6,276 research outputs found

    Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction

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    FCC spectrum auctions sell licenses to provide mobile phone service in designated geographic territories. We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations and apply it to the 1995–1996 C-block auction. We base our estimation of bidder values on a pairwise stability condition, which implies that two bidders cannot exchange licenses in a way that increases total surplus. Pairwise stability holds in many theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions, including some models of intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability is also approximately satisfied in data that we examine from economic experiments. The lack of post-auction resale also suggests pairwise stability. Using our estimates of deterministic valuations, we measure the allocative efficiency of the C-block outcome.

    Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey

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    This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with another set of agents (firms/hospitals). We first give a short overview of a selection of classical results. Then, we review recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists.matching; couples; stability; computational complexity; incentive compatibility; restricted domains; large markets

    Stability, Specialization and Social Recognition

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    Yang s theory of economic specialization under increasing returns to scale (Yang 2001) is a formal development of the fundamental Smith-Young theorem on the extent of the market and the social division of labor.In this theory specialization and, thus, the social division of labor is firmly embedded within a system of perfectly competitive markets.This leaves unresolved whether and how such development processes are possible in economies based on more primitive, nonmarket organizations.In this paper we introduce a general relational model of economic interaction.Within this non-market environment we discuss the emergence of economic specialization and ultimately of economic trade and a social division of labor.We base our approach on three stages in organizational development: the presence of a stable relational structure; the presence of relational trust and subjective specialization; and, finally, the emergence of objective specialization through the social recognition of subjectively defined economic rolesnetworks;stability;social division of labor;specialization

    Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction

    Get PDF
    FCC spectrum auctions sell licenses to provide mobile phone service in designated geographic territories. We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations and apply it to the 1995-1996 C-block auction. We base our estimation of bidder values on a pairwise stability condition, which implies that two bidders cannot exchange licenses in a way that increases total surplus. Pairwise stability holds in many theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions, including some models of intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability is also approximately satisfied in data that we examine from economic experiments. The lack of post-auction resale also suggests pairwise stability. Using our estimates of deterministic valuations, we measure the allocative efficiency of the C-block outcome

    Markets, Contracts, or Integration? The Adoption, Diffusion, and Evolution of Organizational Form

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    The rise of contract farming and vertical integration is one of the most important changes in modern agriculture. Yet the adoption and diffusion of these new forms of organization has varied widely across regions, commodities, or farm types, however. Transaction cost theories and the like are not fully effective at explaining the variation of adoption rates of different organizational forms, in part because of their inherent static nature. In order to explain the adoption, diffusion and evolution of organizational form, a more dynamic framework is required. This paper lays out such a framework for understanding the evolution of organizational practices in U.S. agriculture by drawing on existing theories of economic organization, the diffusion of technological innovation, and organizational complementarities. Using recent trends as stylized facts we argue that the agrifood sector is characterized by strong complementarities among its constituent features and that these complementarities help explain the stylized facts. We also discuss several testable hypotheses concerning changes in organizational form in agriculture.contracting, vertical integration, organizational innovation, diffusion, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, L14, L22, Q13, O33,

    An Approximate "Law of One Price" in Random Assignment Games

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    Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are i.i.d bounded random variables, then with high probability all workers are paid roughly equal wages, and all firms make similar profits. This implies that core allocations vary significantly in balanced markets, but that there is core convergence in even slightly unbalanced markets. For the benchmark case of uniform distribution, we provide a tight bound for the workers' share of the surplus under the firm-optimal core allocation. We present simulation results suggesting that the phenomena analyzed appear even in medium-sized markets. Finally, we briefly discuss the effects of unbounded distributions and the ways in which they may affect wage dispersion

    Assessing subsidiarity

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    This paper discusses the assessment of subsidiarity in the European Union from a broad fiscal federalism perspective. It incorporates recent insights from political economy analyses of fiscal federalism to arrive at a list of issues that need to be taken into account when considering whether concrete policies should be centralised in the European Union or not. ďż˝

    Dynamic Systems of Social Interactions

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    We state conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria in evolu- tionary models with an infinity of locally and globally interacting agents. Agents face repeated discrete choice problems. Their utility depends on the actions of some designated neighbors and the average choice throughout the whole population. We show that the dynamics on the level of aggregate be- havior can be described by a deterministic measure-valued integral equation. If some form of positive complementarities prevails we establish convergence and ergodicity results for aggregate activities. We apply our convergence re- sults to study a class of population games with random matching.evolutionary dynamics, social interaction, equilibrium, interacting particle systems, coordination games
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