Property Rights Conservation and Development: An Analysis of Extractive Reserves in the Brazilian Amazon

The economic literature of property rights has been assessing the impact of different community based arrangements on the efficiency of natural resource management of specific areas. Differently, other strands of development economics and policy-oriented research have been concerned with issues such as poverty alleviation, technological progress and the capability to compete in market economies, which go beyond the local areas where traditional communities live and include the wider economy. The extractive reserves in the Brazilian Amazon offer perhaps one of the most interesting cases for investigating the connections between these two approaches in the context of tropical forests. It is based on the idea that the combination of public property with collective use in particular forest areas can generate competitive and, at the same time, sustainable exploitation of its natural resources. This paper aims to analyse whether the existing property rights support the joint objective of conservation and development. Our main result is that current property rights systems are efficient only with respect to competition in markets for existing extractive products. This finding points out to a fundamental contradiction between the static structure of the property rights systems and the dynamic nature of two most promising development paths, namely the discovery of new products and the supply of biological inputs for plantations. The current model of extractive reserves based on the design of internal property rights fails to taken into account the broader economic context where the reserves must generate a viable revenue stream. We conclude therefore that under the current set of institutions, the development objectives inherent in the extractive reserves model are likely to face probably considerable challenges to be accomplished in the future.Property rights, Extractive reserves, Environment and Development

Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits

We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. For single-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for indivisible items, but that there is a randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. The impossibility results hold for public budgets, while the mechanism allows private budgets, which is in both cases the harder variant to show. While all positive results are polynomial-time algorithms, all negative results hold independent of complexity considerations

Use of Ecolabels in Promoting Exports from Developing Countries to Developed Countries: Lessons from the Indian LeatherFootwear Industry

This paper tries to understand whether importers in the North are able to push exporters in the South towards sustainable production, with the help of a case study of the Indian leather industry. After providing a short description of the global leather footwear industry, the first section provides insights into the competitive advantages of different countries, characteristics of developing country exporters and the difference between large and small European buyers of Indian leather footwear. The subsequent section provides an insight into the different chains of influence that exist in trying to make international trade more sustainable with the help of a broad understanding of the means, their effectiveness, their constraints and a few examples of such chains of influence. Section four studies whether ecolabels are in a position to be suitable indicators of sustainability. Further it delves into understanding the perspectives of consumers, producers and regulators on whether ecolabels are useful in promoting sustainable exports. The explanation of how ecolabels conflict with brand dynamics is quite interesting. The policy measures provide clear options for targeting sustainable production. Suggestions include use of eco-elasticity indicator, toolbox approach to environment policy, introducing comprehensive sustainability labels, maintaining a level of mandatory legislations as well as a constructive effort to increase transparency in supply chains. The annexure include the research methodology adopted for the paper, the reason for choosing Europe as destination for the research, a brief overview about types of ecolabels and a small description of integrated product policies.Ecolabels, Export promotion, Leather footwear, Market access

Contextual advertising

Contextual advertising entails the display of relevant ads based on the content that consumers view, exploiting the potential that consumers' content preferences are indicative of their product preferences. This paper studies the strategic aspects of such advertising, considering an intermediary who has access to a content base, sells advertising space to advertisers who compete in the product market, and provides the targeting technology. The results show that contextual targeting impacts advertiser profit in two ways: First, advertising through relevant content topics helps advertisers reach consumers with a strong preference for their product. Second, heterogeneity in consumers' content preferences can be leveraged to reduce product market competition, especially when competition is intense. The intermediary has incentives to strategically design its targeting technology, sometimes at the cost of the advertisers. When product market competition is moderate, the intermediary offers accurate targeting such that the consumers see the most relevant ads. When competition is high, the intermediary lowers the targeting accuracy such that the consumers see less relevant ads. Doing so intensifies competition and encourages advertisers to bid for multiple content topics in order to prevent their competitors from reaching consumers. In some cases, this may lead to an asymmetric equilibrium where one advertiser bids high even for the content topic that is more relevant to its competitor. © 2012 INFORMS