Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Can Unlicensed Bands Be Used by Unlicensed Usage?

Since their introduction, unlicensed ISM bands have resulted in a wide range of new wireless devices and services. It is fair to say that the success of ISM was an important factor in the opening of the TV white space for unlicensed access. Further bands (e.g., 3550-3650 MHz) are being studied to support unlicensed access. Expansion of the unlicensed bands may well address one of the principle disadvantages of unlicensed (variable quality of service) which could result in a vibrant new group companies providing innovative services and better prices. However, given that many commercial mobile telephone operators are relying heavily on the unlicensed bands to manage growth in data traffic through the “offloading” strategy, the promise of these bands may be more limited than might otherwise be expected (Musey, 2013).\ud \ud Wireless data traffic has exploded in the past several years due to more capable devices and faster network technologies. While there is some debate on the trajectory of data growth, some notable reports include AT&T, which reported data growth of over 5000% from 2008 to 2010 and Cisco, who predicted that mobile data traffic will grow to 6.3 exabytes per month in average by 2015 (Hu, 2012). Although the data traffic increased dramatically, relatively little new spectrum for mobile operators has come online in the last several years; further, the “flat-rate” pricing strategy has led to declining Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) for the mobile operators. Their challenge, then, is how to satisfy the service demand with acceptable additional expenditures on infrastructure and spectrum utilization.\ud \ud A common response to this challenge has been to offload data traffic onto unlicensed (usually WiFi) networks. This can be accomplished either by establishing infrastructure (WiFi hotspots) or to use existing private networks. This phenomenon leads to two potential risks for spectrum entrants: (1) the use of offloading may overwhelm unlicensed spectrum and leave little access opportunities for newcomers; (2) the intensity of the traffic may increase interference and degrade innovative services.\ud \ud Consequently, opening more unlicensed frequency bands alone may not necessarily lead to more unlicensed usage. In this paper, we will estimate spectrum that left for unlicensed usage and analyze risks for unlicensed users in unlicensed bands in terms of access opportunities and monetary gain. We will further provide recommendations that help foster unlicensed usage in unlicensed bands

Technology and market conditions toward a new competitive landscape in the wireless access market

This article argues that the wireless telecommunication market is about to witness a shift in business models and market structure as a result of the deployment of new broadband access technologies, spectrum management techniques, policy-based network management, and the drive of new entrants to compete against the incumbents. The article discusses four agents of evolutionary changes: a range of broadband wireless access standards and technologies that are frontrunners in the industry’s efforts to embody the next generation of wireless networks; new provider-customer relationships facilitated through changes in the usual contract patterns that will allow consumers to enter short-term and spot contracts with the new wireless providers; an overview of the current debate on spectrum management; and an explanation of how autonomic communications and policybased management would support the new structure. Finally, the article asserts the necessity for the integration of the heterogeneous technologies that make up this emerging, hybrid wireless landscape, and describes the economic characteristics of a new competitive scenario.Postprint (published version

Increasing Spectrum for Broadband: What Are The Options?

The growth of wireless broadband is a bright spot in the U.S. economy, but a shortage of flexibly licensed spectrum rights could put a crimp on this expansion. Freeing up spectrum from other uses would allow greater expansion of wireless broadband and would bring substantial gains—likely in the hundreds of billions of dollars—for U.S. consumers, businesses, and the federal treasury. ... U.S. experience suggests that it takes at least six years, and possibly over a decade, to complete any large-scale reallocation of spectrum. Thus, for policymakers, the ?projected? need is actually here today. This paper makes three proposals to increase spectrum available for wireless broadband under a flexibly licensed, market-based regime.

The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical and Economic Perspective

The traditional system of radio spectrum allocation has inefficiently restricted wireless services. Alternatively, liberal licenses ceding de facto spectrum ownership rights yield incentives for operators to maximize airwave value. These authorizations have been widely used for mobile services in the U.S. and internationally, leading to the development of highly productive services and waves of innovation in technology, applications and business models. Serious challenges to the efficacy of such a spectrum regime have arisen, however. Seeing the widespread adoption of such devices as cordless phones and wi-fi radios using bands set aside for unlicensed use, some scholars and policy makers posit that spectrum sharing technologies have become cheap and easy to deploy, mitigating airwave scarcity and, therefore, the utility of exclusive rights. This paper evaluates such claims technically and economically. We demonstrate that spectrum scarcity is alive and well. Costly conflicts over airwave use not only continue, but have intensified with scientific advances that dramatically improve the functionality of wireless devices and so increase demand for spectrum access. Exclusive ownership rights help direct spectrum inputs to where they deliver the highest social gains, making exclusive property rules relatively more socially valuable. Liberal licenses efficiently accommodate rival business models (including those commonly associated with unlicensed spectrum allocations) while mitigating the constraints levied on spectrum use by regulators imposing restrictions in traditional licenses or via use rules and technology standards in unlicensed spectrum allocations.

An Agent-Based Model for Secondary Use of Radio Spectrum

Wireless communications rely on access to radio spectrum. With a continuing proliferation of wireless applications and services, the spectrum resource becomes scarce. The measurement studies of spectrum usage, however, reveal that spectrum is being used sporadically in many geographical areas and times. In an attempt to promote efficiency of spectrum usage, the Federal Communications Commission has supported the use of market mechanism to allocate and assign radio spectrum. We focus on the secondary use of spectrum defined as a temporary access of existing licensed spectrum by a user who does not own a spectrum license. The secondary use of spectrum raises numerous technical, institutional, economic, and strategic issues that merit investigation. Central to the issues are the effects of transaction costs associated with the use of market mechanism and the uncertainties due to potential interference.The research objective is to identify the pre-conditions as to when and why the secondary use would emerge and in what form. We use transaction cost economics as the theoretical framework in this study. We propose a novel use of agent-based computational economics to model the development of the secondary use of spectrum. The agent-based model allows an integration of economic and technical considerations to the study of pre-conditions to the secondary use concept. The agent-based approach aims to observe the aggregate outcomes as a result of interactions among agents and understand the process that leads to the secondary use, which can then be used to create policy instruments in order to obtain the favorable outcomes of the spectrum management

Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons: LightSquared and the Missing Spectrum Rights

The endemic underuse of radio spectrum constitutes a tragedy of the regulatory commons. Like other common interest tragedies, the outcome results from a legal or market structure that prevents economic actors from executing socially efficient bargains. In wireless markets, innovative applications often provoke claims by incumbent radio users that the new traffic will interfere with existing services. Sometimes these concerns are mitigated via market transactions, a la “Coasian bargaining.” Other times, however, solutions cannot be found even when social gains dominate the cost of spillovers. In the recent “LightSquared debacle,” such spectrum allocation failure played out. GPS interests that access frequencies adjacent to the band hosting LightSquared’s new nationwide mobile network complained that the wireless entrant would harm the operation of locational devices. Based on these complaints, regulators then killed LightSquared’s planned 4G network. Conservative estimates placed the prospective 4G consumer gains at least an order of magnitude above GPS losses. “Win win” bargains were theoretically available, fixing GPS vulnerabilities while welcoming the highly valuable wireless innovation. Yet transaction costs—largely caused by policy choices to issue limited and highly fragmented spectrum usage rights (here in the GPS band)—proved prohibitive. This episode provides a template for understanding market and non-market failure in radio spectrum allocation

Preference-based spectrum pricing in dynamic spectrum access networks

With market-driven secondary spectrum trading, licensed users can receive benefits in terms of monetary rewards or various transmission services, thus setting a fair pricing structure by suitably defining spectrum quality characteristics and accurately addressing participant’s requirement is a key issue. In this paper, we investigate the pricing-based spectrum access by casting the problem of spectrum pricing into a Hotelling game model according to spectrum quality diversity. Particularly, we first build a pricing system model where unused spectrum from primary systems with different qualities forms a spectrum pool and can be divided into a number of uniform channels. A secondary user purchases a channel for usage according to its selection preference which is closely related to the channel quality and spectrum evaluation. The secondary user not only needs to consider the channel’s quality and price, but also the interference cost on primary system. Detailed analysis on the policy preference of both primary system and secondary buyer are provided. By forming a game problem of spectrum pricing between primary and secondary users, we apply the Hotelling game model to handle the interaction between the participants. Specifically, by fixing Nash equilibrium of the game, an iterative algorithm for spectrum pricing is proposed based on the distribution characteristics of secondary user’s preference. Essential analysis for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium along with algorithm’s convergence conditions are provided. Numerical results are also supplemented to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in ensuring spectrum owner’s profit