Stackelberg Network Pricing Games

We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more followers optimize a polynomial-time solvable combinatorial minimization problem and choose a minimum cost solution satisfying their requirements based on the fixed costs and the leader's prices. The leader receives as revenue the total amount of prices paid by the followers for priceable edges in their solutions, and the problem is to find revenue maximizing prices. Our model extends several known pricing problems, including single-minded and unit-demand pricing, as well as Stackelberg pricing for certain follower problems like shortest path or minimum spanning tree. Our first main result is a tight analysis of a single-price algorithm for the single follower game, which provides a $(1+\epsilon) \log m$-approximation for any $\epsilon >0$. This can be extended to provide a $(1+\epsilon)(\log k + \log m)$-approximation for the general problem and $k$ followers. The latter result is essentially best possible, as the problem is shown to be hard to approximate within \mathcal{O(\log^\epsilon k + \log^\epsilon m). If followers have demands, the single-price algorithm provides a $(1+\epsilon)m^2$-approximation, and the problem is hard to approximate within \mathcal{O(m^\epsilon) for some $\epsilon >0$. Our second main result is a polynomial time algorithm for revenue maximization in the special case of Stackelberg bipartite vertex cover, which is based on non-trivial max-flow and LP-duality techniques. Our results can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for any constant number of followers

Assortment optimisation under a general discrete choice model: A tight analysis of revenue-ordered assortments

The assortment problem in revenue management is the problem of deciding which subset of products to offer to consumers in order to maximise revenue. A simple and natural strategy is to select the best assortment out of all those that are constructed by fixing a threshold revenue $\pi$ and then choosing all products with revenue at least $\pi$. This is known as the revenue-ordered assortments strategy. In this paper we study the approximation guarantees provided by revenue-ordered assortments when customers are rational in the following sense: the probability of selecting a specific product from the set being offered cannot increase if the set is enlarged. This rationality assumption, known as regularity, is satisfied by almost all discrete choice models considered in the revenue management and choice theory literature, and in particular by random utility models. The bounds we obtain are tight and improve on recent results in that direction, such as for the Mixed Multinomial Logit model by Rusmevichientong et al. (2014). An appealing feature of our analysis is its simplicity, as it relies only on the regularity condition. We also draw a connection between assortment optimisation and two pricing problems called unit demand envy-free pricing and Stackelberg minimum spanning tree: These problems can be restated as assortment problems under discrete choice models satisfying the regularity condition, and moreover revenue-ordered assortments correspond then to the well-studied uniform pricing heuristic. When specialised to that setting, the general bounds we establish for revenue-ordered assortments match and unify the best known results on uniform pricing.Comment: Minor changes following referees' comment

Pricing bridges to cross a river.

We consider a Stackelberg pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tariffs have to be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of m arcs, the tariff arcs. Costs of all other arcs are assumed to be given. There are n clients, the followers, that route their demand independent of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to find tariffs that maximize the operator's revenue. Motivated by problems in telecommunication networks, we consider a restricted version of this problem, assuming that each client utilizes at most one of the operator's tariff arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river. We prove that this problem is APX-hard. Moreover, we show that uniform pricing yields both an m–approximation, and a (1 + lnD)–approximation. Here, D is upper bounded by the total demand of all clients. We furthermore discuss some polynomially solvable special cases, and present a short computational study with instances from France Télécom. In addition, we consider the problem under the additional restriction that the operator must serve all clients. We prove that this problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance guarantee, unless NP = ZPP, and we prove the existence of an n–approximation algorithm.Pricing; Networks; Tariffs; Costs; Cost; Demand; Problems; Order; Yield; Studies; Approximation; Algorithms; Performance;

Pricing Network Edges to Cross a River.

We consider a Stackelberg pricing problem in directed networks:Tariffs (prices) have to be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of the arcs. Clients, the followers, choose paths to route their demand through the network selfishly and independently of each other, on the basis of minimal total cost. The problem is to find tariffs such as to maximize the operator''s revenue. We consider the case where each client takes at most one tariff arc to route the demand.The problem, which we refer to as the river tarification problem, is a special case of problems studied previously in the literature.We prove that the problem is strongly NP-hard.Moreover, we show that the polynomially solvable case of uniform tarification yields an m--approximation algorithm, and this is tight. We suggest a new type of analysis that allows to improve the result to \bigO{\log m}, whenever the input data is polynomially bounded. We furthermore derive an \bigO{m^{1-\varepsilon}}--inapproximability result for problems where the operator must serve all clients, and we discuss some polynomial special cases. Finally, a computational study with instances from France Telecom suggests that uniform pricing performs better in practice than theory would suggest.operations research and management science;

Approximate Pricing in Networks: How to Boost the Betweenness and Revenue of a Node

We introduce and study two new pricing problems in networks: Suppose we are given a directed graph G = (V, E) with non-negative edge costs (c_e)_{e in E}, k commodities (s_i, t_i, w_i)_{i in [k]} and a designated node u in V. Each commodity i in [k] is represented by a source-target pair (s_i, t_i) in V x V and a demand w_i>0, specifying that w_i units of flow are sent from s_i to t_i along shortest s_i, t_i-paths (with respect to (c_e)_{e in E}). The demand of each commodity is split evenly over all shortest paths. Assume we can change the edge costs of some of the outgoing edges of u, while the costs of all other edges remain fixed; we also say that we price (or tax) the edges of u. We study the problem of pricing the edges of u with respect to the following two natural objectives: (i) max-flow: maximize the total flow passing through u, and (ii) max-revenue: maximize the total revenue (flow times tax) through u. Both variants have various applications in practice. For example, the max flow objective is equivalent to maximizing the betweenness centrality of u, which is one of the most popular measures for the influence of a node in a (social) network. We prove that (except for some special cases) both problems are NP-hard and inapproximable in general and therefore resort to approximation algorithms. We derive approximation algorithms for both variants and show that the derived approximation guarantees are best possible

Improved Hardness of Approximation for Stackelberg Shortest-Path Pricing

We consider the Stackelberg shortest-path pricing problem, which is defined as follows. Given a graph G with fixed-cost and pricable edges and two distinct vertices s and t, we may assign prices to the pricable edges. Based on the predefined fixed costs and our prices, a customer purchases a cheapest s-t-path in G and we receive payment equal to the sum of prices of pricable edges belonging to the path. Our goal is to find prices maximizing the payment received from the customer. While Stackelberg shortest-path pricing was known to be APX-hard before, we provide the first explicit approximation threshold and prove hardness of approximation within 2−o(1). We also argue that the nicely structured type of instance resulting from our reduction captures most of the challenges we face in dealing with the problem in general and, in particular, we show that the gap between the revenue of an optimal pricing and the only known general upper bound can still be logarithmically large