Dynamic Resilient Network Games with Applications to Multi-Agent Consensus

A cyber security problem in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game-theoretic approach is considered. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. For this two-stage game, which is played repeatedly over time, we characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to a multi-agent consensus problem. We study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process. Finally, we also provide numerical simulation to illustrate the results.Comment: 12 pages, 13 figure

Switched Stackelberg game analysis of false data injection attacks on networked control systems

summary:This paper is concerned with a security problem for a discrete-time linear networked control system of switched dynamics. The control sequence generated by a remotely located controller is transmitted over a vulnerable communication network, where the control input may be corrupted by false data injection attacks launched by a malicious adversary. Two partially conflicted cost functions are constructed as the quantitative guidelines for both the controller and the attacker, after which a switched Stackelberg game framework is proposed to analyze the interdependent decision-making processes. A receding-horizon switched Stackelberg strategy for the controller is derived subsequently, which, together with the corresponding best response of the attacker, constitutes the switched Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, the asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system under the switched Stackelberg equilibrium is guaranteed if the switching signal exhibits a certain average dwell time. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in this paper

Resilient Control under Denial-of-Service Attacks

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have attracted much attention due to the advances in automation. By integrating communication and computation technologies, CPSs have a broad spectrum of applications ranging from the control of small local systems to the control of large-scale systems, some of which are safety-critical. This raises the issue of reliability of CPSs to a considerably important level. Among a variety of aspects in reliability problems, the security of CPSs becomes a challenge from both practical and theoretical points of view. This thesis investigates the stabilization problem of networked control systems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Intuitively, implementing predictor-based controllers can compensate for the data loss due to DoS attacks by estimating the lost signals, and hence the resilience of control systems can be improved. Following this idea, we have developed the resilient controllers by exploiting the recent results in finite-time observers. It is interesting to see that the resilience of the networked control systems depends on the prediction accuracy and horizon. Besides this, the thesis also investigates the stabilization problem of distributed systems under DoS attacks

UAV Command and Control, Navigation and Surveillance: A Review of Potential 5G and Satellite Systems

Drones, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are expected to be an important component of 5G/beyond 5G (B5G) communications. This includes their use within cellular architectures (5G UAVs), in which they can facilitate both wireless broadcast and point-to-point transmissions, usually using small UAS (sUAS). Allowing UAS to operate within airspace along with commercial, cargo, and other piloted aircraft will likely require dedicated and protected aviation spectrum at least in the near term, while regulatory authorities adapt to their use. The command and control (C2), or control and non-payload communications (CNPC) link provides safety critical information for the control of the UAV both in terrestrial-based line of sight (LOS) conditions and in satellite communication links for so-called beyond LOS (BLOS) conditions. In this paper, we provide an overview of these CNPC links as they may be used in 5G and satellite systems by describing basic concepts and challenges. We review new entrant technologies that might be used for UAV C2 as well as for payload communication, such as millimeter wave (mmWave) systems, and also review navigation and surveillance challenges. A brief discussion of UAV-to-UAV communication and hardware issues are also provided.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figures, IEEE aerospace conferenc