Square root algorithms for the number field sieve

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comInternational audienceWe review several methods for the square root step of the Number Field Sieve, and present an original one, based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem

Computing ee-th roots in number fields

We describe several algorithms for computing $e$-th roots of elements in a number field $K$, where $e$ is an odd prime-power integer. In particular we generalize Couveignes' and Thom\'e's algorithms originally designed to compute square-roots in the Number Field Sieve algorithm for integer factorization. Our algorithms cover most cases of $e$ and $K$ and allow to obtain reasonable timings even for large degree number fields and large exponents $e$. The complexity of our algorithms is better than general root finding algorithms and our implementation compared well in performance to these algorithms implemented in well-known computer algebra softwares. One important application of our algorithms is to compute the saturation phase in the Twisted-PHS algorithm for computing the Ideal-SVP problem over cyclotomic fields in post-quantum cryptography.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures. Associated experimental code provided at https://github.com/ob3rnard/eth-root

Root optimization of polynomials in the number field sieve

The general number field sieve (GNFS) is the most efficient algorithm known for factoring large integers. It consists of several stages, the first one being polynomial selection. The quality of the chosen polynomials in polynomial selection can be modelled in terms of size and root properties. In this paper, we describe some algorithms for selecting polynomials with very good root properties.Comment: 16 pages, 18 reference

Galois invariant smoothness basis

This text answers a question raised by Joux and the second author about the computation of discrete logarithms in the multiplicative group of finite fields. Given a finite residue field \bK, one looks for a smoothness basis for \bK^* that is left invariant by automorphisms of \bK. For a broad class of finite fields, we manage to construct models that allow such a smoothness basis. This work aims at accelerating discrete logarithm computations in such fields. We treat the cases of codimension one (the linear sieve) and codimension two (the function field sieve)

Solving discrete logarithms on a 170-bit MNT curve by pairing reduction

Pairing based cryptography is in a dangerous position following the breakthroughs on discrete logarithms computations in finite fields of small characteristic. Remaining instances are built over finite fields of large characteristic and their security relies on the fact that the embedding field of the underlying curve is relatively large. How large is debatable. The aim of our work is to sustain the claim that the combination of degree 3 embedding and too small finite fields obviously does not provide enough security. As a computational example, we solve the DLP on a 170-bit MNT curve, by exploiting the pairing embedding to a 508-bit, degree-3 extension of the base field.Comment: to appear in the Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS

A kilobit hidden SNFS discrete logarithm computation

We perform a special number field sieve discrete logarithm computation in a 1024-bit prime field. To our knowledge, this is the first kilobit-sized discrete logarithm computation ever reported for prime fields. This computation took a little over two months of calendar time on an academic cluster using the open-source CADO-NFS software. Our chosen prime $p$ looks random, and $p--1$ has a 160-bit prime factor, in line with recommended parameters for the Digital Signature Algorithm. However, our p has been trapdoored in such a way that the special number field sieve can be used to compute discrete logarithms in $\mathbb{F}\_p^*$ , yet detecting that p has this trapdoor seems out of reach. Twenty-five years ago, there was considerable controversy around the possibility of back-doored parameters for DSA. Our computations show that trapdoored primes are entirely feasible with current computing technology. We also describe special number field sieve discrete log computations carried out for multiple weak primes found in use in the wild. As can be expected from a trapdoor mechanism which we say is hard to detect, our research did not reveal any trapdoored prime in wide use. The only way for a user to defend against a hypothetical trapdoor of this kind is to require verifiably random primes