We demonstrate that while public policy targets might implicitly favour specific technologies, especially when gigabit targets are defined, the technological choices that occur within individual Member States are shaped by the complex and dynamic interaction between a series of path dependencies that may vary significantly across as well as within Member States. Adopting an ecosystem perspective, we propose a conceptual framework that identifies the key factors associated with technological neutrality and informs a rational decision-making process.Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economic

    Iris: Deep Reinforcement Learning Driven Shared Spectrum Access Architecture for Indoor Neutral-Host Small Cells

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    We consider indoor mobile access, a vital use case for current and future mobile networks. For this key use case, we outline a vision that combines a neutral-host based shared small-cell infrastructure with a common pool of spectrum for dynamic sharing as a way forward to proliferate indoor small-cell deployments and open up the mobile operator ecosystem. Towards this vision, we focus on the challenges pertaining to managing access to shared spectrum (e.g., 3.5GHz US CBRS spectrum). We propose Iris, a practical shared spectrum access architecture for indoor neutral-host small-cells. At the core of Iris is a deep reinforcement learning based dynamic pricing mechanism that efficiently mediates access to shared spectrum for diverse operators in a way that provides incentives for operators and the neutral-host alike. We then present the Iris system architecture that embeds this dynamic pricing mechanism alongside cloud-RAN and RAN slicing design principles in a practical neutral-host design tailored for the indoor small-cell environment. Using a prototype implementation of the Iris system, we present extensive experimental evaluation results that not only offer insight into the Iris dynamic pricing process and its superiority over alternative approaches but also demonstrate its deployment feasibility
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