Input-to-State Stabilizing Control Under Denial-of-Service

The issue of cyber-security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and design of networked systems. In this paper, we analyze networked control systems in the presence of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the network. We characterize frequency and duration of the DoS attacks under which input-to-state stability (ISS) of the closed-loop system can be preserved. To achieve ISS, a suitable scheduling of the transmission times is determined. It is shown that the considered framework is flexible enough so as to allow the designer to choose from several implementation options that can be used for trading-off performance versus communication resources. Examples are given to substantiate the analysis

Resilient control of networked control systems with stochastic denial of service attacks

This paper focuses on resilient control of networked control systems (NCSs) under the denial of service (DoS) attacks characterized by a Markov process. Firstly, based on the game between attack strategies and defense strategies, the packet dropouts induced by DoS attacks are modeled as a Markov process. Secondly, an NCS under DoS attacks is modeled as a Markovian jump linear system. Then, by use of the Lyapunov theory and the derived NCS model, four theorems are given for the system stability analysis and controller design. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrative the effectiveness of proposed method

Observer-Based Event-Triggered Predictive Control for Networked Control Systems under DoS Attacks

This paper studies the problem of DoS attack defense based on static observer-based event-triggered predictive control in networked control systems (NCSs). First, under the conditions of limited network bandwidth resources and the incomplete observability of the state of the system, we introduce the event-triggered function to provide a discrete event-triggered transmission scheme for the observer. Then, we analyze denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that occur on the network transmission channel. Using the above-mentioned event-triggered scheme, a novel class of predictive control algorithms is designed on the control node to proactively save network bandwidth and compensate for DoS attacks, which ensures the stability of NCSs. Meanwhile, a closed-loop system with an observer-based event-triggered predictive control scheme for analysis is created. Through linear matrix inequality (LMI) and the Lyapunov function method, the design of the controller, observer and event-triggered matrices is established, and the stability of the scheme is analyzed. The results show that the proposed solution can effectively compensate DoS attacks and save network bandwidth resources by combining event-triggered mechanisms. Finally, a smart grid simulation example is employed to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the scheme’s defense against DoS attacks

Towards Stabilization of Distributed Systems under Denial-of-Service

In this paper, we consider networked distributed systems in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the communication network. First, we consider a simple and typical scenario where communication sequence is purely Round-robin and we explicitly calculate a bound of attack frequency and duration, under which the interconnected large-scale system is asymptotically stable. Second, trading-off system resilience and communication load, we design a hybrid transmission strategy consisting of Zeno-free distributed event-triggered control and Round-robin. We show that with lower communication loads, the hybrid communication strategy enables the systems to have the same resilience as in pure Round-robin

Performance analysis with network-enhanced complexities: On fading measurements, event-triggered mechanisms, and cyber attacks

Copyright © 2014 Derui Ding et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Nowadays, the real-world systems are usually subject to various complexities such as parameter uncertainties, time-delays, and nonlinear disturbances. For networked systems, especially large-scale systems such as multiagent systems and systems over sensor networks, the complexities are inevitably enhanced in terms of their degrees or intensities because of the usage of the communication networks. Therefore, it would be interesting to (1) examine how this kind of network-enhanced complexities affects the control or filtering performance; and (2) develop some suitable approaches for controller/filter design problems. In this paper, we aim to survey some recent advances on the performance analysis and synthesis with three sorts of fashionable network-enhanced complexities, namely, fading measurements, event-triggered mechanisms, and attack behaviors of adversaries. First, these three kinds of complexities are introduced in detail according to their engineering backgrounds, dynamical characteristic, and modelling techniques. Then, the developments of the performance analysis and synthesis issues for various networked systems are systematically reviewed. Furthermore, some challenges are illustrated by using a thorough literature review and some possible future research directions are highlighted.This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 61134009, 61329301, 61203139, 61374127, and 61374010, the Royal Society of the UK, and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation of Germany

Self-triggered Coordination over a Shared Network under Denial-of-Service

The issue of security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and design of cyber-physical systems. In this paper, we analyze a consensus network in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent communication among the network agents. By introducing a notion of Persistency-of-Communication (PoC), we provide a characterization of DoS frequency and duration such that consensus is not destroyed. An example is given to substantiate the analysis