Static Analysis of Deterministic Negotiations

Negotiation diagrams are a model of concurrent computation akin to workflow Petri nets. Deterministic negotiation diagrams, equivalent to the much studied and used free-choice workflow Petri nets, are surprisingly amenable to verification. Soundness (a property close to deadlock-freedom) can be decided in PTIME. Further, other fundamental questions like computing summaries or the expected cost, can also be solved in PTIME for sound deterministic negotiation diagrams, while they are PSPACE-complete in the general case. In this paper we generalize and explain these results. We extend the classical "meet-over-all-paths" (MOP) formulation of static analysis problems to our concurrent setting, and introduce Mazurkiewicz-invariant analysis problems, which encompass the questions above and new ones. We show that any Mazurkiewicz-invariant analysis problem can be solved in PTIME for sound deterministic negotiations whenever it is in PTIME for sequential flow-graphs---even though the flow-graph of a deterministic negotiation diagram can be exponentially larger than the diagram itself. This gives a common explanation to the low-complexity of all the analysis questions studied so far. Finally, we show that classical gen/kill analyses are also an instance of our framework, and obtain a PTIME algorithm for detecting anti-patterns in free-choice workflow Petri nets. Our result is based on a novel decomposition theorem, of independent interest, showing that sound deterministic negotiation diagrams can be hierarchically decomposed into (possibly overlapping) smaller sound diagrams.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of LICS 2017, IEEE Computer Societ

A stochastic multiple players multi-issues bargaining model for the Piave river basin

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players’ strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players’ objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.Bargaining, non-cooperative game theory, simulation models, uncertainty

A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players’ strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players’ objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.bargaining, non-cooperative game theory, simulation models, uncertainty

A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players’ strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players’ objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.Bargaining, Non-Cooperative Game Theory, Simulation Models, Uncertainty

On the Empirics of Minimum Wages and Employment: Stylized Facts for The Austrian Industry

We ask for the empirical evidence of the textbook theory of minimum wages for the Austrian Industry. The bargaining result of unions and firms is interpreted as a minimum wage, as the bargaining situation in Austria may be described best by a "right to manage-model". Based on the analysis of micro-founded "employment functions" in contrast to the predictions of the textbook analysis no significant negative effect of minimum wages on employment is found.Minimum Wages; Employment; Austrian Industry

Limited Incremental Linking and Unlinked Trade Agreements

The broadened scope of the GATT/WTO through successive rounds of trade liberalization is explained as a result of trade-partner specificity, linked agreements, and cross retaliation. In more recent years, however, countries have pursued trade liberalization through sector specific zero-for-zero agreements and preferential trade agreements, both of which have a reduced chance of suffering cross retaliation. This increase in unlinked agreements is explained by imperfect observability of trade policies generating gratuitous trade disputes and unjustified cross retaliation. If the dispute generating noise is perfectly correlated across sectors, however, then it provides no reason not to link agreements in a static sense and in many cases incremental linking still produces more liberalization than static linking. It is only when the noise is imperfectly correlated that linking and cross retaliation are problematic so that some sectors can enforce more liberalization in an unlinked agreement. If the correlation drops, the noise increases, or the number of sectors already covered is large, then incremental linking of more sectors is inefficient and countries pursue unlinked agreements.Trade Disputes, WTO, Dispute Settlement, Dynamic Games.

Abstract Argumentation / Persuasion / Dynamics

The act of persuasion, a key component in rhetoric argumentation, may be viewed as a dynamics modifier. We extend Dung's frameworks with acts of persuasion among agents, and consider interactions among attack, persuasion and defence that have been largely unheeded so far. We characterise basic notions of admissibilities in this framework, and show a way of enriching them through, effectively, CTL (computation tree logic) encoding, which also permits importation of the theoretical results known to the logic into our argumentation frameworks. Our aim is to complement the growing interest in coordination of static and dynamic argumentation.Comment: Arisaka R., Satoh K. (2018) Abstract Argumentation / Persuasion / Dynamics. In: Miller T., Oren N., Sakurai Y., Noda I., Savarimuthu B., Cao Son T. (eds) PRIMA 2018: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11224. Springer, Cha

Centralized versus market-based approaches to mobile task allocation problem: State-of-the-art

Centralized approach has been adopted for finding solutions to resource allocation problems (RAPs) in many real-life applications. On the other hand, market-based approach has been proposed as an alternative to solve the problem due to recent advancement in ICT technologies. In spite of the existence of some efforts to review the pros and cons of each approach in RAPs, the studies cannot be directly applied to specific problem domains like mobile task allocation problem which is characterised with high level of uncertainty on the availability of resources (workers). This paper aims to review existing studies on task allocation problems(TAPs) focusing on those two approaches and their comparison and identify major issues that need to be resolved for comparing the two approaches in mobile task allocation problems. Mobile Task Allocation Problem (MTAP) is defined and its problematic structures are explained in relation with task allocation to mobile workers. Solutions produced by each approach to some applications and variations of MTAP are also discussed and compared. Finally, some future research directions are identified in order to compare both approaches in function of uncertainty emerging from the mobile nature of the MTAP