3,110 research outputs found
Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Constructive Approach to Economic Theory
This chapter explores the potential advantages and disadvantages of Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) for the study of economic systems. General points are concretely illustrated using an ACE model of a two-sector decentralized market economy. Six issues are highlighted: Constructive understanding of production, pricing, and trade processes; the essential primacy of survival; strategic rivalry and market power; behavioral uncertainty and learning; the role of conventions and organizations; and the complex interactions among structural attributes, behaviors, and institutional arrangements. Extensive annotated pointers to ACE surveys, research, course materials, and software can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htmagent-based computational economics; Learning; network formation; decentralized market economy
Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives
This paper studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time period has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. The monopoly may be induced to deliver the good if consumers expect that the monopoly will not deliver in the future if it does not deliver today. If the good is non-durable and consumers are anonymous, the monopoly's optimal strategy is to set price equal to the static monopoly price each period if the discount factor is high enough, and otherwise to set the lowest price at which it can credibly promise to deliver the good. If the good is durable, we derive an intuitive lower bound on the monopoly's optimal profit for any discount factor and show that it converges to the optimal static monopoly profit as the discount factor converges to one, in contrast to the Coase conjecture. We also show that rationing the good is never optimal for the monopoly if there is an efficient resale market and that the best equilibrium in which the monopoly always delivers involves a strictly decreasing price path that asymptotes to a level weakly above the ratio of the monopoly's marginal cost to the discount factor.Coase conjecture, durable goods, monopoly pricing, non-durable goods, rationing, relational incentives
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Why markdown as a pricing modality?
Markdown as a pricing modality is ubiquitous in retail whereas everyday low price (EDLP) remains relatively rare (despite its several advantages, such as simplicity). This paper explores whether and why retailers can use either of these pricing modalities as an effective defense against a competitor entering the market with the alternative pricing modality. Various studies have shown that consumers are strategic and heterogeneous in their valuation of a product. Consumers are also shown to be regret-prone, and anticipation of regret affects their purchase decisions. Consumers experience availability regret when they are unable to purchase products due to stockouts and high-price regret when they miss an opportunity to purchase products at low prices. Considering such factors, consumers decide whether, when, and from which retailer to purchase the product. In such a market environment, we find that the possible entry of a competitor should deter retailers from using the EDLP pricing modality but not markdown. We also identify a new reason for the markdown retailer to ration stock (in addition to the reason for discouraging consumers to wait for the markdown). In particular, we show that the markdown retailer can use inventory rationing to preclude a cutthroat competition and bankruptcy after the entry of an EDLP retailer. We also quantify how consumer regret affects both retailers' decisions and resulting profits. In particular, in a competitive market, the EDLP retailer cannot simply disregard consumers' availability and high-price regret (even when it stocks ample inventory and does not discount prices). We show that high-price regret and availability regret have complementary effects on the markdown retailer's rationing strategy and the EDLP retailer's price decision. Finally, using a proprietary price data set from a large department store, we show that ignoring regret factors causes the markdown retailer to leave up to 20% of its profits on the table. In addition, in a competitive market, the markdown retailer rations too aggressively when regret is ignored and, as a result, leaves some of the forgone profit to its competitor-the EDLP retailer. The retail industry is often characterized by its slim profit margins. In such an environment, the aforementioned results also suggest that retailers should seriously consider investing in developing the capacity to estimate and quantify the role of regret in consumers' purchase decisions
Markdowns in Seasonal Conspicuous Goods
In common parlance, luxury and markdowns are, in many respects, contradictory concepts. Markdowns decrease product exclusivity and hence consumers’ willingness to pay (i.e., snob effect) since most consumers purchasing luxury desire uniqueness. Markdowns also encourage strategic (forward-looking) consumers to wait for lower prices (i.e., strategic effect). Yet, luxury retailers frequently adopt markdowns in practice to stimulate the demand for their seasonal products (i.e., sales effect). To study the impact of these three countervailing effects on a luxury retailer’s markdown policy and rationing strategy, this paper develops a game-theoretic model with strategic and exclusivity-seeking consumers who have heterogeneous (high and low) valuations. We characterize a luxury retailer’s equilibrium markdown and rationing strategies, and find that the retailer induces a buying frenzy (i.e., selling deliberately less than the demand) to increase consumers’ willingness to pay when they are sufficiently exclusivity-seeking. We show that the retailer’s markdown policy depends on consumers’ desire for exclusivity when the proportion of consumers with high valuation is not too high or too low. Interestingly, we find that, in such cases, consumers’ higher desire for exclusivity does not motivate the retailer to increase exclusivity and to adopt uniform pricing. To the contrary, it motivates the retailer to decrease the exclusivity and to adopt markdowns. By doing so, we identify exclusivity-seeking consumer behavior as another rationale behind markdown pricing. Lastly, we find that, when selling to exclusivity-seeking consumers, the negative impact of strategic consumer behavior is lower; however, ignoring it can be more costly
Lost in Translation: Interpreting the Brazilian Electric Power Privatisation Failure.
Did Latin American privatisation polices fail because of flawed implementation of fundamentally sound policies or because privatisation policies were themselves seriously flawed?Using the Brazilian electric power reforms as a narrative tool, this paper examines the causal chain assumed by large-scale privatisation policies implemented as part of structural reformand adjustment programmes. The paper concludes that many privatisation policies and the economic stabilisation programmes within which they were embedded were not mutually reinforcingas policymakers had expected and that in their application, much of what privatisation theories claimed was lost in translation.Brazil;privatisation;infrastructure;electric power
Dynamic Pricing with Fairness Concerns and a Capacity Constraint
Although some firms use dynamic pricing to respond to demand fluctuations, other firms claim that fairness concerns prevent them from raising prices during periods when demand exceeds capacity. This paper explores conditions in which fairness concerns can or cannot cause shortages. In our model, a firm announces a price policy that states its prices during high and low demand, and customers must travel to a venue to learn the current price. We show that the interaction of fairness concerns with travel costs can cause the firm to set stable prices, which leads to shortages during high demand. However, if the firm is able to inform customers about the current price before they incur any travel costs, then dynamic pricing with no shortages is optimal even with strong fairness concerns
Money, Inventories and Underemployment in Deflationary Recessions
This paper investigates monetary shocks and the rôle of inventories with respect to the occurrence of deflationary recessions. We propose a non-tâtonnement approach involving temporary equilibria with rationing in each period and price adjustment between successive periods. By amplifying spillover effects inventories imply that, following a restrictive monetary shock, the economy may converge to a quasi-stationary Keynesian underemployment state, in which case money is persistently non-neutral. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this is favored by sufficient downward flexibility of the nominal wage. The model is applied to the current deflationary Japanese recession, and we propose an economic policy to overcome itInventories, non-tatonnement, price adjustment, non-neutrality of money, deflationary recession
Intertemporal Pricing and Consumer Stockpiling
We study a dynamic pricing problem for a class of products with stable consumption patterns (e.g., household items, staple foods). Consumers may stock up the product at current prices for future consumption, but they incur inventory holding costs. We model this situation as a dynamic game over an infinite time horizon: in each period, the seller sets a price, and each consumer chooses how many units to buy. We develop a solution methodology based on rational expectations. By endowing each player with beliefs, we decouple the dynamic game into individual dynamic programs for each player. We solve for the rational expectations equilibrium, where all players make optimal dynamic decisions given correct beliefs about others\u27 behavior. In equilibrium, the seller may either charge a constant fixed price or offer periodic price promotions at predictable time intervals. We show that promotions are useful when frequent shoppers are willing to pay more for the product than are occasional shoppers. We also develop several model extensions to study the impact of consumer stockpiling on the seller\u27s inventory, production, and rationing strategies
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Dynamic pricing decisions and seller-buyer interactions under capacity constraints
Focusing on sellers’ pricing decisions and the ensuing seller-buyer interactions, we report an experiment on dynamic pricing with scarcity in the form of capacity constraints. Rational expectations equilibrium solutions are constructed and then tested experimentally with subjects assigned the roles of sellers and buyers. We investigate behavior in two between-subject conditions with high and moderate levels of capacity. Our laboratory market exhibits strategic sophistication: the price offers of sellers and the buyers’ aggregate responses largely approximate equilibrium predictions. We also observe systematic deviations from equilibrium benchmarks on both sides of the market. Specifically, in our experiment the sellers are boundedly strategic: their prices often exhibit strategic adjustments to profit from buyers with limited strategic sophistication, but they are also often biased towards equilibrium pricing even when that would not be ex-post optimal
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