510 research outputs found
Data Querying with Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption
Data encryption limits the power and efficiency of queries. Direct processing
of encrypted data should ideally be possible to avoid the need for data
decryption, processing, and re-encryption. It is vital to keep the data
searchable and sortable. That is, some information is intentionally leaked.
This intentional leakage technology is known as "querying over encrypted data
schemes", which offer confidentiality as well as querying over encrypted data,
but it is not meant to provide flexible access control. This paper suggests the
use of Ciphertext Policy Attributes Based Encryption (CP-ABE) to address three
security requirements, namely: confidentiality, queries over encrypted data,
and flexible access control. By combining flexible access control and data
confidentiality, CP-ABE can authenticate who can access data and possess the
secret key. Thus, this paper identifies how much data leakage there is in order
to figure out what kinds of operations are allowed when data is encrypted by
CP-ABE
Privacy-Preserving Outsourced Media Search
International audienceThis work proposes a privacy-protection framework for an important application called outsourced media search. This scenario involves a data owner, a client, and an untrusted server, where the owner outsources a search service to the server. Due to lack of trust, the privacy of the client and the owner should be protected. The framework relies on multimedia hashing and symmetric encryption. It requires involved parties to participate in a privacy-enhancing protocol. Additional processing steps are carried out by the owner and the client: (i) before outsourcing low-level media features to the server, the owner has to one-way hash them, and partially encrypt each hash-value; (ii) the client completes the similarity search by re-ranking the most similar candidates received from the server. One-way hashing and encryption add ambiguity to data and make it difficult for the server to infer contents from database items and queries, so the privacy of both the owner and the client is enforced. The proposed framework realizes trade-offs among strength of privacy enforcement, quality of search, and complexity, because the information loss can be tuned during hashing and encryption. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness and the flexibility of the framework
CryptDB: A Practical Encrypted Relational DBMS
CryptDB is a DBMS that provides provable and practical privacy in the face of a compromised database server or curious database administrators. CryptDB works by executing SQL queries over encrypted data. At its core are three novel ideas: an SQL-aware encryption strategy that maps SQL operations to encryption schemes, adjustable query-based encryption which allows CryptDB to adjust the encryption level of each data item based on user queries, and onion encryption to efficiently change data encryption levels. CryptDB only empowers the server to execute queries that the users requested, and achieves maximum privacy given the mix of queries issued by the users. The database server fully evaluates queries on encrypted data and sends the result back to the client for final decryption; client machines do not perform any query processing and client-side applications run unchanged. Our evaluation shows that CryptDB has modest overhead: on the TPC-C benchmark on Postgres, CryptDB reduces throughput by 27% compared to regular Postgres. Importantly, CryptDB does not change the innards of existing DBMSs: we realized the implementation of CryptDB using client-side query rewriting/encrypting, user-defined functions, and server-side tables for public key information. As such, CryptDB is portable; porting CryptDB to MySQL required changing 86 lines of code, mostly at the connectivity layer
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