Spontaneous Mentalizing Predicts the Fundamental Attribution Error

When explaining the reasons for others' behavior, perceivers often overemphasize underlying dispositions and personality traits over the power of the situation, a tendency known as the fundamental attribution error. One possibility is that this bias results from the spontaneous processing of others' mental states, such as their momentary feelings or more enduring personality characteristics. Here, we use fMRI to test this hypothesis. Participants read a series of stories that described a target's ambiguous behavior in response to a specific social situation and later judged whether that act was attributable to the target's internal dispositions or to external situational factors. Neural regions consistently associated with mental state inference—especially, the medial pFC—strongly predicted whether participants later made dispositional attributions. These results suggest that the spontaneous engagement of mentalizing may underlie the biased tendency to attribute behavior to dispositional over situational forces.Psycholog

Getting to know you: Accuracy and error in judgments of character

Character judgments play an important role in our everyday lives. However, decades of empirical research on trait attribution suggest that the cognitive processes that generate these judgments are prone to a number of biases and cognitive distortions. This gives rise to a skeptical worry about the epistemic foundations of everyday characterological beliefs that has deeply disturbing and alienating consequences. In this paper, I argue that this skeptical worry is misplaced: under the appropriate informational conditions, our everyday character-trait judgments are in fact quite trustworthy. I then propose a mindreading-based model of the socio-cognitive processes underlying trait attribution that explains both why these judgments are initially unreliable, and how they eventually become more accurate

Toward a second-person neuroscience

LS & BT : equal contributions (shared first-authorship)Peer reviewedPreprin

Putting ostracism into perspective: young children tell more mentalistic stories after exclusion, but not when anxious

Much is known about when children acquire an understanding of mental states, but few, if any, experiments identify social contexts in which children tend to use this capacity and dispositions that influence its usage. Social exclusion is a common situation that compels us to reconnect with new parties, which may crucially involve attending to those parties’ mental states. Across two studies, this line of inquiry was extended to typically developing preschoolers (Study 1) and young children with and without anxiety disorder (AD) (Study 2). Children played the virtual game of toss “Cyberball” ostensibly over the Internet with two peers who first played fair (inclusion), but eventually threw very few balls to the child (exclusion). Before and after Cyberball, children in both studies completed stories about peer-scenarios. For Study 1, 36 typically developing 5-year-olds were randomly assigned to regular exclusion (for no apparent reason) or accidental exclusion (due to an alleged computer malfunction). Compared to accidental exclusion, regular exclusion led children to portray story-characters more strongly as intentional agents (intentionality), with use of more mental state language (MSL), and more between-character affiliation in post-Cyberball stories. For Study 2, 20 clinically referred 4 to 8-year-olds with AD and 15 age- and gender-matched non-anxious controls completed stories before and after regular exclusion. While we replicated the post regular-exclusion increase of intentional and MSL portrayals of story-characters among non-anxious controls, anxious children exhibited a decline on both dimensions after regular exclusion. We conclude that exclusion typically induces young children to mentalize, enabling more effective reconnection with others. However, excessive anxiety may impair controlled mentalizing, which may, in turn, hamper effective reconnection with others after exclusion

Social cognition and behavioral responses in kinematic interactions

As social beings, humans are constantly probed to infer intentions from verbal and non- verbal communication and to react according to the kinematic signals of other people. In this way, social cognition is tightly bound to our ability to perceive, predict and perform socially relevant actions. Being characterized by impairments in social interactions, in- dividuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) demonstrate insensitivity to predictive social stimuli as well as abnormal kinematic control both on the behavioral and the brain level. Underlining the severe consequences of impaired social interactive capabilities, autistic individuals are at high risk of social exclusion and concomitant mental health issues. Therefore, the investigation of the behavioral and brain responses to social ac- tions might yield valuable insights into the fundamental dynamics of social interactions, which could lay the foundation for clinical research and interventions in ASD. In order to provide first insights, the main goal of this thesis was to identify the non-pathological brain mechanisms in perceptual action prediction and action control within a social context. For this purpose, two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments in healthy control participants were conducted: The first study of this thesis addressed the effect of observing communicative, i.e. predictive, actions on visual perception [interpersonal predictive coding (IPPC)]. By the use of point-light displays, we replicated behavioral findings of improved visual discriminability of a point-light agent after seeing a communicative as compared to an individual action of another point-light agent. Furthermore, our findings suggest a perceptual integration of social event knowledge implemented by the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) during predictive trials and a specific role of the amygdala in setting network configurations to meet the demands of the specific social context. Moving from a spectator perspective to direct involvement in a social interaction, the second study of this thesis examined the interaction of gaze processing and action control during an encounter with an anthropomorphic virtual character. The key finding of this second study comprises an increased functional coupling during high action control demands between the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as central gaze processing region and brain areas implicated in both action control processes and social cognition such as the inferior frontal gyri. The results of the two studies demonstrate that predictive social actions as well as direct gaze signals can modify multimodal functional integration in the brain, thereby recruiting and modulating activation in brain structures implicated in ASD. In this way, the two studies of this thesis underline the interdependence of social cognition and kinematic processes while providing a reference point for future studies on ASD

Social Attribution in Toddlers At Risk for Autism Spectrum Disorder

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) can now be reliably diagnosed in preverbal toddlers and early diagnosis is becoming more common since the development of early autism screening practices. However, the positive predictive value of widely used screening tools remains low, which leads to a high number of false positive cases requiring further evaluation. Given that access to specialists is limited, there is a pressing need to develop easily accessible and broadly applicable direct measures that will further streamline screening and diagnosis for at risk toddlers. The primary aim of the current study is to examine the utility of a novel, direct measure of social attribution in measuring this skill in toddlers with and without ASD and examining the utility of this measure in reliably identifying ASD in a sample of at risk toddlers with a broad range of verbal and cognitive abilities. Participants include 35 toddlers considered at risk for an ASD (i.e., 15 with ASD, 20 with non-ASD delays; DD) and 22 typically developing (TD) toddlers. Children were presented with two versions of a nonverbal social attribution measure featuring a visual habituation-based violation of expectation paradigm; a live puppet show version previously studied in infant populations and a novel touchscreen adaptation. It was hypothesized that toddlers without a diagnosis of ASD would demonstrate evidence of social attribution whereas children with ASD would demonstrate reduced social attribution. Furthermore, it was predicted that performance would have clinical utility in predicting a diagnosis of ASD and symptom severity. Results indicated that no groups showed gross looking time differences evidencing social attribution, bringing into question whether this paradigm is appropriate for capturing social attribution in this age range. Despite this, toddlers in the TD group demonstrated evidence of social evaluation in the live puppet show task whereas toddlers within the ASD and DD groups did not. Differential habituation characteristics between the DD and TD groups suggest that other factors may have impeded success in the DD group. Future research is warranted to examine whether deficient social evaluation is specific to ASD or characterizes developmental delays more broadly. Findings have implications for future research examining theories of social attribution and informing the use of new technologies in toddler research and clinical tool development

Situating emotional experience

Psychological construction approaches to emotion suggest that emotional experience is situated and dynamic. Fear, for example, is typically studied in a physical danger context (e.g., threatening snake), but in the real world, it often occurs in social contexts, especially those involving social evaluation (e.g., public speaking). Understanding situated emotional experience is critical because adaptive responding is guided by situational context (e.g., inferring the intention of another in a social evaluation situation vs. monitoring the environment in a physical danger situation). In an fMRI study, we assessed situated emotional experience using a newly developed paradigm in which participants vividly imagine different scenarios from a first-person perspective, in this case scenarios involving either social evaluation or physical danger. We hypothesized that distributed neural patterns would underlie immersion in social evaluation and physical danger situations, with shared activity patterns across both situations in multiple sensory modalities and in circuitry involved in integrating salient sensory information, and with unique activity patterns for each situation type in coordinated large-scale networks that reflect situated responding. More specifically, we predicted that networks underlying the social inference and mentalizing involved in responding to a social threat (in regions that make up the “default mode” network) would be reliably more active during social evaluation situations. In contrast, networks underlying the visuospatial attention and action planning involved in responding to a physical threat would be reliably more active during physical danger situations. The results supported these hypotheses. In line with emerging psychological construction approaches, the findings suggest that coordinated brain networks offer a systematic way to interpret the distributed patterns that underlie the diverse situational contexts characterizing emotional life