Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists

We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ties, and may be of bounded length. Such restrictions arise naturally in practical applications, such as centralised matching schemes that assign graduating medical students to their first hospital posts. In such a setting, weak stability is the most common solution concept, and it is known that weakly stable matchings can have different sizes. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching, which is known to be NP-hard in general. We show that this problem is solvable in polynomial time if each man's list is of length at most 2 (even for women's lists that are of unbounded length). However if each man's list is of length at most 3, we show that the problem becomes NP-hard (even if each women's list is of length at most 3) and not approximable within some δ>1 (even if each woman's list is of length at most 4)

Stable Marriage with Ties and Bounded Length Preference Lists

We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ties, and may be of bounded length. Such restrictions arise naturally in practical applications, such as centralised matching schemes that assign graduating medical students to their first hospital posts. In such a setting, weak stability is the most common solution concept, and it is known that weakly stable matchings can have different sizes. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching, which is known to be NP-hard in general. We show that this problem is solvable in polynomial time if each man's list is of length at most 2 (even for women's lists that are of unbounded length). However if each man's list is of length at most 3, we show that the problem becomes NP-hard and not approximable within some d > 1, even if each woman's list is of length at most 4

The Stable Roommates problem with short lists

We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (sri) that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, egald-sri, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable instances of sri with preference lists of length at most d. We show that this problem is NP-hard even if d = 3. On the positive side we give a 2d+372d+37-approximation algorithm for d ∈{3,4,5} which improves on the known bound of 2 for the unbounded preference list case. In the second variant of sri, called d-srti, preference lists can include ties and are of length at most d. We show that the problem of deciding whether an instance of d-srti admits a stable matching is NP-complete even if d = 3. We also consider the “most stable” version of this problem and prove a strong inapproximability bound for the d = 3 case. However for d = 2 we show that the latter problem can be solved in polynomial time

Finding large stable matchings

When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the stable marriage and hospitals/residents problems, stable matchings can have different sizes. The problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in this context is known to be NP-hard, even under very severe restrictions on the number, size, and position of ties. In this article, we present two new heuristics for finding large stable matchings in variants of these problems in which ties are on one side only. We describe an empirical study involving these heuristics and the best existing approximation algorithm for this problem. Our results indicate that all three of these algorithms perform significantly better than naive tie-breaking algorithms when applied to real-world and randomly-generated data sets and that one of the new heuristics fares slightly better than the other algorithms, in most cases. This study, and these particular problem variants, are motivated by important applications in large-scale centralized matching schemes

Approximability results for stable marriage problems with ties

We consider instances of the classical stable marriage problem in which persons may include ties in their preference lists. We show that, in such a setting, strong lower bounds hold for the approximability of each of the problems of finding an egalitarian, minimum regret and sex-equal stable matching. We also consider stable marriage instances in which persons may express unacceptable partners in addition to ties. In this setting, we prove that there are constants delta, delta' such that each of the problems of approximating a maximum and minimum cardinality stable matching within factors of delta, delta' (respectively) is NP-hard, under strong restrictions. We also give an approximation algorithm for both problems that has a performance guarantee expressible in terms of the number of lists with ties. This significantly improves on the best-known previous performance guarantee, for the case that the ties are sparse. Our results have applications to large-scale centralized matching schemes

The stable marriage problem with master preference lists

We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or the women, or both, are derived from a master preference list. This models real-world matching problems in which participants are ranked according to some objective criteria. The master list(s) may be strictly ordered, or may include ties, and the lists of individuals may involve ties and may include all, or just some, of the members of the opposite sex. In fact, ties are almost inevitable in the master list if the ranking is done on the basis of a scoring scheme with a relatively small range of distinct values. We show that many of the interesting variants of stable marriage that are NP-hard remain so under very severe restrictions involving the presence of master lists, but a number of special cases can be solved in polynomial time. Under this master list model, versions of the stable marriage problem that are already solvable in polynomial time typically yield to faster and/or simpler algorithms, giving rise to simple new structural characterisations of the solutions in these cases

An 8/5 approximation algorithm for a hard variant of stable marriage

When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage problem, stable matchings can have different sizes. The problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in this context is NP-hard, even under very severe restrictions on the number, size and position of ties. In this paper, we describe a polynomial-time 8/5-approximation algorithm for a variant in which ties are on one side only and at the end of the preference lists. This variant is motivated by important applications in large scale centralized matching schemes