On the average rank of LYM-sets

Let S be a finite set with some rank function r such that the Whitney numbers wi = |{x S|r(x) = i}| are log-concave. Given so that wk − 1 < wk wk + m, set W = wk + wk + 1 + … + wk + m. Generalizing a theorem of Kleitman and Milner, we prove that every F S with cardinality |F| W has average rank at least kwk + … + (k + m) wk + m/W, provided the normalized profile vector x1, …, xn of F satisfies the following LYM-type inequality: x0 + x1 + … + xn m + 1

Balanced Simplices on Polytopes

The well known Sperner lemma states that in a simplicial subdivision of a simplex with a properly labeled boundary there is a completely labeled simplex. We present two combinatorial theorems on polytopes which generalize Sperner's lemma.Using balanced simplices, a generalized concept of completely labeled simplices, a uni ed existence result of balanced simplices in any simplicial subdivision of a polytope is given.This theorem implies the well-known lemmas of Sperner, Scarf, Shapley, and Garcia as well as some other results as special cases.A second theorem which imposes no restrictions on the integer labeling rule is established; this theorem implies several results of Freund.

Combinatorial analogs of Brouwer's fixed point theorem on a bounded polyhedron

Bibliography: p.61-62.by Robert M. Freund

Computing economic equilibria by variable dimension algorithms: State of the art

Economics

07261 Abstracts Collection -- Fair Division

From 24.06. to 29.06.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07261 % generate automatically ``Fair Division\u27\u27 % generate automatically was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available

Unordered Error-Correcting Codes and their Applications

We give efficient constructions for error correcting unordered {ECU) codes, i.e., codes such that any pair of codewords are at a certain minimal distance apart and at the same time they are unordered. These codes are used for detecting a predetermined number of (symmetric) errors and for detecting all unidirectional errors. We also give an application in parallel asynchronous communications

From Points to Potlucks: An Exploration of Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Game Theory Models of Successful Integration Practices

Potlucks have many names: shared community dinners, faith suppers, “bring-a-dish” dinners, etc. They represent the desire to share food with other people and make new friends, sometimes learning about other cultures in the process. Not only does one have to decide what dish to bring, but one must also decide how large of a dish, if there will be a theme, and what course it will fit. For instance, if everyone brings side dishes, there will not be enough food for everyone, and if someone brings food that most of the group cannot eat, then feelings will be hurt on all sides. And in a way, having a potluck is similar to creating integration policies. Successful integration policies are fair to all people and take a “two-street” approach, while simultaneously being a collaborative affair. This paper will first explore fixed point theory, including the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem and Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem; fixed point theorems are a significant field of mathematics and have many well-known applications. One of these applications is game theory, which is the study of how rational actors make decisions in everyday situations. Building upon the mathematical aspects of the first few chapters and the basics of game theory, this paper aims to build its own game theory model called the “Potluck Metaphor” that will model several methods of integration in the European Union; context for the model will be provided by critiquing three primary integration models and a brief literature review of the related field. Starting off with a simple game theory model for a dinner party, this paper will then slowly expand these models to show their applicability to European integration policy on an organizational level and on a member-specific level