Information-theoretic Physical Layer Security for Satellite Channels

Shannon introduced the classic model of a cryptosystem in 1949, where Eve has access to an identical copy of the cyphertext that Alice sends to Bob. Shannon defined perfect secrecy to be the case when the mutual information between the plaintext and the cyphertext is zero. Perfect secrecy is motivated by error-free transmission and requires that Bob and Alice share a secret key. Wyner in 1975 and later I.~Csisz\'ar and J.~K\"orner in 1978 modified the Shannon model assuming that the channels are noisy and proved that secrecy can be achieved without sharing a secret key. This model is called wiretap channel model and secrecy capacity is known when Eve's channel is noisier than Bob's channel. In this paper we review the concept of wiretap coding from the satellite channel viewpoint. We also review subsequently introduced stronger secrecy levels which can be numerically quantified and are keyless unconditionally secure under certain assumptions. We introduce the general construction of wiretap coding and analyse its applicability for a typical satellite channel. From our analysis we discuss the potential of keyless information theoretic physical layer security for satellite channels based on wiretap coding. We also identify system design implications for enabling simultaneous operation with additional information theoretic security protocols

MOCAST 2021

The 10th International Conference on Modern Circuit and System Technologies on Electronics and Communications (MOCAST 2021) will take place in Thessaloniki, Greece, from July 5th to July 7th, 2021. The MOCAST technical program includes all aspects of circuit and system technologies, from modeling to design, verification, implementation, and application. This Special Issue presents extended versions of top-ranking papers in the conference. The topics of MOCAST include:Analog/RF and mixed signal circuits;Digital circuits and systems design;Nonlinear circuits and systems;Device and circuit modeling;High-performance embedded systems;Systems and applications;Sensors and systems;Machine learning and AI applications;Communication; Network systems;Power management;Imagers, MEMS, medical, and displays;Radiation front ends (nuclear and space application);Education in circuits, systems, and communications

Advances in SCA and RF-DNA Fingerprinting Through Enhanced Linear Regression Attacks and Application of Random Forest Classifiers

Radio Frequency (RF) emissions from electronic devices expose security vulnerabilities that can be used by an attacker to extract otherwise unobtainable information. Two realms of study were investigated here, including the exploitation of 1) unintentional RF emissions in the field of Side Channel Analysis (SCA), and 2) intentional RF emissions from physical devices in the field of RF-Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprinting. Statistical analysis on the linear model fit to measured SCA data in Linear Regression Attacks (LRA) improved performance, achieving 98% success rate for AES key-byte identification from unintentional emissions. However, the presence of non-Gaussian noise required the use of a non-parametric classifier to further improve key guessing attacks. RndF based profiling attacks were successful in very high dimensional data sets, correctly guessing all 16 bytes of the AES key with a 50,000 variable dataset. With variable reduction, Random Forest still outperformed Template Attack for this data set, requiring fewer traces and achieving higher success rates with lower misclassification rate. Finally, the use of a RndF classifier is examined for intentional RF emissions from ZigBee devices to enhance security using RF-DNA fingerprinting. RndF outperformed parametric MDA/ML and non-parametric GRLVQI classifiers, providing up to GS =18.0 dB improvement (reduction in required SNR). Network penetration, measured using rogue ZigBee devices, show that the RndF method improved rogue rejection in noisier environments - gains of up to GS =18.0 dB are realized over previous methods

LeakyOhm: Secret Bits Extraction using Impedance Analysis

The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a chip. Such data-dependent influence can be exploited by, for instance, power or electromagnetic analysis. In this work, we introduce a novel non-invasive physical side-channel attack, which exploits the data-dependent changes in the impedance of the chip. Our attack relies on the fact that the temporarily stored contents in registers alter the physical characteristics of the circuit, which results in changes in the die's impedance. To sense such impedance variations, we deploy a well-known RF/microwave method called scattering parameter analysis, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies into the system's power distribution network (PDN) and measure the echo of the signals. We demonstrate that according to the content bits and physical location of a register, the reflected signal is modulated differently at various frequency points enabling the simultaneous and independent probing of individual registers. Such side-channel leakage challenges the $t$-probing security model assumption used in masking, which is a prominent side-channel countermeasure. To validate our claims, we mount non-profiled and profiled impedance analysis attacks on hardware implementations of unprotected and high-order masked AES. We show that in the case of the profiled attack, only a single trace is required to recover the secret key. Finally, we discuss how a specific class of hiding countermeasures might be effective against impedance leakage

Thermal profiling of homogeneous multi-core processors using sensor mini-networks

With large-scale integration and high power density in current generation microprocessors, thermal management is becoming a critical component of system design. Specifically, accurate thermal monitoring using on-die sensors is vital for system reliability and recovery. Achieving an accurate thermal profile of a system with an optimal number of sensors is integral for thermal management. This work focuses on a sensor placement mechanism and an on-chip sensor mini-network to combine temperatures from multiple sensors to determine the full thermal profile of a chip. The sensor placement mechanism proposed in this work uses non-uniform subsampling of thermal maps with k-means clustering. Using this sensing technique with cubic interpolation, an 8-core architecture thermal map was successfully recovered with an average error improvement of 90% over sensor placement via basic k-means clustering. All the simulations were run using HotSpot 5.0 modeling Alpha 21364 processor as a baseline core. The sensor mini-network using both differential encoding and distributed source coding was analyzed on a 1024-core architecture. Distributed source coding compression required fewer transmissions than differential encoding and reduced the number of transmitted bits by 36% over a sensor mini-network with no compression

TAO Conceptual Design Report: A Precision Measurement of the Reactor Antineutrino Spectrum with Sub-percent Energy Resolution

The Taishan Antineutrino Observatory (TAO, also known as JUNO-TAO) is a satellite experiment of the Jiangmen Underground Neutrino Observatory (JUNO). A ton-level liquid scintillator detector will be placed at about 30 m from a core of the Taishan Nuclear Power Plant. The reactor antineutrino spectrum will be measured with sub-percent energy resolution, to provide a reference spectrum for future reactor neutrino experiments, and to provide a benchmark measurement to test nuclear databases. A spherical acrylic vessel containing 2.8 ton gadolinium-doped liquid scintillator will be viewed by 10 m^2 Silicon Photomultipliers (SiPMs) of >50% photon detection efficiency with almost full coverage. The photoelectron yield is about 4500 per MeV, an order higher than any existing large-scale liquid scintillator detectors. The detector operates at -50 degree C to lower the dark noise of SiPMs to an acceptable level. The detector will measure about 2000 reactor antineutrinos per day, and is designed to be well shielded from cosmogenic backgrounds and ambient radioactivities to have about 10% background-to-signal ratio. The experiment is expected to start operation in 2022