Adaptive voting: an empirical analysis of participation and choice

Dynamic models of learning and adaptation have provided realistic predictions in terms of voting behavior. This study aims at contributing to their empirical verification by investigating voting behavior in terms of participation as well as choice. We test through panel data methods an outcome-based learning mechanism based on the following assumptions: (a) people expect that the party they do not support will be unable to bring economic improvements; (b) they receive a feedback whose impact depends on the consistency between their last voting behavior and personal economic improvements (or worsening) from the last election; (c) they tend to discard choices associated to an inconsistent feedback. Results show that feedbacks of this sort affect persistence of voting behavior, interpreted as participation and voting choice. Age and trade union affiliation reinforce this adaptive behavior. The analysis also investigates the intensity of the learning feedback, differentiating between a strong inconsistent feedback, which leads to a vote switch in favor of the opponent party, and a weak inconsistent feedback, which induces just abstention rather than a vote switch.voting, bounded rationality, learning, political accountability

The quest for a fiscal rule: Italy, 1861-1998

The Italian fiscal history is characterised by a number of fiscal consolidations. In this paper we characterise fiscal policy in terms of non-linear deterministic processes. We find that government spending and taxes can be described as being non-linear trend stationary processes instead of unit roots. A long run equilibrium relationship - a non-linear co-trend - does exist between the two series, fulfilling the intertemporal government budget constraint. We interpret this result as evidence of a long run fiscal rule that different policy makers have adopted, putting public finance in balance.taxes, government expenditure, intertemporal government budget constraint, non-linear trend stationarity, non-linear co-trending

Voter discernment and candidate entry in pluralitarian election

The paper develops a sequential model of candidate entry into elections decided on the basis of plurality. We analyze the kinds of candidates who are most likely to enter elections and simulate several plausible myopic entry sequences under various assumptions about voter abilities to discern differences in candidate positions. In the cases examined, open elections for “important” positions attract the entry of more than two candidates. Moreover, myopic entry often generates electoral outcomes which depart from the median-mean outcomes of the conventional models. These results are consistent with the observed diversity of candidates in presidential and other significant primary elections which contrasts with many previous analyses of electoral entry