Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games

This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, which are ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-runplayers have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game but not in the trust game.Reputation; Long-run equilibria; Selective matching; Games with an outside option

Complex network analysis and nonlinear dynamics

This chapter aims at reviewing complex network and nonlinear dynamical models and methods that were either developed for or applied to socioeconomic issues, and pertinent to the theme of New Economic Geography. After an introduction to the foundations of the field of complex networks, the present summary introduces some applications of complex networks to economics, finance, epidemic spreading of innovations, and regional trade and developments. The chapter also reviews results involving applications of complex networks to other relevant socioeconomic issue

Spatial patterns and scale freedom in a Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata with Pavlovian strategies

A cellular automaton in which cells represent agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game following the simple "win-stay, loose-shift" strategy is studied. Individuals with binary behavior, such as they can either cooperate (C) or defect (D), play repeatedly with their neighbors (Von Neumann's and Moore's neighborhoods). Their utilities in each round of the game are given by a rescaled payoff matrix described by a single parameter Tau, which measures the ratio of 'temptation to defect' to 'reward for cooperation'. Depending on the region of the parameter space Tau, the system self-organizes - after a transient - into dynamical equilibrium states characterized by different definite fractions of C agents (2 states for the Von Neumann neighborhood and 4 for Moore neighborhood). For some ranges of Tau the cluster size distributions, the power spectrums P(f) and the perimeter-area curves follow power-law scalings. Percolation below threshold is also found for D agent clusters. We also analyze the asynchronous dynamics version of this model and compare results.Comment: Accepted for publication in JSTA

Stochastic Stability in Network with Decay

This paper considers a simple communication network characterized by an endogenous architecture and an imperfect transmission of information. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework where self – interested individuals can form or delete links and, occasionally, are doing mistakes. Then, using stochastic stability, we identify which network structures the formation process will converge to.Network, Decay, Strategical interaction