Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation

We consider a general equilibrium model where groups operating in a competitive market environment can have several members and make efficient collective consumption decisions. Individuals have the option to leave the group and make it on their own or join another group. We study the effect of these outside options on group formation, group stability, equilibrium existence, and equilibrium efficiency.household behavior, household formation, collective decision making, general equilibrium

Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction

FCC spectrum auctions sell licenses to provide mobile phone service in designated geographic territories. We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations and apply it to the 1995–1996 C-block auction. We base our estimation of bidder values on a pairwise stability condition, which implies that two bidders cannot exchange licenses in a way that increases total surplus. Pairwise stability holds in many theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions, including some models of intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability is also approximately satisfied in data that we examine from economic experiments. The lack of post-auction resale also suggests pairwise stability. Using our estimates of deterministic valuations, we measure the allocative efficiency of the C-block outcome.

Introduction to property theory - the fundamental theorems

The market system consists of a price mechanism, built on the foundation of a system of property, and contract. In many developing, and transition economies, the market system functions poorly. In many cases, if not most, the malfunctioning is not simply in the price system (for example, anti-competitive activities), but in the underlying property system (such as contracts being breached, and externalities in the sense of transfers not covered by contracts). Economic theory tends to take the functioning of the system of property, and contract for granted, and focuses on the operation of the price mechanism. Property theory focuses on the underlying system of property, and contract. In this paper, the author inaugurates the mathematical treatment of property theory.In contrast with earlier work in"law and economics", and the"new institutional economics", this approach uses principles drawn from jurisprudence, and does not attempt to reduce"law"to"economics"in the sense of efficiency considerations, such as the minimization of transaction costs. The main results are the two fundamental theorems of property theory that are analogous to the two fundamental theorems of price theory that, in essence, state that: 1) A competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 2) Given a Pareto optimal state, there exists a set of prices such, that a competitive equilibrium at those prices would realize that Pareto optimal state.Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Housing and Land,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Municipal Housing and Land,Land and Real Estate Development

Equilibrium unemployment in a general equilibrium model with taxes

The ratio of unemployed to vacancies has risen sharply in the UK after the recession of 2008/09. How harmful is it for the long run growth, equity and efficiency and what sorts of long run cycles does it generate in the economy? With a dynamic computable general equilibrium model with Pissarides (1979, 2011) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type equilibrium unemployment, impacts of tax-transfer programmes are assessed for the UK. The model contains more desirable structure of households and production sectors and includes more type of shocks in preferences, technology, trade and policy instruments for stochastic analyses than is usual in DSGE models. It assesses growth and cycles as well as equity and efficiency effects of policies simultaneously. Improvements in the matching technology lowers the equilibrium unemployment and raises the long-run growth rate and life time utilities of households and reduces long run cycles. Matching could be made more efficient by influencing the relative price system by optimal set of tax and transfer instruments. Better matching techniques can make transition of job-seekers to employment more efficient so that the intertemporal labour-leisure and consumption-saving decisions have greater impacts on growth and redistribution reducing fluctuations in the economy

Migration, Tied Foreign Aid and the Welfare State

In this paper we highlight aspects related to the links between international migration, foreign tied aid and the welfare state. We model migration as a costly movement from an aid-recipient developing country with low income, poor infrastructure, and no welfare system, towards a rich donor, developed country with a well-developed welfare system. Within this model we find, among other things, that the best response of the developed donor country is to increase aid as the co-financing rate by the recipient country increases. When the immigration cost decreases, e.g. due to greater economic integration between the two countries, it is beneficial for the donor country to increase aid.migration, tied foreign aid, welfare state

Labor tax reform and equilibrium unemployment: a search and matching approach

The paper studies simple strategies of labor tax reform in a search and matching model of the labor market featuring endogenous labor supply. Changing the composition of the tax wedge---that is, reducing a payroll tax and increasing a progressive wage tax such that the marginal tax wedge remains unaffected---increases employment, reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, and increases public revenue as long as workers do not have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations. A strategy of replacing employment taxes by payroll taxes increases employment and reduces the equilibrium unemployment rate, while the effect on public revenue is ambiguous.

Labour market institutions and labour market performance: A survey of the literature

This paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions. It describes the different empirical approaches used to explore the nexus between labour market institutions and labour market performance. It stresses that the effect of institutions is complex in both stock and flow models and that it is also crucial to take into account the interactions they generate among themselves and with macroeconomic shocks.labour market performance, labour market institutions, redistributive policies, unemployment dynamics, Arpaia, Mourre

Dynamic matching and bargaining games: A general approach

This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies. This result is informed by the analysis of non-cooperative dynamic search and bargaining games. Such games provide models of decentralized markets with trading frictions. A central objective of this literature is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions. In particular, does the trading outcome become Walrasian when frictions become small? Existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers. The characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific search and bargaining games.Dynamic Matching and Bargaining, Decentralized Markets, Non-cooperative Foundations of Competitive Equilibrium, Search Theory