14 research outputs found
Perfectly Secure Steganography: Capacity, Error Exponents, and Code Constructions
An analysis of steganographic systems subject to the following perfect
undetectability condition is presented in this paper. Following embedding of
the message into the covertext, the resulting stegotext is required to have
exactly the same probability distribution as the covertext. Then no statistical
test can reliably detect the presence of the hidden message. We refer to such
steganographic schemes as perfectly secure. A few such schemes have been
proposed in recent literature, but they have vanishing rate. We prove that
communication performance can potentially be vastly improved; specifically, our
basic setup assumes independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
covertext, and we construct perfectly secure steganographic codes from public
watermarking codes using binning methods and randomized permutations of the
code. The permutation is a secret key shared between encoder and decoder. We
derive (positive) capacity and random-coding exponents for perfectly-secure
steganographic systems. The error exponents provide estimates of the code
length required to achieve a target low error probability. We address the
potential loss in communication performance due to the perfect-security
requirement. This loss is the same as the loss obtained under a weaker order-1
steganographic requirement that would just require matching of first-order
marginals of the covertext and stegotext distributions. Furthermore, no loss
occurs if the covertext distribution is uniform and the distortion metric is
cyclically symmetric; steganographic capacity is then achieved by randomized
linear codes. Our framework may also be useful for developing computationally
secure steganographic systems that have near-optimal communication performance.Comment: To appear in IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, June 2008; ignore
Version 2 as the file was corrupte
Perfectly Secure Steganography: Capacity, Error Exponents, and Code Constructions
An analysis of steganographic systems subject to the following perfect
undetectability condition is presented in this paper. Following embedding of
the message into the covertext, the resulting stegotext is required to have
exactly the same probability distribution as the covertext. Then no statistical
test can reliably detect the presence of the hidden message. We refer to such
steganographic schemes as perfectly secure. A few such schemes have been
proposed in recent literature, but they have vanishing rate. We prove that
communication performance can potentially be vastly improved; specifically, our
basic setup assumes independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
covertext, and we construct perfectly secure steganographic codes from public
watermarking codes using binning methods and randomized permutations of the
code. The permutation is a secret key shared between encoder and decoder. We
derive (positive) capacity and random-coding exponents for perfectly-secure
steganographic systems. The error exponents provide estimates of the code
length required to achieve a target low error probability. We address the
potential loss in communication performance due to the perfect-security
requirement. This loss is the same as the loss obtained under a weaker order-1
steganographic requirement that would just require matching of first-order
marginals of the covertext and stegotext distributions. Furthermore, no loss
occurs if the covertext distribution is uniform and the distortion metric is
cyclically symmetric; steganographic capacity is then achieved by randomized
linear codes. Our framework may also be useful for developing computationally
secure steganographic systems that have near-optimal communication performance.Comment: To appear in IEEE Trans. on Information Theory, June 2008; ignore
Version 2 as the file was corrupte
Building Security Protocols Against Powerful Adversaries
As our sensitive data is increasingly carried over the Internet and stored remotely, security in communications becomes a fundamental requirement. Yet, today's security practices are designed around assumptions the validity of which is being challenged. In this thesis we design new security mechanisms for certain scenarios where traditional security assumptions do not hold. First, we design secret-agreement protocols for wireless networks, where the security of the secrets does not depend on assumptions about the computational limitations of adversaries. Our protocols leverage intrinsic characteristics of the wireless to enable nodes to agree on common pairwise secrets that are secure against computationally unconstrained adversaries. Through testbed and simulation experimentation, we show that it is feasible in practice to create thousands of secret bits per second. Second, we propose a traffic anonymization scheme for wireless networks. Our protocol aims in providing anonymity in a fashion similar to Tor - yet being resilient to computationally unbounded adversaries - by exploiting the security properties of our secret-agreement. Our analysis and simulation results indicate that our scheme can offer a level of anonymity comparable to the level of anonymity that Tor does. Third, we design a lightweight data encryption protocol for protecting against computationally powerful adversaries in wireless sensor networks. Our protocol aims in increasing the inherent weak security that network coding naturally offers, at a low extra overhead. Our extensive simulation results demonstrate the additional security benefits of our approach. Finally, we present a steganographic mechanism for secret message exchange over untrustworthy messaging service providers. Our scheme masks secret messages into innocuous texts, aiming in hiding the fact that secret message exchange is taking place. Our results indicate that our schemes succeeds in communicating hidden information at non-negligible rates
Security and Privacy for the Modern World
The world is organized around technology that does not respect its users. As a precondition of participation in digital life, users cede control of their data to third-parties with murky motivations, and cannot ensure this control is not mishandled or abused. In this work, we create secure, privacy-respecting computing for the average user by giving them the tools to guarantee their data is shielded from prying eyes. We first uncover the side channels present when outsourcing scientific computation to the cloud, and address them by building a data-oblivious virtual environment capable of efficiently handling these workloads. Then, we explore stronger privacy protections for interpersonal communication through practical steganography, using it to hide sensitive messages in realistic cover distributions like English text. Finally, we discuss at-home cryptography, and leverage it to bind a userβs access to their online services and important files to a secure location, such as their smart home. This line of research represents a new model of digital life, one that is both full-featured and protected against the security and privacy threats of the modern world
Application of Stochastic Diffusion for Hiding High Fidelity Encrypted Images
Cryptography coupled with information hiding has received increased attention in recent years and has become a major research theme because of the importance of protecting encrypted information in any Electronic Data Interchange system in a way that is both discrete and covert. One of the essential limitations in any cryptography system is that the encrypted data provides an indication on its importance which arouses suspicion and makes it vulnerable to attack. Information hiding of Steganography provides a potential solution to this issue by making the data imperceptible, the security of the hidden information being a threat only if its existence is detected through Steganalysis. This paper focuses on a study methods for hiding encrypted information, specifically, methods that encrypt data before embedding in host data where the βdataβ is in the form of a full colour digital image. Such methods provide a greater level of data security especially when the information is to be submitted over the Internet, for example, since a potential attacker needs to first detect, then extract and then decrypt the embedded data in order to recover the original information.
After providing an extensive survey of the current methods available, we present a new method of encrypting and then hiding full colour images in three full colour host images with out loss of fidelity following data extraction and decryption. The application of this technique, which is based on a technique called βStochastic Diffusionβ are wide ranging and include covert image information interchange, digital image authentication, video authentication, copyright protection and digital rights management of image data in general
A Covert Encryption Method for Applications in Electronic Data Interchange
A principal weakness of all encryption systems is that the output data can be βseenβ to be encrypted. In other words, encrypted data provides a βflagβ on the potential value of the information that has been encrypted. In this paper, we provide a new approach to βhidingβ encrypted data in a digital image.
In conventional (symmetric) encryption, the plaintext is usually represented as a binary stream and encrypted using an XOR type operation with a binary cipher. The algorithm used is ideally designed to: (i) generate a maximum entropy cipher so that there is no bias with regard to any bit; (ii) maximize diffusion in terms of key dependency so that a change in any bit of the key can effect any, and potentially all, bits of the cipher. In the work reported here, we consider an approach in which a binary or low-bit plaintext image is encrypted with a decimal integer or floating point cipher using a convolution operation and the output quantized into a 1-bit array generating a binary image ciphertext. This output is then βembeddedβ in a host image to hide the encrypted information. Embedding is undertaken either in the lowest 1-bit layer or multiple 1-bit layers. Decryption is accomplished by: (i) extracting the binary image from the host image; (ii) correlating the result with the original cipher. In principle, any cipher generator can be used for this purpose and the method has been designed to operate with 24-bit colour images. The approach has a variety of applications and, in this paper, we focus on the authentication and self-authentication of e-documents (letters and certificates, for example) that are communicated over the Internet and are thereby vulnerable to attack (e.g. modification, editing, counterfeiting etc.). In addition to document authentication, the approach considered provides a way of propagating disinformation and a solution to scenarios that require βplausible deniabilityβ
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Fundamental Limits of Covert Communication
Traditional security (e.g., encryption) prevents unauthorized access to message content; however, detection of the mere presence of a message can have significant negative impact on the privacy of the communicating parties. Unlike these standard methods, covert or low probability of detection (LPD) communication not only protects the information contained in a transmission from unauthorized decoding, but also prevents the detection of a transmission in the first place. In this thesis we investigate the fundamental laws of covert communication.
We first study covert communication over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, a standard model for radio-frequency (RF) communication. We present a square root limit on the amount of information transmitted covertly and reliably over such channels. Specifically, we prove that if the transmitter has the channels to the intended receiver and the warden that are both AWGN, then O(\sqrt{n}) covert bits can be reliably transmitted to the receiver in n uses of the channel. Conversely, attempting to transmit more than O(\sqrt{n}) bits either results in detection by the warden with probability one or a non-zero probability of decoding error at the receiver as n--\u3e\infty.
Next we study the impact of warden\u27s ignorance of the communication attempt time. We prove that if the channels from the transmitter to the intended receiver and the warden are both AWGN, and if a single n-symbol period slot out of T(n) such slots is selected secretly (forcing the warden to monitor all T(n) slots), then O(\min{\sqrt{n\log T(n)},n}) covert bits can be transmitted reliably using this slot. Conversely, attempting to transmit more than O(\sqrt{n\log T(n)}) bits either results in detection with probability one or a non-zero probability of decoding error at the receiver.
We then study covert optical communication and characterize the ultimate limit of covert communication that is secure against the most powerful physically-permissible adversary. We show that, although covert communication is impossible when a channel injects the minimum noise allowed by quantum mechanics, it is attainable in the presence of any noise excess of this minimum (such as the thermal background). In this case, O(\sqrt{n}) covert bits can be transmitted reliably in n optical channel uses using standard optical communication equipment. The all-powerful adversary may intercept all transmitted photons not received by the intended receiver, and employ arbitrary quantum memory and measurements. Conversely, we show that this square root scaling cannot be circumvented. Finally, we corroborate our theory in a proof-of-concept experiment on an optical testbed
ΠΠΎΠ²ΡΠΉ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ Π²ΡΡΡΠ°ΠΈΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ²Π°Π½ΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, ΡΡΠΎΠΉΠΊΠΈΠΉ ΠΊ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ΅ Π²ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠ²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°
Π ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΠ΄ΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΈΠΌ ΠΈΠ· Π°Π²ΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ² Π±ΡΠ»Π° ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π° Π½ΠΎΠ²Π°Ρ Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ° ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ² ΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ° Π²ΡΡΡΠ°ΠΈΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²ΡΡ
Π²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π·Π½Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ² DM-QIM, ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΡΠ°Ρ ΠΏΡΠΈ Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π΅ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΈΡΠ»Π° ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠΎ Π²ΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ΅ΠΉ Π²ΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΡ ΠΈ Π²ΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π¦ΠΠ, ΠΈ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡ Π²ΡΡΡΠ°ΠΈΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ. Π Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π° ΠΏΡΠΈΡΠΈΠ½ ΡΡΠ·Π²ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ° DM-QIM ΠΊ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π»ΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π½Π° ΡΡΠΎΠΉΠΊΠ°Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΡ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ°, ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΠ²ΡΠ°Ρ Π½Π°Π·Π²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ IM-QIM. ΠΠ°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ Π½Π° ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΈ Ρ.Π½. Β«ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠΎΠΉΠΊΠΎΠΉΒ» ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΈ Π²ΡΡΡΠ°ΠΈΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΡΡ Π½Π΅Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡΡ
ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΅Π½Ρ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΠΉΠ½Π΅ΡΠ° ΠΈ ΠΎΡΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π±ΠΈΡΠΎΠ² Π²ΡΡΡΠ°ΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΠΌΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ. Π ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½Ρ ΡΠΊΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΡ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΠΎΠΉΠΊΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ° ΠΊ Π°Π΄Π΄ΠΈΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΌΡ Π·Π°ΡΡΠΌΠ»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ Π²Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ² Π²ΡΡΡΠ°ΠΈΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π° ΠΊΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΡΠ΅Π³ΠΎ ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°Π»ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ²ΠΎ IM-QIM Π½Π°Π΄ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΈΠΌΠΈ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ°ΠΌΠΈ QIM ΠΈ DMQIM Π½Π° ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π°Π»Π΅ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ².Π Π°Π±ΠΎΡΠ° Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½Π΅Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΊΠ΅ Π Π€Π€Π (Π³ΡΠ°Π½ΡΡ 15-07-05576, 16-37-00056 ΠΈ 16-41-630676) ΠΈ ΠΠΈΠ½ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ½Π°ΡΠΊΠΈ Π Π€ Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
Π³ΡΠ°Π½ΡΠ° ΠΏΡΠ΅Π·ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ° Π Π€ ΠΠ-1907.2017.9