11,518 research outputs found
Dynamic Reserves in Matching Markets
We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where
authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific
student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools
they are matched to but also the type of slots they receive. Such reservation
policies might cause waste in instances of low demand from some student groups.
To propose a solution to this issue, we construct a family of choice functions,
dynamic reserves choice functions, for schools that respect within-group
fairness and allow the transfer of otherwise vacant slots from low-demand
groups to high-demand groups. We propose the cumulative offer mechanism (COM)
as an allocation rule where each school uses a dynamic reserves choice function
and show that it is stable with respect to schools' choice functions, is
strategy-proof, and respects improvements. Furthermore, we show that
transferring more of the otherwise vacant slots leads to strategy-proof Pareto
improvement under the COM
Stable Roommate Problem with Diversity Preferences
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated
to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the
complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption
that agents have diversity preferences [Bredereck et al., 2019]: each agent
belongs to one of the two types (e.g., juniors and seniors, artists and
engineers), and agents' preferences over rooms depend solely on the fraction of
agents of their own type among their potential roommates. We consider various
solution concepts for this setting, such as core and exchange stability, Pareto
optimality and envy-freeness. On the negative side, we prove that envy-free,
core stable or (strongly) exchange stable outcomes may fail to exist and that
the associated decision problems are NP-complete. On the positive side, we show
that these problems are in FPT with respect to the room size, which is not the
case for the general stable roommate problem. Moreover, for the classic setting
with rooms of size two, we present a linear-time algorithm that computes an
outcome that is core and exchange stable as well as Pareto optimal. Many of our
results for the stable roommate problem extend to the stable marriage problem.Comment: accepted to IJCAI'2
Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program
In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents to rural hospitals, the Japanese government recently introduced "regional caps" which restrict the total number of residents matched within each region of the country. The government modified the deferred acceptance mechanism incorporating the regional caps. This paper shows that the current mechanism may result in avoidable ineffciency and instability and proposes a better mechanism that improves upon it in terms of effciency and stability while meeting the regional caps. More broadly, the paper contributes to the general research agenda of matching and market design to address practical problems.medical residency matching, regional caps, the rural hospital theorem, sta- bility, strategy-proofness, matching with contracts
Multi-Stage Generalized Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: Strategyproof Mechanism for Handling General Hereditary Constraints
The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied
to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to
increasingly diverse types of environments, researchers and practitioners have
encountered various forms of distributional constraints. Arguably, the most
general class of distributional constraints would be hereditary constraints; if
a matching is feasible, then any matching that assigns weakly fewer students at
each college is also feasible. However, under general hereditary constraints,
it is shown that no strategyproof mechanism exists that simultaneously
satisfies fairness and weak nonwastefulness, which is an efficiency (students'
welfare) requirement weaker than nonwastefulness. We propose a new
strategyproof mechanism that works for hereditary constraints called the
Multi-Stage Generalized Deferred Acceptance mechanism (MS-GDA). It uses the
Generalized Deferred Acceptance mechanism (GDA) as a subroutine, which works
when distributional constraints belong to a well-behaved class called
hereditary M-convex set. We show that GDA satisfies several
desirable properties, most of which are also preserved in MS-GDA. We
experimentally show that MS-GDA strikes a good balance between fairness and
efficiency (students' welfare) compared to existing strategyproof mechanisms
when distributional constraints are close to an M-convex set.Comment: 23 page
Growth, Income Distribution, and Poverty: A Review
This paper reviews the recent literature dealing with the relationships between economic growth, income distribution, and poverty. This generally fails to find any systematic pattern of change in income distribution during recent decades. Neither does it find any systematic link from fast growth to increasing inequality. Some recent empirical evidence has tended to confirm the negative impact of inequality on growth, on the other hand. Others have found that the level of initial income inequality is not a robust explanatory factor of growth, though high inequality in the distribution of assets, such as land, has a significantly negative effect on growth. Possible channels are credit rationing, reduced possibilities for participation in the political process, and social conflicts. Among the strategic elements that contributed to reduced poverty are: an outward-oriented strategy of export-led growth, based on labour-intensive manufacturing; agricultural and rural development, with encouragement of new technologies; investment in physical infrastructure and human capital; efficient institutions that provide the right set of incentives to farmers and entrepreneurs; and social policies to promote health, education, and social capital, as well as safety nets to protect the poor. Countries that have been successful in terms of economic growth are also very likely to be successful in reducing poverty. Poverty can be reduced if there is sufficient economic growth. Growth can be substantial if the policy and institutional environment is right.Growth; income distribution; poverty; economic policy
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