The effect of conversational agent skill on user behavior during deception

Conversational agents (CAs) are an integral component of many personal and business interactions. Many recent advancements in CA technology have attempted to make these interactions more natural and human-like. However, it is currently unclear how human-like traits in a CA impact the way users respond to questions from the CA. In some applications where CAs may be used, detecting deception is important. Design elements that make CA interactions more human-like may induce undesired strategic behaviors from human deceivers to mask their deception. To better understand this interaction, this research investigates the effect of conversational skill—that is, the ability of the CA to mimic human conversation—from CAs on behavioral indicators of deception. Our results show that cues of deception vary depending on CA conversational skill, and that increased conversational skill leads to users engaging in strategic behaviors that are detrimental to deception detection. This finding suggests that for applications in which it is desirable to detect when individuals are lying, the pursuit of more human-like interactions may be counter-productive

Ten possible experiments on communication and deception

I describe ten situations in which experimental data may provide useful guidance to the study of cheap-talk games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C92, D8. © 2013 Elsevier B.V

Towards a theory of deception

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent�s strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of the simplest theories compatible with the available knowledge. The approach can be viewed as formalizing into a game theoretic setting a well documented bias in social psychology, the Fundamental Attribution Er- ror. It is applied to a bargaining problem, thereby revealing a deceptive tactic that is hard to explain in the full rationality paradigm