Asymmetric connectedness of stocks: How does bad and good volatility spill over the U.S. stock market?

Asymmetries in volatility spillovers are highly relevant to risk valuation and portfolio diversification strategies in financial markets. Yet, the large literature studying information transmission mechanisms ignores the fact that bad and good volatility may spill over at different magnitudes. This paper fills this gap with two contributions. One, we suggest how to quantify asymmetries in volatility spillovers due to bad and good volatility. Two, using high frequency data covering most liquid U.S. stocks in seven sectors, we provide ample evidence of the asymmetric connectedness of stocks. We universally reject the hypothesis of symmetric connectedness at the disaggregate level but in contrast, we document the symmetric transmission of information in an aggregated portfolio. We show that bad and good volatility is transmitted at different magnitudes in different sectors, and the asymmetries sizably change over time. While negative spillovers are often of substantial magnitudes, they do not strictly dominate positive spillovers. We find that the overall intra-market connectedness of U.S. stocks increased substantially with the increased uncertainty of stock market participants during the financial crisis.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1405.244

Partner Selection in R&D Cooperation

In this paper we extend the R&D cooperation model to asymmetric firms, focusing on the incentives for cooperating with firms characterized by different levels of efficiency. Three firms differentiated by their cost levels invest in cost-reducing R&D before competing in output. Firms may cooperate in R&D, which implies both R&D coordination and perfect information sharing. It is found that firms’ preferences over whom to cooperate with depend on spillovers and on cost differences between firms. With low (high) spillovers, a firm prefers to cooperate with the most (least) efficient among the remaining firms. As the cost differential between firms increases, efficient (inefficient) firms prefer to cooperate with the most (least) efficient firm more often. For very high spillovers, a firm prefers to be excluded from R&D cooperation. The equilibrium configuration is that the most efficient firms cooperate for low spillovers, while all firms cooperate for intermediate spillovers. For high spillovers, the equilibrium is for all firms to cooperate when the cost differential is sufficiently low, but depends on the bargaining mechanism when the cost differential is high. The model constitutes a generalization of the standard R&D model with symmetric firms. Ce papier analyse les incitations à la coopération technologique entre des firmes différenciées par leur niveau d’efficacité. Trois firmes dotées de coûts de production différents investissent dans la R&D visant à réduire leurs coûts de production, avant de se concurrencer en quantités. Les firmes peuvent coopérer en R&D, ce qui implique la coordination des investissements en R&D et le partage d’information. Il est démontré que les préférences quant au choix du partenaire dépendent des externalités de recherche et du différentiel de coûts. Lorsque les externalités de recherche sont faibles (élevées), une firme préfère coopérer avec le partenaire le plus (moins) efficace qui est disponible. À mesure que le différentiel de coûts augmente, les firmes efficaces (inefficaces) préfèrent coopérer avec les partenaires les plus (moins) efficaces plus souvent. Pour des niveaux d’externalités très élevés, une firme préfère être exclue de la coopération en R&D. La configuration d’équilibre est que les firmes les plus efficaces coopèrent lorsque les externalités sont faibles, alors que toutes les firmes coopèrent pour des niveaux intermédiaires des externalités. Lorsque les externalités sont élevées, l’équilibre est que toutes les firmes coopèrent lorsque le différentiel de coûts est suffisamment faible, mais dépend de la structure de négociation lorsque ce différentiel est élevé. Le modèle constitue une généralisation du modèle de concurrence en R&D avec des firmes symétriques.asymmetric firms, R&D cooperation, R&D spillovers, research joint ventures, coopération en R&D, consortiums de recherche, firmes asymétriques, externalités de recherche

How to Stir Up FDI Spillovers: Evidence from a Large Meta-Analysis

The voluminous empirical research on horizontal productivity spillovers from foreign investors to domestic firms has yielded mixed results. In this paper, we collect 1,205 estimates of horizontal spillovers from the literature and examine which factors influence spillover magnitude. To identify the most important determinants of spillovers among 43 collected variables, we employ Bayesian model averaging. Our results suggest that horizontal spillovers are on average zero, but that their sign and magnitude depend systematically on the characteristics of the domestic economy and foreign investors. The most important determinants are the technology gap between domestic and foreign firms and the ownership structure in investment projects. Foreign investors who form joint ventures with domestic firms and who come from countries with a modest technology edge create the largest benefits for the domestic economy.Bayesian model averaging; Foreign direct investment; Productivity spillovers; Determinants; Meta-analysis

A restatement of the case for Scottish fiscal autonomy : or: the Barnett Formula - a formula for a Rake’s Progress

In this paper, we rebut the case that Ashcroft, Christie and Swales [ACS] (2006) make in favour of the status quo fiscal settlement in Scotland that stems from the Scotland Act 1998. This Act in creating the Scottish Parliament and Executive effectively separated public spending by the Scottish government from the need to raise taxes to finance it; rather, financing comes from Westminster through the Barnett formula. We do not think that these arrangements provide a stable political solution in the UK, as is evidenced by the so-called West Lothian question - a matter that may be becoming of greater concern in England than hitherto. Scotland, therefore, should be forewarned that even if it does not move from the status quo, movement might anyway be forced on it

Determinants of Horizontal Spillovers from FDI: Evidence from a Large Meta-Analysis

The voluminous empirical research on horizontal productivity spillovers from foreign investors to domestic firms has yielded mixed results. In this paper, we collect 1,205 estimates of horizontal spillovers from the literature and examine which factors influence spillover magnitude. To identify the most important determinants of spillovers among 43 collected variables, we employ Bayesian model averaging. Our results suggest that horizontal spillovers are on average zero, but that their sign and magnitude depend systematically on the characteristics of the domestic economy and foreign investors. The most important determinants are the technology gap between domestic and foreign firms and the ownership structure in investment projects. Foreign investors who form joint ventures with domestic firms and who come from countries with a modest technology edge create the largest benefits for the domestic economy.Bayesian model averaging, determinants, foreign direct investment, meta-analysis, productivity spillovers.

The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and Global Market Developments on Russian Financial Markets

This paper analyzes the impact of news, oil prices, and international financial market developments on daily returns on Russian bond and stock markets. First, regarding returns, energy news affects returns, while news from the war in Chechnya is not significant. Market volatility does not appear to be sensitive to either type of news. Second, a significant effect of the growth in oil prices on Russian stock returns is detected. Third, the international influence on Russian financial markets depends upon the degree of financial liberalization. The higher the degree of financial liberalization, the stronger is the impact of U.S. stock returns on Russian financial markets. In addition, banking reform and interest rate liberalization efforts seem to dictate the globalization of Russian stock markets, while it is the progress in liberalizing securities markets and non-bank financial institutions that matters more for the globalization of Russian bond markets.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40042/3/wp656.pd

Do Foreign Exchange Markets Matter Dor Industry Stock Returns ? An empirical investigation

In this paper, we develop a bivariate two factor-two country GARCH model of stock returns in order to investigate whether exchange rate fluctuations have a significant impact on the conditional mean, variance, and correlation of industry stock returns. Weekly data for seven industries in five European countries over the 1990-1998 period are used. We document that exchange rates have a significant effect on expected industry stock returns and on their volatility. The magnitude of this effect is, however, quite small. The contribution of the exchange rate factor to the time-varying correlation coefficients between two countries’industry returns is also very modest. The paper also shows that the importance of the exchange rate spillovers is influenced by the exchange rate regime, the magnitude and the direction of exchange rate shocks.Industry stock returns; Fx market; Volatility; International correlation

Let the Experts Decide? Asymmetric Information, Abstention, and Coordination in Standing Committees

We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure strategy equilibria-swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto Optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto Optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.

The Decentralization Tradeoff for Complementary Spillovers

We examine a symmetric two-district setting with spillovers of local public spending where a spill-in from the foreign spending is not a substitute, but a complement to domestic spending. Specifically, we assume production of two district-specific public goods out of two complementary district-specific inputs. We compare equilibria in non-cooperative decentralization and cooperative centralization for different spillovers, complementarities and cost-division rules, and control for the effects of strategic delegation and the feasibility of voluntary contributions to the input in the foreign district. We find that centralization welfare-dominates decentralization in most institutional settings and for a wide range of parameters, yet we can also identify necessary and sufficient conditions for decentralization to welfare-dominate centralization. The setup features three novelties: In the absence of transfers, welfare in decentralization increases in spillovers, strategic delegation in decentralization improves welfare, and centralized provision may be non-monotonic in spillovers.Spillover, Spill-in, Strategic complementarity, Decentralization theorem

Entry of Foreign Banks and their Impact on Host Countries

Foreign bank entry is frequently associated with spillover effects for local banks and increasing competition in the local banking market. We study the impact of these effects on host countries. In particular, we ask how these effects interact and how they depend on the competitive environment of the host banking market. An increasing number of banks is more likely to have positive welfare effects the more competitive the market environment, whereas spillovers are less likely to have positive welfare effects the stronger competition. Hence, competitive effects seem to reinforce each other, while spillovers and competition tend to weaken each other